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ABSTRACT 
The thesis is a contribution to the literature on policymaking in 
business and government. By a critical examination of relevant published 
work in the field and by specific examples it seeks to demonstrate how 
the system dynamics modelling methodology can contribute to an 
improvement in the process of corporate and public policy design. 
It is argued that the relative lack of use of models in the policy 
process may now be reversed. This is, in part, because of the develop- 
ment of user-friendly interactive modelling software on personal com- 
puters together with large screen colour projection facilities. But the 
most important stimulus to the fulfilment of the potential of modelling 
work in these areas will come with a realisation by policy makers of the 
proper role of the model in the overall process. This is a central tenet 
of the thesis: the model provides a fulcrum for debate and enhanced 
understanding and should never be viewed as an 'answer generator'. All 
too often miscasting models in this latter role has, in the author9s 
view, seriously affected their adoption at the strategic policy level. 
Three specific examples are used to support the above line of argument. 
These are concerned with: 
M Technology policy and planning in the steel industry. A model is 
devised which addresses the crucial role of the blast furnace in an 
integrated steel works. The pursuit of economies of scale has led to 
larger and larger furnaces being installed. Given the often cyclical 
nature of customer demand for steel, together with forced interruptions 
to production in order to periodically reline the furnaces, it is argued 
that larger production units are not necessarily advisable. 
(ii) Public policy considerations arising from the AIDS epidemic. The 
spread of AIDS and the implications of this for health planning has taxed 
governments worldwide. A model is presented which captures the spread of 
HIV disease within the U. K. homosexual population and policy issues 
arising from model runs are discussed. This is in contrast to some other 
models which attempt to 9forecast2 the progress of the epidemic. 
(iii) Financial policy in a firm which failed (Laker Airways). This 
example differs from the other two in that the policy issues surrounding 
the firm's financial management are directed at students. They are the 
'clients' who would want to use this model in order to explore the 
implications of alternative strategic policies. System dynamics models 
of a real-life case study can be usefully harnessed in such a pedagogic 
role. 
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"One cannot teach a man anything. 
One can on17 enable him to learn from within himself. " 
Galileo. 
"I know that history at all times draws 
The strangest consequence from remotest cause. " 
T. S. Eliot. 
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I MODELS AND THE POLICY PROCESS 
I 
1.1 Introduction 
This is a thesis about policy. It examines the process of 
policy making in business and government along with the role 
which formal mathematical models, and System Dynamics models in 
particular, have played in contributing to that process. The 
premise is that strategic policy models will never play a more 
significant role in the future unless a fuller understanding of 
the precise nature of their role is more widespread amongst 
senior management and civil servants. 
Thus far, especially on this side of the Atlantic, the role of 
models in the policy process has been negligible which, in some 
ways, is rather surprising. Directors of large private-sector 
firms and senior civil servants and ministers are responsible 
for managing overtly complex, highly non-linear systems. Yet 
they seem prepared to discharge this task largely without 
recourse to methods and techniques which may augment their 
native wisdom. They prefer to verbalise with their immediate 
colleagues. Interaction with a human executive appears to be 
safer (and possibly less stressful) than interaction with an 
electronic one. 
Nonetheless 
-the objective advanced 
by this thesis is not an 
extravagant one. It is nothing more than a coherent plea for a 
slight shift in attitude on the part of those whose job it is 
to formulate policy. Having to wait, possibly two decades or 
more, for the boardrooms and ministerial committee rooms to 
become populated by a majority of individuals who are relaxed 
in terms of submitting themselves to a dialogue with a policy 
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model is p, erhaps one view of the way things might evolve. But 
valuable time is lost in this way. If the System Dynamics 
modelling community feel they can lay claim to a methodology 
which is possibly the only one in the management scientist's 
armoury capable of generating insight into the workings of com- 
plex economic, corporate and societal systems then they should 
be prepared unstintingly to sell that methodology. This 
research offers what the author considers to be the best way of 
going about the task of selling it. If policy makers can be 
persuaded to fully understand the role and function of a System 
Dynamics model then they may become more open-minded in their 
attitude to such models. Rather than wait while today9s 
business graduates reach senior positions, effective promulga- 
tion of System Dynamics policy models now might offer much ear- 
lier rewards. 
In the light of the foregoing, therefore, it should be clear 
that the work reported is as much a statement concerning the 
proper role for a System Dynamics model as it is a statement 
about specific applications to policy issues in the private and 
public sectors. Nonetheless three such examples are included: 
on technology policy in the UK steel industry (chapters 2 
and 3), on policy issues stemming from an epidemiological model 
of the spread of HIV/AIDS (chapter 4) and, finally, pedagogic 
lessons from a study of corporate financial collapse (chap- 
ter 5). 
The thesis does not attempt in any way to describe the basis of 
System Dynamics modelling. It is assumed that the reader is 
reasonably familiar with the method and will therefore under- 
stand the material in chapters 3 to 5. Various accounts of the 
page 3 
I 
methodology are available. These include books by Forrester 
(1968). Coyle (1977), Roberts et al (1983), a paper by Sahin 
(1980) and, most recently, a book by Wolstenholme (1990). 
Additionally, Wolstenholme (1982) and Wolstenholme and Coyle 
(1983) emphasise the strengths of the methodology in purely 
qualitative modelling, a feature some systems practitioners had 
lost sight of. 
1.2 Strategic planning and the use of models 
The salient objective of this thesis is to promote policy 
models. In order to provide a perspective from which to assess 
this objective it will be helpful initially to examine reported 
accounts of the extent to which modelling has been adopted at 
the strategic level. 
This review is confined to methods which are strictly 
associated with modelling at a strategic level of aggregation 
and some form of deterministic simulation model is normally 
employed for such purposes. By implication this means that 
Operational Research type optimising models (specifically 
mathematical programming) are excluded because these are not 
obviously time-based models. While it is conceded that large 
corporate-wide linear programming models have been built which 
involve time as one of the variable and coefficient subscripts, 
these models fall into the category of answer generators and 
are not most obviously useful for aiding policy analysis in the 
sense portrayed in this thesis. 
A study commonly referred to is that by Grinyer and Wooller 
(1975). Their exercise was repeated later (1978) and the 
results compared. In the earlier survey they studied 65 com- 
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panies with corporate models. They estimated from their 
research that about 9% of the largest UK companies already had 
or were developing such models. By 1978 the authors quoted 'a 
veritable explosion of corporate modelling and the figure is 
probably now in excess of 50% (of the top 1000 companies)'. 
They also attempted to discover whether companies found model- 
ling to be advantageous in the sense of whether the benefits 
exceeded the costs. A total of 55% of the sample were very 
positive on this aspect implying "successful" models, a further 
18% were fairly positive ("partly successful"). 
In a study carried out in the U. S. A. Naylor and Schauland 
(1976) reported that of 346 corporations who responded to their 
survey, of corporate modelling activities, 73% were either using 
or developing such a model and a further 15% were planning to 
develop a model. 
Higgins and Finn (1977a) surveyed 56 British organisations 
using a postal questionnaire mainly, although this was backed 
up by interviews in selected cases. Sixty per cent of respon- 
dents reported possessing either a financial or a corporate 
model. A comparison of the results of this and the Naylor and 
Schauland survey (extracted from Higgins (1985a)) is presented 
below. 
Naylor/Schauland 
Use Survey (%) 
Evaluation of policy 
alternatives 79 
Financial projections 75 
Long-term planning 73 
(Analysis for) decision 
making 58 
Short-term planning 56 
Preparation of (financial) 
reports 47 
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Higgins/Finn 
Survey 
63 
88 
81 
44 
38 
44 
Table 1.1 Uses of corporate models: a comparison from two surveys 
While a healthy percentage report the use of strategic models 
for the "evaluation of policy alternatives" and in general the 
adoption of "corporate modelling" is quite high across all the 
surveys, it-is difficult to disagree with an inference that the 
models concerned are primarily financial. Indeed Higgins 
(1985b) asserts that models using deterministic financial 
simulation were the most common ones in use for corporate 
modelling. In their results reporting the principal model 
users Higgins and Finn quote over 70% in use by accountants, 
53% in use by planners and 59% in use by directors. In addi- 
tion the Naylor and Schauland survey reports the most popular 
areas of application were cash flow analysis, financial 
forecasting, balance sheet projections, financial analysis, 
profit planning and budgeting. 
In the results from the Higgins and Finn survey, the emphasis 
on 'plans' was quite marked. Mention was made of "making bet- 
ter plans" or "being able to planýin more detail". as a result 
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of having a corporate model. By contrast no mention was made 
of managerial learning or improved understanding as a benefit. 
This buttresses the conclusion that little use is made of the 
sort of corporate models which are the subject of this thesis. 
Most emphasis seems to be on those models which lend themselves 
to the production of formal print-outs which then pass as the 
9Corporate Plan9. 
In a follow-up article to their earlier one in the same jour- 
nal, Higgins and Finn (1977b) report on future possibilities 
for corporate modelling and these seem quite encouraging. 
Asked if they would use a corporate model to try out strategic 
decisions, 46% of their respondents said they definitely would 
while a further 22% said they might. So just over two-thirds 
of the sample had positive attitudes towards the utility of 
corporate models. An even larger proportion (75%) answered 
'yes' to the question "would you personally authorise the buil- 
ding of a corporate model, given the availability of resources, 
if your company did not possess one? ". The split of the 75% 
comprised 59% who had had some experience in the use of 
corporate models and a further 16% with none. 
It- is clear from the results of this survey that there is a 
reservoir of goodwill towards the idea of using a corporate 
model, which must be encouraging for the proponents of system 
dynamics models in a strategic policy support role. , Although 
this type of 'corporate model' is quite different to the type 
implied by the Higgins and Finn survey, it is to be hoped that 
the goodwill has lasted to the present day when the potential 
for the use of system dynamics models is that much greater, not 
least because of the recent implementations of software for 
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system dynamics on microcomputers. 
The bias of corporate models towards the finance and accounting 
function is corroborated by a later survey undertaken by Hig- 
gins and Opdebeeck (1984). Although the survey was principally 
addressing the use of microcomputers, the information was col- 
lected from 106 senior finance executives. Forty-six companies 
responded and almost without exception the model application 
was overtly financial. While this surely does not mean that 
only financial executives are involved with modelling, the fact 
that this category were targetted by the survey authors pos- 
sibly implies that they did not expect much use of corporate 
modelling on a microcomputer outside of the financial area. An 
update of this entire area of corporate modelling can be found 
in Shim and McGlade (1984). 
One insight derived from these surveys is particularly 
pertinent. It is clear that for directors, senior executives 
and (in the public policy arena) ministers, money is virtually 
the only metric in use. To those who wish to promulgate System 
Dynamics type models for analysing policy issues in corporate 
and governmental systems, the message is quite clear: money is 
the metric which should be used as a performance criterion. It 
is no coincidence that, in two of the three example models 
described in later chapters, financial measurements feature 
strongly. If System Dynamics models are to be more effectively 
promulgated then, as far as possible, they should employ the 
language of those to whom the models are directed. 
Recent surveys of System Dynamics modelling activity, while not 
exclusively directed at its use in business and government, 
have produced only mildly encouraging results. For instance, a 
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survey by Sandra Joy (1988) attempts to assess the state of 
system dynamics in the United Kingdom. Although it is tempting 
to criticise an unpublished piece of work such as this, there 
are nonetheless important messages coming from the survey which 
she conducted. Its objective was "to assess the potential for 
the growth of the subject of system dynamics in the U. K. ". 
Her orientation was clearly the role of system dynamics within 
the "systems movement" (a more 'academic' orientation) and not 
an exploration of its pragmatic role in corporate strategic 
policy making which is the purpose of this thesis. Of the 66 
questionnaires she distributed, only 16 were completed by non- 
academics and, of these, only 3 returned the supplement to the 
questionnaire specially created for people working in industry. 
(Analysis of this was duly abandoned. ) Whether this indicates 
a lack of co-operation with academic surveys by those working 
in industry, an inability to uncover enough contacts in the 
industrial sector or a reflection of the truth about system 
dynamics in the UK is not addressed. But the message from the 
result, taken at face value, is that the majority of prac- 
titioners are in the academic sector. Indeed, Joy states that 
there are only four key practitioners in the UK and they are 
all in academic institutions! 
Her final analysis, though, is encouraging. The use of system 
dynamics is clearly on an upward trend. Some 70% of respon- 
dents thought they were spending more time on system dynamics 
work than they did 10 years ago and the subject is "definitely 
increasing in popularity and it is growing". 
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The survey conducted by Wils (1988) reached - some 200 prac- 
titioners world-wide but seems to be heavily biased towards 
members of the System Dynamics Society and workers at academic 
and government institutions. The survey, prompted by the Dutch 
Department of Science Policy, like that of Joy makes for 
interesting reading. Twenty-seven out of fifty-six question- 
naires were returned from people in Western Europe. Again 
there was a marked lack of any mention of system dynamics in 
use in the private sector which confirms the suspicion that few 
people in this sector either use system dynamics regularly or 
are aware of its potential. The picture which must be inferred 
is that, whenever system dynamics is used within a private 
firm, it is often for a specific one-off project. Industrial 
practitioners feel no great loyalty to the method. Some 
academics, on the other hand, are teaching and researching the 
material regularly and see a continuing involvement with the 
subject. This is not particularly unexpected but the general 
inference does indicate that there is extensive opportunity to 
arouse the interest of managers in the private sector in 
Western Europe, principally because so few seem to have used it 
so farl 
In the USA on the other hand there is apparently much more 
extensive use of the method by private sector companies and, by 
the government, in particular for determining energy policy. 
Many consultancies have grown up in the Boston area and are 
experiencing heavy demand for their services in building system 
dynamics models - -- for clients all over the country. The 
demand is not the result of particularly heavy advertising but 
rather information spread by word of mouth. 
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It has been stated earlier on in this thesis that the adoption 
of modelling tools for strategic policy is much more extensive 
on the other side of the Atlantic and the results from Wils' 
survey seem to concur with that view (though, curiously, not 
for Canada where it is said to be $stagnating"). What is 
encouraging, however, is the tone of many of the responses made 
by practitioners of system dynamics. Clearly they see it in 
the same light as the message of this thesis and the following 
collection of comments reflects this: 
"The ability to look at a wide range of scenarios 
clearly and quickly is becoming of greater 
importance". 
"The focus is shifting towards long term, high-tech 
scenarios and non-equilibrium situations. This 
provides an opportunity for system dynamics". 
"S7stem d7namics is for learning more than problem 
solving". 
"Practising system dynamics a ims at changing 
people's way of thinking and organisations, ways of 
behaving, but people and organisations have a great 
resistance to change". 
Wils own comments in assessing and synthesising the responses 
he had received are though t-p r ovoking, none more so than the 
comments surrounding what he calls a 'new realisation' of the 
practice of management. 
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"The new realisation is that in practice the actual 
behaviour of managers is mostly controlled by, to a 
large extent, unconscious mental models. Zt does 
not suffice to have the right answers. What mat- 
ters is to offer managers, in addition, a learning 
environment In which they are helped: 
- to observe the differences between actual reality 
and expected reality; 
- to interpret the actual reality, so that the 
right answers are found; and 
- to experiment and practice the new answers so 
that these can become integrated In their mental 
models". 
Wils9 report ought to be seen as a catalyst for an agenda which 
practitioners on this side of the Atlantic should address. 
They must be prepared to promote the system dynamics method 
but, more importantly, do so by showing how it can best be 
employed. It is not sufficient merely to promulgate its tech- 
nicalities. Unless this is prefaced by an exposition of the 
most effective way of 'utilising such a potentially powerful 
tool, anything that follows is likely to be misunderstood. If 
such an exposition can be put across to senior'managers and 
civil servants, providing it concentrates on the themes of 
'strategic policy-making9,9scenarios9 and "managerial lear- 
ning9 it should excite the curiosity of the intended clientele 
into wanting to know more about the method. An imminent reces- 
sion in this country could be a contributory stimulus, for 
strategic policy issues are quite likely to occupy centre stage 
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in many companies, internal deliberations, over the next twelve 
months or so. 
Already, mention has been made of how the appropriate role for 
system dynamics modelling can be easily miscast by those not 
thoroughly familiar with the subject. For instance, Naylor 
(1983) seems to connect the "Limits to Growth" study (Meadows 
et al, 1972) with forecasting when it was nothing more than a 
set of global scenarios capable of interpretation only by com- 
parison of one with another. Now there is further evidence in 
a recent book on strategic policy by Dyson (1990). He correc- 
tly draws a distinction between deterministic financial simula- 
tion models incorporating only definitional relationships (and, 
it must be said, devoid of feedback influences) and behavioural 
simulation models. based on system dynamics. However, he fails 
to make a sufficiently strong connection between the latter 
type of model and scenarios, which are treated quite separately 
in his book under a section headed "Assessment of Uncertainty". 
His statement that "Corporate modelling and system dynamics 
models are modelling methods aimed explicitly at providing a 
formal corporate system model of the organisation" smacks of 
the all-embracing type of model. No mention is made of addres- 
sing specific policy issues through system dynamics and 
moreover the emerging concept of managerial learning does not 
seem to figure at all. However he certainly confirms the 
conclusion reached by Sandra Joy with his assertion that, "In 
recent years there has been a growing interest in the develop- 
ment of behavioural simulation models using ideas of system 
dynamics". 
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It is people employed at director (or equivalent) level to 
which the contents of this thesis are addressed yet there is 
just no current information available as to the type of models 
(if any) being used by this specific group. This informational 
vacuum concerning strategic policy models should be remedied 
urgently. The present author would now like to see a large 
survey conducted to investigate the extent of use of any type 
of model to support strategic policy making in business and 
government. The incipient recession could make such a venture 
particularly timely. Instead of practitioners, managers and 
civil servants would be targetted in order to elicit the views 
of the people who ultimately matter. The various types of 
model employed would emerge from the results of such a survey 
along with the extent of use of such models. 
Besides the detailed factual information concerning the type of 
models employed, the survey should elicit senior managers9 and 
directors9 attitudes to embracing a modelling input in the 
first place. It would be interesting to know, for instance, if 
only a handful of system dynamics studies were conducted but 
they were very well received and led to some change in 
behaviour whereas a significant number of spreadsheet' type 
models were created but received little support from policy- 
makers, although the Higgins and Finn (1977b) survey certainly 
gave some evidence of positive attitudes to the use of such 
models. To avoid problems of comparability which have bedevil- 
led surveys in the past, perhaps the same survey instrument 
could be disseminated to firms and government agencies on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
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1.3 Time-based methods for modelling: a review 
Within the field of management science there are just a few 
techniques which come anywhere near to being able to further 
the development of effective policy analysis. All of these 
have the characteristic that they are time-based. In their 
normal mode of use, they portray each constituent variable 
flowing over time. Because directors and others responsible 
for strategic policy are forever making mental projections of 
the effects of their collective policy choices it therefore 
seems sensible to limit feasible modelling techniques to those 
which, similarly, project behaviour over time. A consideration 
of these techniques now follows. 
Discrete-event simulation 
Few would deny the successes enjoyed by discrete-event simula- 
tion in management science. It has been used by many analysts 
for studies ranging from the design of a float glass line 
(Marks et al., 1982) to the organisation of a hospital X-ray 
department (O'Kane, 1981). Its progress is reviewed by Crookes 
(1982) and the relatively new development of visual interactive 
modelling is covered by Hurrion (1980) and Hollocks (1983) 
amongst others. 
Unfortunately, discrete-event simulation is of no use for 
strategic policy studies in organisations. Case studies of 
problems dealt with by such methods inevitably describe tac- 
tical or operational issues and while it is recognised that 
some operational matters have what might be termed strategic 
overtones (e. g. the design of a complete new assembly line) 
these do not relate to strategic policy-making in the sense 
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that System Dynamics does, with its emphasis on stability, 
growth, retrenchment, the reversal of decline or the interac- 
tion of an organisation with its economic environment (includ- 
ing competitors). 
Discrete event simulation deals with entities -- single items 
such as a product, a machine or an operative -- which are 
programmed to mimic the real life system that they belong to. 
They take part in activities -- a live, state in which someth- 
ing is happening to them or they are doing something, for exam- 
ple an operative working on his machine -- or they are in a 
'dead' state called a queue, for example an operative resting 
or awaiting further work. These are all detailed concepts'at a 
low level of aggregation in the organisation, reflecting the 
bias towards operational issues manifest in discrete event 
simulation studies of, say, inventory control or queueing and 
congestion problems. System Dynamics studies are always con- 
ducted at a high level of aggregation where individual entities 
are lost in the blur. Strategic issues do not involve machines 
or operatives; Boards of Directors are interested only in the 
total company situation or at least that embracing major 
product groupings. 
To many this may appear self-evident, but the number of texts 
which couple System Dynamics with discrete-event simulation 
modelling is not insignificant and it suggests a lack of under- 
standing by some authors of what should be the essential 
purpose of System Dynamics modelling, a focussed exposition of 
which is the primary objective of this thesis. 
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1.3.2 Financial (spreadsheet) modelling 
The personal computer revolution has propelled "business model- 
ling" software into prominence and it is likely thqt few 
managers or planners have not heard of LOTUS 1-2-3 or EXCEL, to 
quote just two of the leading examples. While mainframe 
software for this type of modelling predates the take-up of 
personal computers (for example, FCS-EPS (EPS Consultants, 
1984) which is still very widely used) its rate of adoption 
has, in all probability, been seriously affected by the PC- 
based offerings. (FCS-EPS is, however, now available on a PC 
as MICRO-FCS. ) Not that this matters in reviewing its 
suitability for strategic policy modelling: all such software 
posses*ses the same basic underlying principle -- the spread- 
sheet. I 
Unlike System Dynamics models, spreadsheet models have no 
conceptual underpinnings. The variables are entered as num- 
bered rows, either derivable from other variables or read in as 
data, while time is represented through the columns, which can 
be lettered in some packages. Perhaps the only underpinning is 
that accountants have traditionally written out such 
arrangements on large sheets of paper, with the assistance only 
of a calculator if one was availablel 
Spreadsheet models have been rapidly embraced by the accounting 
profession and it is true that they are almost always used for 
financial modelling. But they do not really deserve to be 
described as "business models" or "corporate models" inferring, 
as this does, some utility for dealing with strategic issues. 
Admittedly the financial aspects of a firm's operations are 
very important, but excessive concentration on policy from a 
0 
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purely financial angle can be shortsighted. The language of 
the accountant is not always the most effective language for 
strategic planning. 
If the ubiquity of the information feedback process is accep- 
ted, trying to program such a notion into a spreadsheet model 
would be fraught with difficulty. Commonly, the first few 
lines of logic in a typical spreadsheet model include something 
like the following, using FCS-EPS syntax. 
10 9VOLUME9 
12 'PRICE/UNIT9 
14 9REVENUE9=10*12 
Elsewhere a data file would exist containing what are effec- 
tively forecasts of volume and price per unit. This data is 
exogenous to the model and, therefore, unaffected by what 
unfolds in the model as time creeps forward. For instance, an 
increase in labour costs may well force an upward revision of 
prices; this in turn could seriously affect volume sold. 
However, volume, being input exogenously, is unaffected by 
price changes as far as the model is concerned. The required 
feedback has to be introduced manually by the analyst in the 
form of "what if? " runs. In other words, separate runs have 
to be carried out to assess the effect of changes which in a 
System Dynamics type formulation can be allowed to happen 
automatically in the model. With the feedback loop as a 
conceptual framework, the policy levers programmed into the 
System Dynamics model can be expected to react to endogenously 
occurring state changes in a manner which accords with the 
strategic hypothesis that the model aims I to represent. 
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Another example, similar to the above, concerns the area of 
corporate finance. Strategic policy here often centres on the 
gearing ratio (the ratio of debt to equity held by the firm). 
A financial modelling approach would almost invariably regard 
the gearing ratio as an output measure, yet a highly geared 
firm is not going to be looked on sympathetically by any mer- 
chant bank to whom a request for loan capital was made. Such a 
request would be all the more likely in a firm saddled with 
debt, for a high proportion of the cash inflow might be used in 
making interest payments on earlier loans. Also, the attrac- 
tiveness of new share issues from a highly geared firm is 
diminished in line with its standing in the community of 
potential investors. So in these contexts the gearing ratio is 
very much an input measure. The influence diagram below cap- 
tures the essential interrelationships here. 
New Issue Subscription 
Rate by Investors 
1 00, ft-A - 
Financial Desired Credit 
standing 
/ 
Borrowing Worthiness 
R--., JL '40ý I 
+ earing + Actual Rati +Borrowing 
Figure 1.1 Gearing as an input and an output measure 
Using TABLE functions, it would be relatively simple to capture 
these feedback processes in a System Dynamics model, whereas 
using a spreadsheet it would be extremely difficult, if not 
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impossible, to accomplish. The feedback would have to be 
introduced manually by, the analyst repeat-running the model in 
"what-if? " mode. 
1.3.3 Forecasting 
It is probably true to say that, of all the available methods, 
forecasting enjoys the most frequent use as a tool in the 
strategic planning process. Indeed, a few authors would go as 
far as to virtually equate strategic planning with forecasting. 
At a seminar on quantitative strategic planning held in London 
(Society for Strategic and Long Range Planning, 1985) a 
representative of British Airways commented that ordinary least 
squares (OLS) models tempered by judgement were found to be the 
most successful in use. 
It is difficult to agree with this opinion because, as Eden and 
Harris (1975) point out, it is a manifestation of support for a 
rather strange proposition. This proposition is 
11 ..... that the past states of a single variable in 
a social system are only a direct function of time 
rather than related to events associated,, with a 
number of variables which, occurred at particular 
times. 11, 
Papers in the forecasting literature by Naylor (1983) and Capon 
and Hulbert (1985) have examined the relationship between 
strategic planning and forecasting. In the more recent of the 
two papers Capon and Hulbert argue that forecasting for 
strategic planning requires a multi-scenario approach involving 
a number of "what if? " forecasting runs. This distinguishes 
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it from 'operational forecasting which is apt to take as given 
the firm's objectives and strategies. But while a move away 
from the naive operational forecasting approach is welcome, the 
thrust is still directed at forecasting -- some form of 
extrapolation, however crude or sophisticated the chosen 
approach is. 
The purpose of a System Dynamics model is not to predict how a 
system will exist at a particular point of time in the future; 
its purpose is to ensure the system will do what it was inten- 
ded to do under any circumstances in the future. Many authors 
do not appreciate this basic feature of System Dynamics models. 
Even Thomas Naylor (1983), a well-respected American author of 
texts on corporate simulation modelling, states 
rt , .... global simulation models, such as those by 
Jay Forrester and Dennis & Donella Meadows and 
others, seem to have a certain mystique about them 
that is independent of their forecasting accuracy 
or lack thereof". 
With System Dynamics the emphasis switches from forecasting the 
future to designing policies which are robust enough to 
insulate the corporate system from environmental shocks and yet 
allow it to grasp opportunities. While this is easy to say it 
is far from easy to implement because forecasting 
(extrapolating) is something almost all firms attempt. Sug- 
gesting a firm might drop the practice could well be 
organisationally unacceptable. 
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But while it is recognised that it is likely to be unacceptable 
to recommend that a firm cease to carry on the practice of 
forecasting, it must be somewhat risky for the same firm to 
place their trust in the supposition that the past is still a 
good guide to the future. This may well have been the case in 
the 19609s and early 19709s but now the economic environment is 
characterised by sudden discontinuities (Drucker, 1980). It is 
hardly the setting for effective use of statistical forecasting 
as an aid to strategic planning and policy design. 
The engineering sciences have a long tradition of using dynamic 
models in technological design studies. Here, System Dynamics 
type models are the norm not the exception. Admittedly, the 
approach 'differs in detail, for engineering models are usually 
structured more closely to the differential and integral 
equations involved and the computer languages (e. g. CSMP, 
ISIS, CSL) used for theiý solution rely on this feature. Yet 
these languages are members of the same generic grouping, cal- 
led Continuous System Simulation Languages (CSSL), to which the 
System Dynamics simulation languages belong. The basic 
philosophy of the modelling approach adopted, that of closed 
loop information feedback, is exactly the same in the version 
used by the engineering sciences as it is in the version adop- 
ted by the management and economic sciences. 
One example of an engineering application of a dynamic model is 
in process control. The control strategy is to determine how 
to change a control input so that any deviation'between desired 
and actual values of the process output is minimised. In 
essence, the idea is to keep the process variables at their set 
points. The problem is compounded by the fact that most 
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processes possess inertia or lag: a sudden change in the 
control input will not result in an equally sudden change in 
the output. 
To be more specific, the example might be from polymerisation 
control. The temperature in a jacketed reactor is controlled 
by manipulating the flow of coolant in the jacket. If there 
was likely to be a sudden change in the temperature, the design 
features of the plant (determined from the dynamic modelling 
studies) would accomodate the change and contain it. The 
notion of not incorporating those design features but of attem- 
pting instead to forecast the future temperatures in the reac- 
tor is, clearly ridiculous but that is, in effect, an analogy of 
the methods by which many business firms go about their 
strategic planning. 
1.3.4 Macro-economic forecasting 
The view contained in this section, that statistically based 
forecasting procedures are an ineffective means of shaping the 
ground for strategic policy design, applies equally well at the 
level of the national economy as it does at the level of the 
individual corporate group. National economic policy is a 
central aspect of public policy and economic forecasting 
attracts significant publicity. Considerable sums are devoted 
to the maintenance and development of econometric models. For 
instance, in 1985 the Economic & Social Research Council in the 
U. K. reported ongoing support for macro-economic modelling 
research of an amount in excess of E2.6 million (Economic and 
Social Research Council, 1985). Virtually all of this research 
concerns the use of econometric models for forecasting the 
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exact numerical values of various critical economic variables 
such as G. N. P., the balance of payments or the rate of 
inflation. Here is a perf ect example of an over-emphasis on 
forecasting to the apparent exclusion of research on the struc- 
ture and workings of the U. K. economy tied to the design of 
policies which will further its efficiency. 
To seek to improve numerical forecasting of performance 
measures for a system whose complex workings are, at best, ill- 
understood is seemingly to put the cart before the horse. So 
as to illustrate this point consider which of the two following 
statements is likely to be most useful to those directly 
concerned with the management of the U. K. economy: 
* "Earnings inflation is rising and is forecast to be 14% 
higher in a yearld time. " 
"The output graph shows that the policy adopted in the 
educational sector, which has had the effect of cutting-back 
the rate of flow of skilled recruits for all levels of 
industry, is subsequently causing overheating in the industrial 
sector as firms are being forced to pay significant wage and 
salary increases in order to retain skilled staff. The 
variable reflecting Trade Union pressure can be seen to be 
virtually stagnant and so little or no effect on earnings can 
be attributed from this source. " 
The latter statement could plausibly emerge from a System 
Dynamics model of the U. K. economy, which would capture the 
rich interactions between the flows of people and money, while 
the former would be that associated with a statistically-based 
forecasting model. The statement associated with the forecast- 
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ing exercise is empty of significantly useful content and tends 
to produce a policy response equally lacking in substance and 
one which addresses the symptoms and not the cause, for exam- 
ple: 
"Prepare the political ground for another incomes policy-" 
On the other hand, the policy prescription emanating from the 
systems model might be: 
"An urgent investment in the numbers going through further and 
higher education is necessary so as to increase the rate of 
flow of well-educated and trained recruits for the industrial 
sector. " 
It is not immediately apparent why economists should hold a 
monopoly on commentary about a country's economic performance 
and yet the media turn exclusively to that profession when 
requiring informed comment on the latest economic news in the 
K. Management systems scientists have only themselves to 
blame about this state of affairs. The lack of a U. K. 
economic model utilising a paradigm other than econometrics 
means that no professional group have yet offered an alter- 
native to the econometric models which attract so much 
publicity. Only two references describing System Dynamics 
models of the U. K. economy are known to the author (Hobbs, 
1981; Tomkins, 1978) and in only the former case does the work 
seem to have been continued. 
For years now, articles in the operational research literature 
have lamented its lack of impact on strategic issues. This is 
fair comment, for the practice of O. R. to date can arguably be 
summed up as concentration on improved decision making to the 
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neglect of policy making. A systems model of the economy which 
eschewed forecasting as its ultimate purpose and attempted 
instead to achieve a better understanding of the complex 
interrelationships in a modern economy would go f ar towards 
redressing this imbalance. Statistical macro-economic 
forecasting rarely aids understanding of the processes at work 
in the economy. At best such models lack transparency to the 
(predominantly) laypeople who manage our economy and who desire 
a better understanding of the workings of the system. At worst 
econometric models are nothing more than data mining in an 
effort to push coefficients of determination as near to 1.0 as 
possible. 
1.4 The distinction between policy-making and decision-taking 
In a previous section it was pointed out that discrete event 
simulation methods were not appropriate for policy analysis 
because they were suite d only for looking at the movement of 
individual items or people in an operational setting. In 
essence, then, the technique of discrete event simulation is 
ideal for aiding tactical decision making, usually the province 
of middle managers. 
It is necessary to clearly distinguish between policies and 
decisions because steering on organisation involves only the 
former. The material in this thesis is addressed to those at 
the top of the organisational ýhierarchy and policy-making is 
their raison d9etre. The ability with which they discharge 
their ' role directly affects the performance of the 
organisation. While poor decision, making can be compensated, 
poor policy can result in under-performance or even collapse of 
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the enterprise (see chapter 5 on this particular aspect). 
It is not always possible to identify a policy as such because 
it is not written down, it is merely implied by the collective 
actions of the board of directors. Sometimes, though, policy 
can be quite specific: 
"This firm will refuse additional orders once the unfilled 
order backlog exceeds XOOO units". 
In other situations it might have to be deduced from action 
taken. If, in a situation of declining demand for a firm's 
major product, finished goods stocks are allowed to climb 
before any moves are made to shed direct labour then clearly 
the policy is implicit in the action taken. Nonetheless, there 
is a definite policy choice available here. output could be 
tied much more directly to the level of customer demand which 
might mean greater volatility in the size of the labour force. 
Allowing finished goods stock levels to vary instead reflects 
the direction of the policy choice. 
A choice between policies is also apparent on the question of 
the timing of major capital investments. Directors are almost 
always involved in these issues. They could choose a policy of 
sanctioning capital investment in times of a business slumP9 
but it seems that few firms are proactive in this respect. 
Action to procure additional plant and machinery is most often 
instigated only after it has been shown that existing capacity 
is fully utilised. This policy choice has implications for the 
size of order backlogs and the reaction of customers to 
delivery delays. It can even disturb financial stability if a 
new investment comes on stream just after the market has 
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experienced a downturn. 
A policy can be viewed as an overall framework within which 
individual decisions are taken. Without some sort of policy 
guidance from senior management, decision making by middle 
management becomes a set of ad hoe exercises and, occasionally, 
this will lead to continual 9fire-fighting'. 
As examples of policies providing a framework for decision 
making, consider the following. A consumer goods manufacturer 
might have a policy never to accept orders below a certain 
total value. So, if a small order comes in from a remote out- 
post in the Highlands, the order handling department can lose 
no time (or sleep) in making the decision to return it. 
The second example illustrates how discretion can be built into 
policies. Parliament can lay down a policy of maximum 
sentences for certain types of crime. Individual judges can 
then make a decision as to the appropriate sentence for each 
individual defendant found guilty. This decision would be made 
in the light of the circumstances of each case. 
The department in which the author has conducted this research 
has a very detailed policy for the honours classification of 
undergraduate degrees. The policy guidelines were drawn. up 
some four years ago in response to an apparent lack of 
consistency in the treatment of candidates between one year and 
the next and also across the spectrum of candidates in any one 
year. While a certain amount of discretion is built in at the 
margin, it is noticeable that decisions about individual can- 
didates are now made much more promptly and with little rancour 
between examiners than was the case certainly five years ago. 
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1.5 Desirable characteristics of models used for Policy 
Analysis 
For effective policy analysis in business and government it is 
posited that the modelling methodology employed should exhibit 
the following characteristics: 
M Be capable of providing insights into the workings of 
complex managerial feedback systems so as to influence the 
formulation of policy by moderating attitudes. 
(ii) Not be seen as an 'answer generator' (the implied label 
for many Operational Research techniques) but be capable of 
adopting the role of a fulcrum for informed discussion and 
debate on policy evaluations. Rather than being convergent it 
should be the exact opposite. Explorations with the model 
should highlight unexpected features of the system or 
inconsistencies which require additional research. By this 
means policy-makers learn; their mental models are enhanced. 
(iii) Be capable of using the nomenclature of the Policy 
makers. Variables should be written down as English text (or 
by using mnemonics) and Greek or other similarly confusing 
notation avoided altogether. 
(iv) Incorporate associated diagramming tools which allow 
policy makers to follow the underlying influences captured 
within model equations. 
(v) Allow the inclusion of relationships based on beliefs or 
judgement. The admissibility of such influences brings a 
richer variety into the model but implies a revision of 
attitudes concerning rigour and precision. With many of the 
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judgemental relationships it may not be possible to offer any 
formal statistical proof of their existence. I 
Generate output in the form of time series graph plots 
with numerical data acting only as a backup when detailed 
figures are required. 
The first two characteristics are vitally important. Most 
people involved with policy design are extremely senior and 
often powerful individuals. They are not likely to cherish 
being told what to do by a computerised strategic planning 
model. Nor should they. Rarely in complex policy analyses is 
there an ideal result. Policy choices exist certainly, but a 
small number of those choices are likely to yield a range of 
outcomes which involve trade-offs. The role of the model is to 
aid the policy makers in evaluating such trade-offs. If fac- 
tions develop around the boardroom table then each faction can 
use the model as an objective benchmark through which com- 
parative scenarios can be judged. Differing mental models (the 
source of the conflict) may then be ironed out to yield just 
one which commands -widespread support. An example of a model 
(not incidentally a system dynamics model) being used in just 
this way, and in an area as remote from business or government 
as you could imagine, is recited in the next section. 
All of the above characteristics are consonant with a basic 
maxim concerning the successful use of models in the policy 
process, namely that the client and the analyst should work 
jointly on the construction of the model. Eden and Harris 
(1975) suggest that the joint approach 
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becomes more viable the more analysts move 
away from the concept of optimising models involv- 
ing sophisticated mathematical techniques to 
dynamic simulation models such as those associated* 
with system dynamics. A model of a complex system 
can be easy to depict and develop when it uses 
constructs that are preceived to relate closely to 
the real system. " 
1.6 To the top of Everest with the aid of a strategy model 
One of the most interesting accounts of the way in which a 
model can be used to clarify thinking about policy and strategy 
is to be found in an unlikely source. In 1975 Chris Bonnington 
led an expedition to climb Everest by the South-West face: the 
hardest route to the summit. That they were successful is now 
a huge milestone in mountaineering history. In Appendix 2 of a 
book published a year later, Bonnington (1976) recounts how a 
computer model had aided his thinking about how to tackle the 
climb. He was responsible for 18 climbers, 60 sherpas and a 
large quantity of tentage, food, gas cartridges, oxygen cylin- 
ders and climbing gear. It was a formidable logistical problem 
irrespective of the climb itself. 
Bonnington had used the services of Comshare Ltd (a computer 
time-sharing bureau) prior to an earlier expedition. A climb- 
ing friend, Ian McNaught Davis, happened to be managing direc- 
tor of Comshare and so offered the use of one of his staff at 
that time. Unfortunately the earlier expedition had been put 
together in something of a rush and full use of the computer 
model had not been made. However, Bonnington states that.... 
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(the computer model) 
"had shown me its value as a means, not so much of 
finding the perfect logistic answer, but one of 
checking out one's own planning thinking". 
In 1975 rather more use was to be made of a computer model. 
Stephen Taylor (the Comshare programmer who devised the model) 
used the APL programming language for the task and by April 
1975 was able to visit Bonnington for three days and make final 
adjustments to the code. During May, and usually working late 
at night, Bonnington (in the Lake District) would be in 
telephone contact with Taylor (in the basement of Comshare's 
London offices) with suggestions to run through the model. 
Taylor would report back the results and Bonnington suggested 
further moves. So these 'conversations' with the assembled 
model progressed. In fact, using the computer Bonnington never 
reached 'the top', becoming stuck in a logistic bottleneck 
around the time that Camp 4 was being established. 
It is indicative of the role which the model played that the 
Final Plan, as used by Bonnington, was never actually tested on 
the model before the expedition left for Katmandu. Taylor 
describes his reaction to this omission: 
"I think that this gives a clue to the real 
benefits of the study. Chris handed me a copy of 
the Final Solution just before he left, announcing 
blithely that held reconsidered his plans and had 
come up with a new one. Momentarily, I was appal- 
led. Was he going to reject the results of all the 
work that we had done? 
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In fact not. The Final Solution was very much# I 
think, the child of the work that Chris had pu .t 
into the study. The process of exploring and test- 
Ing his ideas on the logistical problems had yiel- 
ded the Insights into the problem that we had 
originally been aiming for, and as a result of this 
he was able to construct the strategy that was so 
successfully employed, confident in his ability to 
modify it in action. My biggest thrill of the 
expedition was a card from the mountain reporting 
that Camp 4 had been established at the same time 
that Base Camp was cleared -- a point which had 
been established as critical". 
There is not much which can sensibly be added to the above. As 
near as possible it portrays the role which it is hoped System 
Dynamics models will come more and more to play in corporate 
and public policy. 
1.7 Scenario generation and policy modelling 
If numerous surveys have yielded results which suggest that 
most "corporate models" are, in fact, deterministic financial 
simulation models devoid of any feedback influences (save 
through the users of such models) yet models can be created 
which are capable of influencing policy choices, as in the case 
of Bonnington contemplating on assault on Everest, in what 
context then are policy models for business and government best 
presented? To this author a preferred answer is to see policy 
models as a means of creating one or more scenarios which can 
be used to confront managers9 mental models. Unfortunately the 
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literature on scenarios does not always relate their generation 
to the building of computer models. (See for example, Godet 
(1987). ) A synthesis of the two is a primary goal of this sec- 
tion of the thesis. It is posited that scenario generation is 
a niche into which policy models of the System Dynamics type 
fit quite happily. 
Scenario is a term claimed to be coined first by Herman Kahn. 
In a book published in 1979 (Kahn, 1979) he asserts that the 
term was used first in this sense by himself and fellow resear- 
chers at the RAND Corporation in the USA in the late 19501s. 
The term was thought to be apt because it deglamourised the 
projection being outlined. They would say, "remember it's only 
a scenario". This seems extremely sensible and in keeping with 
the theme of this thesis. Policy makers exposed to models 
capable of projecting one view of the future should appreciate 
such tools for what they are, namely distillations of the real 
world which do not lay claim to embracing the ultimate truth. 
Scenarios must be distinguished from forecasts (Godet, 1987). 
As noted by Schnaars (1987) a scenario provides a more 
qualitative and contextual description of how the present will 
evolve into the future. -A scenario does not seek numerical 
precision. It is one possible view of the future which, if 
generated by a System Dynamics model, is more a product of the 
structure of the system and its constituent delays than a func- 
tion of model parameter values. 
The style of policy modelling advocated herein emphasises a 
continuing interaction with the model. Comparisons, are made 
across possible futures, each reflected in a separate run of 
the model; no attempt -is made- to produce sophisticated 
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measurement of the variables of interest in absolute terms. 
Projections relative to one another are what matter in this 
context, as is stressed by, for example, Chandler and Cockle 
(1982). 
Multiple scenarios would be considered and evaluated. All 
would be possible futures for the system but none would be 
assured. Rather than trying to predict what will happen in the 
future a System Dynamics model should aid contemplation of what 
might happen in any feasible future. Within the model (and its 
policy derivatives) futures are not merely some mathematical 
manipulation of past data but must be seen as the confluence of 
many forces: past, present and future. This is how Schnaars 
(1987) sees scenarios and coincidentally how System Dynamics 
models evolve a behaviour mode through time., 
Huss and Honton (1987), in their contribution to the burgeoning 
literature on scenarios in business, describe three different 
approaches to scenario generation. These are intuitive logics, 
trend-impact analysis and cross-impact analysis. Each method 
is associated with an organisation which makes available its 
services on a commercial basis. All three of them are in the 
USA. A visibly shortened description of each method now fol- 
lows. 
Intuitive logics forms the basis of the way in which the Royal 
Dutch/Shell Group use scenarios and this empirical application 
by the Shell Group is described later. The method posits that 
policies are based on a complex set of relationships among 
economic, political, technological, social, resource and 
environmental factors. Most of these factors are external to a 
company but need to be understood to provide, insights. Some of i 
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the variables involved are precise, quantitative measures and 
are predictable. (An example here is demographics. ) Others, 
however, are imprecise, qualitative and much less predictable, 
for example consumer attitudes, life style and product demand. 
A major step in the method involves the definition of $scenario 
logics' which are organising themes, principles or assumptions 
that provide each scenario with a 'coherent, consistent and 
plausible logical underpinning' (Huss and Honton, 1987). These 
logics are not necessarily meant to cover every distinct pos- 
sibility. They are not the logical underpinnings for 
optimistic/pessimistic scenarios or high, medium and low 
postulates. Instead they describe alternative futures such as 
a regulated versus a de-regulated market. Because both 
opportunities as well as threats are considered, they cannot be 
viewed as either exclusively optimistic or pessimistic. 
The latter stages of the method involve combination of the 
scenario logics with the (earlier) environmental analyses. It 
would be at this -stage that a System Dynamics model would 
assert its value. The model would be able to combine the 
scenario logics with environmental aspects so as to allow time- 
based futures to evolve. Here would be starkly visible the 
detailed implications for policy actions. The Directors would 
have both a time-phased sequence and a portrayal of the degree 
of concern. Food for thought surrounding When? and How Bad? 
(threat) and When? and How Good? (opportunity) would be 
offered. 
Trend-impact analysis (Becker, 1983) on the other hand relies 
on a formal forecast of the key indicator (dependent) variable. 
This is then adjusted based on the occurrence of impacting 
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events. Probabilities have to be established of both the tim- 
ing and the extent of these impacting events, including years 
to first impact, years to maximum impact, level of maximum 
impact, years to steady state impact, level of steady state 
impact and so on. 
It is at the stage of modifying the extrapolation that System 
Dynamics models would be of use. It might be possible to 
design policies which offer a defence or an encouragement to 
impacting influences irrespective of the timing and the extent 
of their occurrence. 
The use of a-formal means of making the initial projection also 
features in the method of cross-impact analysis. (In fact, 
both this method and the trend-impact method can be 
distinguished from the intuitive logics approach because of the 
use made of formal statistical or econometric forecasting 
methods at an early stage in the analysis. ) A formal forecast 
for a set of key indicators (for example number of imported 
vehicles, size of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement) is 
carried out. Following this attempts are made to identify pos- 
sible future events which might significantly affect one or 
more of the key indicators. Interviews with experts and 
literature searches would be adopted towards this end. 
The feature which distinguishes cross-impact analysis from 
trend-impact analysis is that the former allows an assessment 
of the way impact events may affect other impact events in 
addition to affecting the key indicators. Cross-impact 
matrices are drawn up and an indication entered in each cell of 
the extent to which (using an arbitrary index scale) the 
occurrence of the column state would change the probability 
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(previously) assigned to the occurrence of the row state. 
All this information is 'taken account of by specially written 
computer software which then produces multiple projections 
covering consistent sets of impact events, that is those 
particular combinations which will most likely occur together. 
With more and more computer runs conducted, a range of possible 
future paths for each indicator variable is created. 
Now it must be appreciated that these future paths (scenarios) 
are nothing more than projections of the behaviour of 
environmental influences. In certain circumstances these paths 
themselves may be created, not by the sort of simplistic model 
implied by the previous paragraph, but by a System Dynamics 
model. One example here would be utilisation of the M. I. T. 
National Model of the U. S. economy (Forrester, 1989) to create 
scenarios which would form the input to a corporate strategic 
policy model. As noted by Becker (1983) the costs of creating 
large lenvironmental9 models purely for the generation of 
scenarios, to be used as inputs to policy models or debates, 
are largely prohibitive for any organisation. It does imply, 
however, that there is likely to be a ready commercial market 
for economic environmental model outputs. Indeed, this has 
already started in the UK where London Business School and the 
Henley Forecasting Centre (amongst others) market the results 
of their econometric model projections. 
So it is clear then that the descriptions of scenario genera- 
tion in the literature concentrate on environmental influences. 
They are a more sophisticated means of determining the likely 
form to be taken by the exogenous factors affecting a corporate 
or governmental system. However, it is readily admitted by 
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proponents of scenario analysis that the next step is a 
particularly crucial one: how these scenarios are going to 
impact on the strategic policy choices of the organisation 
concerned. This is one important aspect of scenarios developed 
by Leemhuis (1985). 
To further the discussion it would be useful at this point to 
introduce a discriminating terminology. It is posited that 
scenarios should be conceptualised separately as external 
scenarios or internal scenarios. The former relates to the 
understanding of scenarios which is mirrored in the general 
body of literature on the subject. As described above, this 
sees a scenario are being basically a projection of some facet 
of the system's environment. The projection is created using a 
systematic approach and by no means can it be considered a mere 
extrapolation. As has been indicated above, the extrapolation 
element is just the starting point for the formulation of an 
external scenario. Impacts against that extrapolation are then 
considered. 
An internal scenario, on the other hand, is one which projects 
possible consequences of alternative policies adopted by the 
organisation. It can be viewed as a conjunction between can- 
didate policies and the possible futures being offered by the 
external scenarios. In some situations the chosen policies may 
be adopted as a direct consequence of the specific external 
scenarios. External scenario generation is a logically prior 
activity to consideration of internal (policy) scenarios. Mil- 
lett (1988) uses the term 'cascading scenarios' (although in 
his case not quite in the same context) and this is an apt way 
of thinking about the two processes. 
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A niche for System Dynamics modelling activity is in the crea- 
tion of internal scenarios. If an external scenario(s) has 
been made beforehand then this would be used as an exogenous 
input to the model but it is not absolutely necessary for this 
particular procedure to be adopted. 
For instance, there is no evidence that Bonnington, in 
considering his policy choices on Everest, specifically input, 
say, an avalanche descending on camp 2 or a violent storm 
breaking out just as some of the team reached the summit 
(although both these events did, in fact, take place). 
At this point, therefore, it is appropriate to recount examples 
of the use of System Dynamics models in the context of scenario 
generation in business. While it might be expected that the 
vast majority of these accounts relate to internal scenarios, 
in fact two relate to external scenarios and these are 
considered first. It is recognised, however, that the clas- 
sification of individual examples into either external or 
internal scenarios is not easy. Some of the documented exam- 
ples address both. 
In sum they amount to little more than a handful, covering 
mainly United Kingdom and Western European blue chip companies. 
It is a rather sad testimony that the present author has not 
been able to uncover many more examples of the use of system 
dynamics and similar models for assisting the policy-making 
process. There are other occasional examples but it is only 
those recorded below which are felt to properly reflect the 
utility of the method at the top (policy level) of the 
organisation. If the message of this thesis is adequately 
promulgated then it is to be hoped that by the year 2000 there 
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will be very many more case histories which could be cited. 
1.7.1 Applications of System Dynamics models for external 
scenarios 
ICI use System Dynamics in their Planning Department in London. 
A macro-economic model has been built using this methodology. 
A early version was described by Hobbs (1981). It was 
developed in response to a need for corporate managers to bet- 
ter understand the economic environment in which they were 
operating. This need has grown in intensity since the mid 
1970's because of the increasing turbulence in the economy. 
Large econometric forecasting models are technically opaque and 
have little value as tools in the promotion of understanding 
and improvement of communication. Numerate economists may 
understand them but it is unlikely that corporate managers 
would. 
The model is structured into six sectors: households, trading 
companies, government, financial managers, banks and overseas. 
It is directed towards an understanding of the mechanisms at 
work during the business cycle of between four and five years 
duration. Therefore its time horizon is no more than ten years 
with the emphasis being on the next five. of particular 
interest in respect of System Dynamics is the f act that the 
model is not merely a means of simulating the National 
Accounts. Econometric models need past data in order to allow 
estimation of their coefficients and, as such, include only 
those variables for which data is available in the National 
Accounts. However, within the economy there are forces at 
work, such as lead times and 'business confidence', which 
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should be . properly 
included in any national economic model. 
The System Dynamics method does not prohibit inclusion of 
certain model variables merely because of the absence of time 
series data for those variables. 
Pink (1988) in a recent review of the work of the Planning 
Department at ICI remarks that the time horizon in the macro- 
economic model has been extended because the initial model now 
incorporates a 'Futures' capability. This projects social and 
technical trends with the objective of raising eyes collec- 
tively beyond current horizons to try to spot changes and even 
discontinuities in markets and technology. Pink states, 
11 (the model) encourages use of this insight In 
identifying threats to existing business and also 
new opportunities of high potential". 
Naylor (1986) describes how the management consultancy firm 
PA Computers and Telecommunications (PACTEL) used the methods 
of System Dynamics to create scenarios for the development of 
non-voice communications over a ten year period. The study was 
commissioned by the Eurodata Foundation on behalf of European 
telecommunications authorities. it involved developing 
scenarios for each of the 14 countries involved. The scenarios 
encompassed the current position for each national authority 
and then considered the likely future developments in telecom- 
munications. In other words they were quantitative pictures of 
the future. The scenarios were internally consistent and, what 
is more, reachable by a feasible path from the present day. 
Their scope encompassed technology, competition, services and 
user demand, concentrating solely on business communications. 
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Part of the model development involved the construction of 
influence diagrams and Naylor had this to say on the effec- 
tiveness of this particular tool: 
"Influence diagramming proved to be a very success- 
ful way of describing complex relationships and 
providing a means of communication between the 
manager's view of the world and that of the expert 
analyst. The diagrams also proved to be a useful 
analytical tool, highlighting exogenous variables 
and allowing inferences to be drawn about expected 
chains of-cause and effect". 
The relative utility of an influence diagram as a tool of 
system enquiry in its own right had previously been commented 
on by Wolstenholme (1982). Whilst not denying that the 
influence diagramming technique is often the prelude to a full 
computer simulation study (such as that subsequently conducted 
by Naylor), Wolstenholme notes how the technique can 
"facilitate identification of critical factors or restrictions 
and leverage points where the biggest impact on performance 
might be achieved" and 11... in multiple ownership situations 
(can be) used to demonstrate to the owners of system sub- 
sectors how their respective policies interact with one 
another". Given Naylor9s comment on the tool as a means of 
communication, Wolstenholme's concluding remark on multiple 
ownership situations, "This (the influence diagram) is 
particularly useful in comparing individual perceptions of 
systems and enhancing communication and compromise", is quite 
apposite. 
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The objective of the' PACTEL study was not merely to provide 
scenarios for each of the telecommunication authorities but to 
provide also the model from which these scenarios could be 
generated. This model could then be used by planners and 
policy-makers within each of the - national authorities as a 
means of providing an input to their own internal planning 
models. 
Baets (1987), who describes corporate strategic planning within 
the Belgian telephone company (RTT), is an example of one such 
planner. His company used the PACTEL model not only directly 
but also to provide an exogenous framework for an econometric 
model (BLIKSIM) which is employed for the elaboration'of alter- 
native strategic options. 
1.7.2 Applications of System Dynamics models for ' internal 
scenarios 
Coincidentally the first case study to be considered in this 
section is also within the telecommunications industry. 
Probert (1982) describes the development of a large strategic 
planning and policy model for British Telecom. It first became 
operational in 1978 and by 1982 was in fairly wide use inside 
the company. 
-The 
author notes how a colour graphics interface, 
developed at a late stage in the overall project, succeeded in 
rendering the model far more acceptable to senior managers than 
had been the case beforehand. Through this interface it 
appears that the modelling team have broken down artificial 
barriers between the model and the users. Probert notes (in 
keeping with the theme of this thesis): 
page 44 
"We now try to convey the idea that dynamic models 
should be viewed merely as alternative forms of 
information and subsequent Insight rather than as 
the corporate 'oracle' which necessarily represents 
any absolute truth". .1 
The model consists of four modules: Marketing, Technology, 
Personnel and Finance. Spread over these areas are around 300 
policy parameters available to the user, who might typically 
alter ten parameters prior to a 30 year run to generate another 
specif ic scenario. The sort of issues which can be tackled 
are: 
"What scope is there for the development of video services such 
as cable TV and viewphones? " 
"What are the benefits of mounting an 'all-out' attack on a 
I 
market immediately after launch? " 
"What are the ideal tariff differentials between advanced and 
basic services? " 
Morecroft (1984) gives a description of the use of a strategy 
support model for a supplier of advanced office equipment. (It 
could be argued that the term $strategy support9 -- apparently 
coined by Alan Graham at M. I. T. -- could be more appropriately 
replaced by 'policy suppoW since the latter is free of 
overtones of 9marketing' and 'competition9. ) Morecroft 
experienced many of the same enthusiastic reactions reported by 
Probert in respect of the graphically-based outputs. The model 
is used in exactly the same dialectic role as the British 
Telecom model - to offer another viewpoint, to confront the 
opinions of senior management and to mobilise their percep- 
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tions. Morecrof t notes that there is no direct operational 
impact with such a model. It exists as an insight generator 
(not an answer generator) and as such does not get implemented 
in the same sense as many Operational Research models are. 
Further, if a specific strategic recommendation does flow from 
the model, it will have to pass through the usual communication 
and administrative channels so as to be fleshed out into the 
detail needed to state precisely how it is to be converted into 
specific operating procedures. 
On the dialectic role of the model, Morecroft states: 
"A most natural extension of the dialectic method 
is the introduction of a formal model into the 
discussion with which to temper the prevailing 
opinions. in the standard dialectic method, debate 
and discussion draw on opinion from the 'mental 
models' of a management team. A formal model 
merely adds another viewpoint, which, though per- 
haps more carefully formulated, is nevertheless an 
opinion. 
To be effective, the model must be seen as a 
vehicle for extending argument and debate -- quite 
different from the customary role of models. The 
model must be brought down from the pedestal of the 
infallible black box (where it is often ignored) to 
occupy a more modest position as a complement to 
the thinking and deducing powers of management. 
The model must be seen as a generator of opinions, 
not answers. Executives must be encouraged to 
challenge and debate model conclusions, and members 
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of the modelling team must be capable of engaging 
In executive, non-technical argument". 
It is claimed that the model did indeed produce certain 
insights which the management team had not previously realised. 
For instance, a reduction in the sales force employed to market 
the advanced office equipment concerned caused a loss of sales 
effort far greater than could be explained by the smaller num- 
ber of individual salesmen. Further scenario runs suggested 
that what was happening was that the revenue-generating base of 
customers not yet supplied with the firm's product was being 
eroded by the actions of competitors. This erosion was making 
it more difficult for the sales team to repeat past revenue 
performances and this led to demotivation, and lowered produc- 
tivity. If a reduction of the sales team was added into the 
model then it was observed that the original downward-trend was 
amplified since the maintenance of overall performance by the 
remaining members of the sales team was rendered even more 
dif f icult. 
Another insight concerned additions to the sales force and the 
consequent effect on market share. As more salesmen were added 
to the team, customers converted much sooner to the new tech- 
nology office equipment offered by this and other firms. This 
is the natural result of the salesmen doing their jobs 
properly. However, it could not be guaranteed that all 
customers would ultimately select the firmss (rather than a 
competitor's) product. Inevitably some would go to the com- 
petition with the unavoidable consequence for market share. 
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The final, case study concerns the evolution of the use of 
scenarios by the Royal Dutch/Shell company referred to earlier. 
Although formal computer models were not part of their policy- 
making process when scenario planning was first introduced, 
they now contribute to the enhancement of managerial learning, 
just as Bonnington experienced by confronting the model created 
prior to the successful Everest expedition. This initiative 
with modelling was taken by the Group Planning department. 
The account in this section does not dwell on any one specific 
policy application by Group Planning (for the source material 
concerned does not describe any model in detail) but that is 
not a sufficient reason to exclude an account of the progress 
towards dynamic modelling for policy planning by one of the 
world's major companies. On the other hand, a description of 
the adoption of the method by Shell9s Business Consultancy 
department, mentioned later, does include some specific 
applications. 
Shell introduced scenario planning on an experimental basis in 
1971 (Lorenz, 1980a; 1980b). It had been initiated as a direct 
consequence of collective unease about 9planning by 
forecasting9 which had been the ethos in the company in the 
sixties. There was a growing 'feeling in the, Planning Depart- 
ment that the next ten years or more were going to be charac- 
terised by extreme turbulence. A single line 2forecast, would 
not be sufficient. Beck (1982) offers an early exposition of 
Shell's disenchantment with forecasting which he describes as 
"providing the equivalent of a straight line route through a 
minefield". 
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Beck makes a number of poignant comparisons between forecasts 
and scenarios. From amongst the many it is possible to extract 
three of these: 
"A forecast stands alone, to be considered, accep- 
ted or rejected on its own. A scenario is designed 
to be considered in conjunction with other 
scenarios; it is valueless on its own". 
"A forecast is intended to be regarded as an 
authoritative statement. A scenario Is intended to 
be regarded as a tool to assist understanding -- as 
a backdrop to the decision-making process, rather 
than as an integral part of the decision itself". 
"Forecasts are based on the belief that the future 
can be measured and controlled. Scenarios 'are 
based on the belief that it can not". 
Whereas the initial use of scenarios in Shell concerned global 
viewpoints ten to fifteen years into the future, their use has 
spawned additional scenario planning that concerns, firstly, 
the forces at work over the medium-term business cycle of 4-5 
years and, secondly, scenarios for individual "local' business 
sectors and operating companies (Financial Times, 1980). (For 
example, Galer and Kasper (1982) describe how scenarios were 
developed to aid policy-making in Shell9s Australian 
operations. ) It is these two latter approaches to scenario 
based planning from which the evolution to computer models 
seems to have occurred. 
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Wack (1985a, 1985b) charts in some depth the use of scenarios 
in Shell, taking up the story started by Beek. it i; in his 
articles that the reader can discern how Shell latched on to 
System Dynamics models specifically. Wack talks of "changing 
the decision makers' assumptions about how the world works and 
compelling them to reorganise their mental model of reality". 
He also speaks of "exposing and invalidating an obsolete world- 
view" and planners needing to "link the new realities of the 
outside world to the managers' microcosm". 
Further reasons for a steady progression towards utilising 
System Dynamics must surely revolve around the 'intuitive 
logics' approach to scenarios, discussed earlier on, and which 
Shell subscribe to. In addition there is the mode of presenta- 
tion of the results. Intuitive logics as a method can be 
viewed as the equivalent of a manually designed and operated 
System Dynamics model. In using the intuitive logics approach 
there is a need to design an internally consistent and coherent 
network of possible effects which are intuitively extrapolated 
to yield various time-series based scenario projections. 
the consonance with the System Dynamics method exists even down 
to time series graphs being a major component of output. The 
limitation of the manual approach is in handling the interac- 
tions and, in particular, the feedback effects. Seen in this 
context it is easy to appreciate why Shell moved on to computer 
models which, as near as possible, captured the spirit of their 
own brand of scenario generation for policy making. 
The introduction of computer models into Shell's planning 
process is documented by De Geus (1988) who has written a 
recent instalment of their progress in planning. He talks of 
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managers needing to become adaptive, in short to learn about 
the complex systems of which they are a part. The caption 
above the title of the article says it all: "At Shell., plan- 
ning means changing minds, not making plans". 
De Geus notes that in his experience it can take some 12 to 18 
months for a received signal to be acted upon. It takes this 
long for the manager's mental models to develop a few new hooks 
and for them to start responding meaningfully to the stimulus. 
Obviously, therefore, the question must be asked as to how 
institutional learning can be accelerated. De Geus sets out to 
describe how computer models are quite appropriate for this 
task, a task which is central to effective planning. Only 
managers have the power to act so the planner9s role should not 
be to try and engage them into putting their imprimatur onto a 
formal plan, but rather to get them to think and learn about 
policy; in other words, to expand the managers9 collective 
mental models by introducing them to a new policy support tool. 
Trying to teach senior managers by formal classroom-type 
methods is manifestly ineffective. De Geus notes that maybe 
only 25% of what is taught is actually received. At best this 
might reach 40%. Further, a staff member (planner) cannot walk 
into a boardroom and start talking about strategy. Such a per- 
son would not have authority over the audience. In the normal 
teaching situation this is resolved because students will ack- 
nowledge their teacher's presumed superior understanding. In 
the case of the most senior managers in a company, notice 
should be taken of the old Chinese proverb: 
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I 
I hear and I forget 
I see and I remember 
I do and I understand. 
If managers can be introduced to a computer model which the7 
themselves manipulate and interact with then maybe 
institutional learning will be accelerated. This is what Shell 
are currently exploring. It derives from considering a System 
Dynamics model as a $transitional object$ (De Geus, 1988) which 
can be used to play back and forth manager9s mental models. 
The computer model is assembled to capture the models that 
exist in the minds of the participating group of senior 
managers /directors and not the real-world. (It follows from 
this the model builder should engage in extensive discussions 
and workshop type sessions before the first equation is even 
written. It is likely that influence diagramming tools, so 
useful in the PACTEL study mentioned earlier, would be 
instrumental in eliciting the mental models- of the policy- 
makers and forging this into a collective one for the group to 
work with. ) 
De Geus acknowledges that learning is enhanced whenever senior 
managers meet to thrash out an issue. However, he goes on to 
assert that in his experience at Shell the computer model 
accelerates learning. He mentions three reasons for this: 
(i) Managers can deal with, at most, three or four variables 
at a time. By using a computer model a much more interacting 
set of influences can be simultaneously considered. 
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Computer models emphasise how cause and effect can be 
separated. In creating a desired effect managers should not 
necessarily look for the most immediate cause, but should seek 
other trigger points which may be separated in time and place. 
Conversely, undesirable effects can be shown by a computer 
model to emerge from seemingly sound policy decisions taken 
remotely from the immediate cause of concern. 
(iii) A computer model can be the vehicle which highlights 
what the relevant information is which policy makers really 
need to know. In any large corporate system a great deal of 
regular information is placed before these important groups of 
people. But do they really need it all? Conversely, might 
there not be something which they don't regularly receive but 
which they should? 
By virtue of their interaction with the computer model the 
planners' individual mental models are enriched and possibly 
restructured. The quality of debate is on a higher plane than 
if dialogue were conducted without a computer model to organise 
that debate around. This arises, in addition to the reasons 
put forward by De Geus, because the model creates additional 
paths of interaction between the members of the policy-making 
body'. 
Within Shell International the developments in effective 
managerial learning have extended from Group Planning to the 
Business Consultancy department which, in essence, is Shell's 
OR department. Lane (1989) documents in detail their adopted 
consulting philosophy of "Modelling 'as Learning". He bemoans 
the modus operandi of 9expert consultancy9, the traditional 
style of consultancy which involves $experts, being called in 
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who then go away and conduct analyses of some complexity, 
return and offer the client their 'answer' usually in the form 
of a thick report which in all probability then gathers dust on 
a shelf. 
What is striking about this classic consultancy approach, 
argues Lane, is that it is seemingly never applied to top level 
policy issues which senior management are grappling with. But 
by following a re-orientation which makes the consultant9s role 
a facilitator rather than an expert, by involving members of 
senior management in the model-building process and, most 
important of all, using a system dynamics modelling 
methodology, it is now possible to gain a foothold in the boar- 
droom. 
One interesting aspect of Lane9s paper is his notion of a 
trade-off between model size and model transparency. The 
expert consultancy approach implies that the bigger the model 
is by definition the better it is. However, the bigger it is 
the less chance client management will have of understanding it 
and even less that they will change their behaviour because of 
it. The answer is to develop relatively small models, in a 
close alliance with the management team, and which each address 
a particular issue which is selected for analysis. The key 
alliance with management is important for they are hardly 
likely then to summarily reject insights coming out of a model 
they themselves have played such a significant part in buil- 
ding! 
Lane sets out a statement of "Modelling as Learning" and this 
is reproduced here: 
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"Modelling as Learning Is a Shell consultancy 
process which involves the use of analytical tools 
In close association with a client. It consists of 
the capturing of clients' ideas and assumptions and 
their expression using modelling tools which can be 
readily understood. The resulting models are not 
forecasting tools. Rather, they give a client the 
ability to check the consistency and consequences 
of a certain set of ideas. They also provide a 
representation of a business system on which 
experiments with policy and strategy can be per- 
formed. The goal is then to enhance understanding 
of the issues in the client's mind, to focus 
discussions and to generate new options and ideas". 
Lane selects four examples to illustrate the Shell philosophy. 
These cover new product launch, future developments of a 
natural gas market, a high technology start-up company (which 
is reviewed in depth in Morecroft, Lane and Viita (1989)) and 
commodity production and trading. With the possible exception 
of the new product launch study, which involved assessing the 
likely actions of a competitor, all the projects reviewed 
utilised the system dynamics methodology for structuring a 
debate around a series of internal scenarios. 
Two interesting vignettes emerged from all this work and which 
serve to further underline the benefits arising from this style 
of strategy modelling. Firstly, what the clients considered a 
highly unlikely scenario emerged in one of the studies. This 
was $wrong' only in the sense that the logic operating in the 
present would not- operate in the future. But the message for 
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the clients was that this logic would have to be changed in the 
next f ew decades and they would have to play some part In 
changing it. The second interesting feature centred on the 
model addressing commodity production and trading. Here the 
model was being used to attempt to resolve a disagreement 
between two separate functional areas and which was threatening 
to degenerate into a "Yes it will/No it won9t" event. After 
being exposed to the system dynamics model, one of the two 
parties acquiesced and were able to reconstruct their mental 
model of the likely scenario without even conducting con- 
firmatory simulation runs based on the changed assumptions. 
The consultants, though, did so out of curiosityl 
Shell's -pioneering work using System Dynamics models to 
accelerate the corporate learning process, via debate organised 
around model-generated scenarios, clearly has longer to run. 
It is heartening that they have allowed so many publications by 
their personnel and it is to be hoped that a sufficiently 
detailed description of their future experiences is also forth- 
coming. 
1.8 The Technology supporting policy debate around a model 
Having identified various uses of System Dynamics models at the 
strategic policy level it is clearly necessary to review a lit- 
tle of the infrastructure which supports this particular 
process of learning. This is the setting for that which 
Morecroft (1988) calls a microvorld for policy debate, follow- 
ing Papert (1980). A microworld is an incubator for 
knowledge', a setting in which policy-makers engage in a learn- 
ing experience through interaction with text, systems diagrams 
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and computer simulations. In the examples reviewed above, the 
detail included on this facet was sometimes sketchy. However, 
this section can be considered as offering an opinion on a com- 
bination of hardware and software which will facilitate, in 
conjunction with a System Dynamics model, the policymaking 
process, 
1.8.1 Hardware 
For the purposes of eliciting hypotheses and beliefs ingrained 
in the managers' mental models it is not computer hardware 
which functions best but a pedagogic piece of hardware -- 
namely a whiteboard. Lane (1989) notes how an experienced 
consultant using a whiteboard and working with up to six senior 
managers can develop an influence (causal loop) diagram which 
draws out the complexity and the dynamics of the issue under 
investigation. Such a session would last maybe two to three 
hours and, if it is going well, the attendees would want to 
move to the whiteboard to add to or change the diagram. The 
whiteboard holding the emerging diagram is the focal point and, 
as such, is indispensable. 
This is underlined by Vennix et al (1988) when they describe 
the conceptualisation of a health care model. Three sub-groups 
were formed to look at different aspects of the problem in 
isolation. When they returned for the plenary session their 
efforts were aggregated on a whiteboard into one influence 
diagram using different colours to reflect relationships 
identified by the different groups. On merging the sub-models 
various feedback loops were created and the consequences of 
these loops discussed. 
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In terms of computer hardware, the $operations Room' depicted 
in colour photographs on the inside of the dust cover of Beer's 
"Platform for Change" (1975) is likely to be too intimidating 
for senior managers and directors. The room described by Beer 
was set up in Santiago, Chile when he was consulting to the 
Chilean government in the early 19709s. It included a number 
of comfortable armchairs incorporating keypads on the arms. 
Different keystrokes would cause different types of colour 
display to appear on large screens affixed into the walls of 
the room. Ministers and government officials could summon up- 
to-the-minute plots of industrial production and other relevant 
economic variables. In addition they could evaluate potential 
policy changes in the light of system dynamics simulations of 
the future also instigated by a special keypad sequence. 
While this is perhaps too clinical, too akin to a laboratory 
rather than a boardroom, it is undeniable that some form of 
large-screen colour display is needed if all the people present 
are expected to contribute to the debate. It is possible to 
use a device that sits on top of an overhead projector screen. 
This device can relay information from the computer screen onto 
the wall-screen directly. Although these systems can be useful 
in a classroom environment their widespread use is questionable 
especially since the quality of the image is often not high and 
also they transmit only in monochrome (although, at the time of 
writing, colour versions are starting to appear). 
Much better are proper RGB projectors which produce a large- 
screen colour image. These are the mainstay of what are now 
known in the UK as $Boardroom Systems', commercially available 
hardware /software installations used for quality presentation 
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of boardroom information. A good account of such systems is 
given by Preedy and Bittlestone (1985). In the UK in 1988 
three different vendors had boardroom systems on offer commer- 
cially. British Airways had developed their own, called AIMS. 
At present these systems are used only for reporting informa- 
tion in a meaningful way. They do not involve any modelling, 
either of the firm in question or indeed any policy issue ýit 
may be grappling with. This must be the next step, however, 
and this author sees the integration of system dynamics model- 
ling with boardroom systems as a highly promising (and logical) 
development in policy support tools. 
Sometimes progress in several separate lines of development 
needs to-be fused in order to allow an applied discipline to 
make a quantum leap forward. Besides the advent of boardroom 
systems, developments in 'group decision support systems' (Eden 
and Radford, 1990) seem to offer immense scope for the further 
promotion of system dynamics models in a policy support role. 
In fact, boardroom systems would be seen by some as part of the 
formal achitecture of a group decision support system, someth- 
ing which has been defined by Huber (1984) as "a set of 
software, hardware and language components and procedures that 
support a group of people engaged in a decision-related 
meeting". However, given the precise -nature of most group 
decision support systems, it would be somewhat inappropriate to 
integrate such processes into a formal board meeting. A more 
suitable context would be an ad hoc meeting which may be called 
purely to explore a specific issue, perhaps at a location away 
from the normal office environment. 
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In terms of hardware, Ackermann (1990) writing in the Eden and 
Radford book, sees such an environment as "including a series 
of terminals or workstations linked together through some form 
of networking, a large main screen visible to all and control- 
led by the facilitator, large sheets of paper and a three- 
colour video projector or large monitor". The large screen 
display is seen as important because, if each participant had 
their own display screen together with a capability to control 
what appeared on it, there would be hardly any interaction 
between them either verbally or non-verbally. 
Further contributions to the volume by Eden and Radford include 
those by Huxham (1990) and by Hickling (1990). Their chapters 
explore the advantages and disadvantages of particular types of 
room layout and of the supporting facilities in those rooms. 
Here there is less emphasis on the role of the computer itself 
but rather in the use of whiteboards (in particular photocopy- 
ing whiteboards) and other non-computing hardware. 
1.8.2 Software 
The last three years of the decade just ended have seen a 
remarkable transformation in system dynamics software and this 
transformation has been made possible by the vastly increased 
power of microcomputers. Not only are such devices so much 
more inherently user-friendly, they allow direct control of a 
graphics image on-screen using standards which have succes- 
sively improved the resolution and the maximum number of 
permissible colours. 
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As long as the use of computers implied a terminal hooked up to 
a mainframe or minicomputer, an installation to act as a 
vehicle for assisting policy debate and dialogue was always 
going to be a rather uncommon sight in corporate offices. 
Networked links were liable to disruption and in any case the 
bandwidth of the line was often a limiting factor, predisposing 
the graphics screen image to be created far too slowly. 
Coincidentally and totally independently the three main systems 
for system dynamics simulation on a personal computer (PC), 
Professional DYNAMO (Pugh-Roberts Associates, 1986), DYSMAP2 
(Dangerfield and Vapenikova, 1987) and STELLA (Richmond, 1987), 
appeared within two years of one another. The author has been 
closely involved with the creation of DYSMAP2 from its forerun- 
ner, DYSMAP (Cavana and Coyle, 1982), which was designed purely 
for mainframe and minicomputer installations. 
What singles out these systems is the fact that they allow one 
equation for each model variable which can be placed anywhere 
in the list. The software automatically sorts the equations 
into a computable sequence and then executes the model. All 
three systems include special library functions which are of 
direct help in this kind of modelling work, together with an 
integrated graph plotting capability, so necessary for review- 
ing the results from policy explorations. 
In essence, these software systems provide an environment which 
makes it feasible to conduct real-time policy explorations 
using simulation models. Professional DYNAMO has extensive 
menu facilities and a DYNEX (executive) user interface which 
can be customised to suit corporate tastes. DYSMAP2 has an 
Interactive Command Processor environment from which groups of 
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variables. can be plotted, additional runs created and executed 
and equations, written in a user-friendly algebra if desired, 
reviewed. In this package, variable names of up to 32 charac- 
ters are possible, including the underscore character, and so 
any non-numerate executive is put more at ease by seeing 
equations such as 
Total-revenue - Unit_price * Amount-sold 
rather than 
TR = UP * AS 
or even worse 
T= voa 
DYSMAP2's co-plot facility is particularly useful in a learning 
context as it permits a side-by-side comparison of the effects 
of different policy scenarios for a single variable. 
There is no question that, of the three, STELLA has attracted 
the most attention. It suffers from the disadvantage that it 
is written only for the APPLET" Macintosh range of personal com- 
puters which are much less common in corporate offices at least 
on this side of the Atlantic. Also users of earlier versions 
of the software (before the MacIIc range of computers appeared) 
had to be content with a monochrome screen only. 
However, practitioners such as Morecroft, Lane and Viita (1989) 
report an enthusiastic response when using this tool in a 
managerial learning situation. STELLA allows a model to be 
developed on-screen using icons to represent various parts of 
the modelling symbology. The icons are manipulated as part of 
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a Graphical User Interface (GUI) by means of a mouse. Anima- 
tion facilities permit direct observation of resource flows 
because 'tanks' (representing state variables) can be seen fil- 
ling up or draining out. Graph plots of variables can be 
displayed whilst the model is executing rather than merely at 
the end. 
Whichever program is selected for the purpose, however, there 
is no denying that it is capable of discharging the task of 
providing, in conjunction with a suitable model, a means to 
learn and understand the consequences of strategic policy. 
Quite simply no other general purpose languages or specialist 
systems can match the combination of free-ordering of 
equations, simple syntax, powerful function library and rapid 
graph plotting which these three offerings make available. 
All the developments described above are underscored by the 
results of a survey which was conducted by the British business 
magazine "Business Computing and Communications" in 1987. The 
magazine surveyed 1500 chief executives, managing directors and 
finance directors of organisations employing over 750 people. 
Questionnaires were returned by 118 executives, 49% of whom 
worked for companies with an annual turnover in excess of E100 
million. Just over 40% of respondents worked for manufacturing 
companies in the metal goods, engineering and vehicle 
industries. Relevant results in the present context were that 
almost one-third of respondents would like to see information 
provided in more comprehensible, graphic form. Of greatest 
importance, however, was the finding that 40% would like "the 
provision of possible scenarios for strategic planning". In 
other words, they were appealing for the availability of data 
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on scenarios, but put into a more conducive (graphical) form. 
This encouraging finding shows that there may have beeh little 
dissipation of the goodwill towards the use of models at the 
strategic level, evidenced by Higgins and Finn (1977b) and 
discussed earlier. 
The developments in group decision support, referred to above, 
have a 9softwarel element too. This is the process by which 
the strategic issue is tackled. Eden (1989) has been 
associated with the development of one such process called 
Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA). The use of 
formal computer simulation models as an ingredient of this 
process is not prohibited and so the software element can be 
defined to embrace both process and content. Indeed Eden 
(1990) offers a very interesting opinion: 
"There are indications that the use of computers 
for any future improvement in decision-making by 
very senior managers may incorporate a class of 
certainty-geared models that serve to clarify thin- 
king about the dynamic interdependencies of complex 
systems. 0000. Cognitive maps (Eden et al,, ý, 1983) 
and system dynamics models (Morecroft, 1984) are 
not only similar in that the causal relationships 
between variables typically are 'hard-wired' 
(rather than probabilistic) but also because they 
are typically 'information-free', that is, built on 
impression, belief, judgement, wisdom and intuition 
rather than on formally gathered data. Represent- 
ing the world through the construction of a 
'processual toy' which can become a learning 
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Instrument seems to be a promising development 
(DeGeus, 1988). 'In a sense, such models have 
exhausted empiricism and placed no bounds on 
rationality' (attributed to Rohrbaugh at the 
Toronto conference on which this book is based). " 
Unfortunately the contribution by Ackermann, which follows on 
directly from the section in which the above quotation appears, 
does not support the sentiment expressed by Eden. Here 
Ackermann, quoting Winograd and Flores (1986), suggests that 
the appropriate role for the computer in group decision support 
is not as a surrogate expert but rather a sophisticated medium 
of communication. The emphasis is on data and the capability 
to access it concurrently. Whatever is emphasised in system 
dynamics models it is certainly not formal statistical data, as 
Eden's quote bears testimony. DeGeus (1988) would agree and he 
argues counter to Ackermann. Indeed, DeGeus would say, in sup- 
port of the theme of this thesis, that a computer model should 
be utilised as a 'surrogate expert'. 
Tomlinson (1990) offers a taxonomy which is useful for putting 
the ideas of 'group decision support' in context. He 
distinguishes between 'process' models and 'product' models. 
The former describe the relationships between the decision- 
making group and the process by which the decision can be 
reached. Group decision support emphasises the 'process' model 
to the apparent exclusion of product models which incorporate 
the values, beliefs and concerns of senior managers; this 
category would include system dynamics models. 
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There must be many types of strategic problems in business and 
government for which the adoption of a group decision support 
method alone would mean that there was a well-defined process 
but little or no substantial content. This imbalance would 
operate to the detriment of the process and also, possibly, the 
enthusiasm of the participants. Similarly, to press ahead with 
a system dynamics model which was not embedded within a group 
decision (or more appropriately policy) process might risk a 
very real miscasting of the role of that model by those 
involved. Earlier sections of this thesis have elaborated on 
the desirability of setting out very carefully the proper role 
for system dynamics models in the policy process. For 
deliberations made outside of a formal board meeting with its 
fixed agenda, the ideas of group decision support seem to offer 
the best platform via which this role can be discharged. 
1.9 Modelling public policy issues 
Thus far, the material in this chapter has been devoted almost 
exclusively to corporate strategic policy and the role of 
system dynamics models in shaping that policy. But the 
emphasis on firms is not intentional, indeed the title of this 
thesis clearly implies that system dynamics has a role to ful- 
fill in the context of public policy determination. 
Consequently, this section is devoted to an exploration of the 
nature of public Policy issues and whether the models which can 
be employed to support evaluation of such issues need to be any 
different from those associated with corporate strategic 
policy. There is also some comment on the apparent contrast 
between the extent to which public policy modelling has been 
embraced on both sides of the Atlantic. 
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It should be made clear at the outset that it is impossible to 
do Justice, in this relatively short section, to the 'subject 
matter of *policy analysis9, as it is known in government. The 
whole area of policy evaluation and implementationg and the 
political framework within which it is set, is a subject in its 
own right, firmly entrenched in the discipline of political 
science. Not only books but specialist journals exist which 
are devoted solely to the determination and evaluation of 
public policy. In dipping a somewhat alien toe into these 
waters it is with the specific purpose of assessing the 
strength of the current running in favour of (or against) the 
use of models to inform the policy-making process. 
As with earlier coverage of corporate strategic policy-making, 
the neglect of 'tactical' issues will be apparent. System 
dynamics models are of greatest use for supporting -strategic 
policy issues possessing a time evolutionary quality. Although 
the optimal siting of pelican crossings, say, is an important 
issue for local authorities it is not something which system 
dynamics can shed much light on. 
Similarly there are more strategic public issues which are the 
province of other academic disciplines. In this category would 
come the maximum speed limit on motorways, the drink-driving 
laws or the extent of the dissemination of welfare benefits, 
all of which are (or should be) supported by an input f rom 
statistical science. In the same vein questions surrounding 
farming and processing of food require an input from medical 
and biological science- nuclear waste one from physics and 
chemistry. 
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The areas of public policy which have already received atten- 
tion from practitioners of system dynamics include the criminal 
justice system (Hunzeker, 1980; Beijdorff, 1986), energy plan- 
ning (Naill, 1977), urban studies (Forrester, 1969), the 
national economy (Forrester, 1989), occupational health and 
safety (Crawford, 1988) and, in Scandinavia, forestry (Sten- 
berg, 1980). The famous "Limits to Growth' study (Meadows 
et al, 1972) is not strictly comparable since it implied more 
of an international public policy effort than the other exam- 
ples quoted, being a model of the world's use of resources. 
Clearly, then, there are a range of studies which fall within 
the framework of public policy and to which system dynamics 
models can contribute. That no great store of applications 
should exist on this side of the Atlantic pe rhaps will come as 
no great surprise, especially given the findings from Joy's 
(1988) survey discussed earlier on. What is more serious, 
however, is the relative lack of an7 modelling or analytical 
studies conducted as part of the public policy process in this 
country. 
There is a tendency (and, it must be stressed, not wholly con- 
fined to the U. K. ) to uphold the view that evaluation of 
public policy takes place after implementation. Indeed, the 
book by Rossi and Freeman (1985) is an example of this 
emphasis. But as a method of approach it is f lawed and it is 
unnecessary. In fact it is the very antithesis of the modus 
operandi known as the scientific method. More ex ante evalua- 
tion of public policy is both feasible and warranted. System 
dynamics models, by promoting better understanding, can 
contibute significantly at this stage in the process. 
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Over the period January to May 1983, the Royal Institute of 
Public Administration held a series of seminars to examine 
policy analysis in British government (Gray and Jenkins, 1983). 
The gist of the contributions seemed to indicate that while 
government departments had embraced formal management informa- 
tion systems with some relish, there was a distinct lack of 
analysis of the pertinent issues and policy choices. Informa- 
tion systems mean better standards in the auditing sense but 
definitely not in the ex ante explorative sense. 
Walter Williams made a contribution (Williams, 1983). He was 
on a sixth month sabbatical with the Central Policy Review 
Staff (CPRS), coming over from the University of Washington 
where, following a lengthy spell within the U. S. government, 
he was employed as Director of the Institute for Public Policy 
and Management. Having written two books (Williams, 1971; 
1980) on his experiences as an advisor to the U. S. government 
he is uniquely qualified to comment. His opinion is forthright 
about the British scene: 
"POlic7 anal7sis has become a significant factor 
throughout the American decision-making process. 
In Britain, POlic7 anal7sis has not emerged 
prominentl7 either at the centre or at the top of 
ministries. British government has remained pre- 
modern in terms of the use of what I label 'hard- 
edged' policy analysis techniques". 
(He later defines these techniques to rest on the logic-of- 
choice approach to decision-making, drawn from economics, 
statistical decision theory and operational research. ) While 
he stresses that modern tools of policy analysis and strategic 
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planning are not panaceas, he affirms that "they do increase 
the probability of more effective governance". 
Williams puts down the lack of policy analysis in British 
government to three things: an absence of any desire by 
ministers and higher civil servants to see it implemented, the 
paucity of understanding of the techniques of policy analysis 
by the latter and, finally, pervasive secrecy in the conduct of 
government. His spell with the CPRS terminated just as Mrs 
Thatcher abolished the unit and he remarks on this irony in the 
conclusion to his contribution: 11 .... her act underscores both 
the dearth of policy analysis in the British government and the 
present Administration's lack of understanding of the need for 
information and analysis -- how fitting a symbolic gesture for 
what I have tried to say". 
one area of governmental policy making which to some extent 
goes against the trend described by Williams is, of course, 
macro-economic policy where a number of large econometric 
forecasting models exist, including the Treasury's own model. 
For most people this would be the one area where they could 
cite with confidence that models helped in the formulation of 
policy. But a closer examination of the statistical models 
involved reveals that the preparation of forecasts of the main 
macro-economic variables is their raison dletre. As discussed 
earlier in this chapter, forecasting is not the same as policy 
evaluation and although econometric models are increasingly 
being used for policy simulations, they are not as ideally 
suited to policy explorations surrounding specific issues as 
are system dynamics models. 
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Public policy issues, in contrast with those concerning 
business policy, are . characterised 
by the greater number of 
people involved in or affected by the issue. The consequence 
is that, usually, the process of policy change is much more 
complex and slow-moving. It is, in effect, akin to a bargain- 
ing process between a large number of interest groups, each 
with many members (Stenberg, 1980). Nevertheless there seems 
no logical reason why a system dynamics model might not be 
employed to assist the various interest groups in 'thinking 
through' the consequences of alternative policy prescriptions. 
Stenberg reported a positive response by such interest groups 
to informed discussion centred around a model. There was pos- 
sibly less rancour because the representatives of the interest 
groups could dispense with tactical manoeuvres and "consider 
their situation in a larger context and with a longer time per- 
spective than usual". He concluded that the sessions devoted 
to consideration of simulation runs were often the most 
thought-provoking for all participants. 
In these circumstances models should not be large. Interest 
groups coming from a varied set of educational backgrounds will 
not be able to cope with models running into thousands of 
equations. Such efforts would be counterproductive - in the 
context of providing a pivot around which, sometimes 
diametrically opposed viewpoints could be explored and perhaps 
reconciled. Large models are often predicated by the need to 
reproduce the past with high historical accuracy. Participants 
to the sessions where a model acts as a strategic counsellor' 
must be fully briefed that the purpose of the exercise is not 
to explain in great detail what may have transpired in the 
past, but rather to contemplate a better way of designing the 
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future. Any member of the participating interest -groups with 
experience of econometric modelling should be a first target 
for such a briefing. 
Because econometric modelling represents such a large propor- 
tion of all the modelling work associated with UK public 
policy, it is perhaps worth establishing quite clearly the 
different function of such a model as compared with the use a 
system dynamics model might have in the sphere of economic 
policy. Greenberger et al (1976), in their authoritative text 
on the uses of models to underpin public policy, identify 
unconditional and conditional forecasting roles. The f ormer 
exists when an econometric model is used simply to forecast the 
future value of, say, unemployment or interest rates. The 
assumption is that the policy makers do nothing; they are just 
being forewarned about emerging problems which will require 
their attention. Conditional forecasting, on the other hand, 
is the process whereby the 'forecast' is contingent on the 
actions which the policymakers take. Such forecasts deal with 
the likely consequences of policy decisions and are the result 
of, for example, using an econometric model for simulating 
alternative possible actions. The implication is that one (or 
a mixture) of the alternative actions will eventually be selec- 
ted. In the discussion of the major decisions taken by the 
British Steel Corporation in the 1970's (see chapter 2) mention 
is made of how a number of financial projections were prepared, 
each supposedly the result of a specific action of the Board, 
who obviously then selected that policy choice offering the 
best return. 
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However, Greenberger et al also recognise that there is, in 
addition, "a more elusive and indirect use of models" and that 
is in education. This is the role in the policy-making process 
where a system dynamics model would figure heavily. Greenber- 
ger et al in effect support the view offered on many occasions 
in the above description of the appropriate use of system 
dynamics models within the corporate sector. They talk of 
"refining the intuitions of policymakers" and "stimulating the 
inventiveness and sharpening the perceptions of decision 
makers". The phrase that best sums up this use is attributed 
to Brewer (1973): using a model for "descriptive 
clarification". 
That public policy models can be contextualised in the role of 
providing a learning experience for participants in the policy 
process is also endorsed by Drake et al (1972) in their seminal 
book on the use of models in the public arena. They state, "By 
virtue of explicitly examining many of the difficult issues of 
a particular problem, their abilities to think systematically 
about complex aspects of public problems will likely improve". 
Drake et al are convinced by the formalisation of the public 
policy decision making process. The model-based approach is 
said to stimulate insightful thinking about the interactions of 
various parts of the problem and, by forcing an explicit 
consideration of the entire problem, it can be a catalyst for 
generating new alternatives to be evaluated as well as pin- 
pointing -the need for additional data. What is more, discus- 
sion can go beyond merely listing the pros and cons of each 
alternative and reach the stage of balancing them against each 
other. 
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Yet further support on this point comes from Dror (1975) who 
berates the methods of management science with its strong foun- 
dations in optimising mathematics and neglect of unquantifiable 
variables. He argues f or the development of what he calls 
"policy sciences" which, while not neglecting the modelling 
ethos of management science, would fit more appropriately into 
the 9soft' context in which most policy issues are embedded. 
He infers that the system dynamics methodology might fit his 
specification for an analytical approach to underpin his vision 
of policy sciences, although it is unlikely to fulfill all of 
his requirements. The inference emerges in his recognition of 
the "pioneering efforts" of Forrester to integrate behavioural 
science knowledge into formal computer models, particularly in 
the urban dynamics model (Forrester, 1969). 
It has been posited that effective learning in the context of 
using models in the public policy process is closely linked 
with both the nature of the model employed and its size. By 
way of illustration, consider the following plausible 
initiative which might be undertaken by one of the interest 
groups involved in the well-documented skills shortage in the 
UK (National Economic Development Office, 1989). The Committee 
of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (CVCP) of British univer- 
sities decide to commission some research to explore the link 
between graduate-level skills shortages, wage inflation and 
hence price inflation. (This is, in fact, a possible future 
public policy research project for the author and colleagues at 
the University of Salford. ) A model could help to articulate 
the reasoning involved: skills shortages lead to the bidding- 
up of salaries with the result that an increasing rate of price 
inflation can emerge once the economy loses momentum in a dow- 
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nturn. This happens because employers who recruit to certain 
graduate skill occupations find that they must compete by 
offering high enough salaries or lose valuable employees to 
their competitors. While demand is strong they can withstand 
the consequences for costs by virtue of the volume effect on 
total revenue. However, in times of slack or weakening demand 
this effect is lost. Because salary increases once given are 
never withdrawn, in less prosperous economic circumstances it 
means that a price effect is needed to replace the volume 
effect. The prices charged for the company's output must, 
therefore, be raised in order to maintain profitability. 
If such a model were to be constructed then a relatively com- 
pact system dynamics model would surely be the most effective 
choice. This model would include the flows of recruits to 
graduate-level occupations, product sales and, final, ly, money 
which would represent industry9s cost and revenue flows. 
Carefully crafted, such a model could be a potent catalyst to 
thought and a means whereby the CVCP could marshall public 
opinion in favour of increased public expenditure on the 
universities. This, of course, is an entirely appropriate role 
for a system dynamics model in the public policy process. It 
is quite clear, however, that it would be wholly inappropriate 
to have recourse to a huge model like the US National Economic 
model (Forrester, 1989) for this purpose irrespective of 
whether such an all-embracing model could be focussed so as to 
shed some light on the specific issue of skills shortages. 
Similarly the notion that an econometric model should be 
constructed would be a facile suggestion. Even if all the 
necessary data series were regularly recorded, a large propor- 
tion of the series may be irrelevant not least because the 
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process described above could well be of relatively recent 
origin, being associated with the 'third industrial revolution' 
of electronics and information technology. 
It is to be hoped that this section has eradicated any sugges- 
tion that public policy is so inherently different from 
corporate strategic policy as to invalidate the contribution of 
system dynamics models to the public policy-making process. 
one of the desirable characteristics of all participants in 
this process should be a willingness to learn, and learning can 
be accomplished by examining policy issues with the aid of such 
a model which, merely through the act of its creation, is 
capable of releasing understanding in a situation of some com- 
plexity. 
But care should be exercised in the sort of system dynamics 
models which are produced as a contribution to public policy 
making. The days of creating 'glory models$, which sometimes 
seem designed to cloak the intended audience in a mixture of 
bewilderment and forced acquiescence, should be banished 
forever. Specific issues call for specific models. Parsimony 
replaces comprehensiveness. Properly constructed and couched 
in the context of a learning tool, a system dynamics model sup- 
porting an issue of public policy has far greater potential to 
elevate the level of policy debate than has the yield from any 
other modelling method. 
1.10 A Conclusion by way of an Introduction 
In the foregoing sections an attempt has been made to set out 
the proper role for a system dynamics model in the context of 
the process of policy formulation concerning corporate and 
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public issues. Not until quite recently (see for example 
Morecroft (1988)) has it occurred to proponents of the system 
dynamics method that this aspect ought to be emphasised. Per- 
haps this neglect goes some way to explaining both the relative 
lack of use of system dynamics as a modelling tool generally 
and the apparent inability of some authors not completely 
familiar with the method to properly position it in a taxonomy 
of modelling methods. In some small way, therefore, this 
thesis will hopefully augment the as yet embryonic literature 
devoted to an exposition of the appropriate context for a 
system dynamics model in corporate and public policy. 
However, were that achievement to be the sole feature of this 
thesis then its content would be reduced by perhaps some 75 per 
cent. That this is not so is due to three illustrations of 
system dynamics models, of specific corporate and public policy 
issues. Thus, in concluding this first chapter it is necessary 
to introduce the models contained in the four remaining chap- 
ters. (References for each chapter, including this one, are 
placed at the end of the chapter, rather than as one overall 
listing at the back of the thesis. ) Each model has been assem- 
bled with the purpose of enlightening the issue for those 
senior managers, directors, civil servants, professionals and 
students who are variously concerned with its resolution. Each 
example should conform to the framework for effective use of 
system dynamics models set out above. The first one concerns 
production technology policy in the U. K. steel industry, the 
second the transmission of HIV infection and the third, by 
means of a model of a corporate collapse, defines one use of a 
system dynamics model in the business school curriculum. 
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The steel industry model is described in detail in chapter 3 
although some relevant background material on the structure, 
technology options and strategic policy over the last twenty- 
five years has been included separately in chapter 2. This is 
because a full understanding of the setting for the model will 
considerably assist the reader in evaluating its utility as a 
catalyst to thinking about technology policy in the industry. 
The model challenges widely held views about the benefits of 
economies of scale. It focuses particularly on the 'heavy end' 
of steel making which operates as a continuous process. Within 
this sphere of operations the blast furnace is singled out 
principally because this production unit has perhaps, above all 
others, exhibited significant increases in size designed to 
procure lower unit costs of production. 
An extension of the steel industry model explores the greater 
flexibility arising from adoption of the leading-edge produc- 
tion technology in the industry, namely the electric arc fur- 
nace-. Steel production by this method eliminates the iron- 
making stage altogether; arc melting shops take steel scrap as 
their raw material. As compared with the blast furnace process 
route, electric steelmaking avoids lengthy periodically enfor- 
ced maintenance work which can often coincide with a boom in 
the steel cycle and result in rapidly extending delivery delays 
for the customers. 
The model describing the spread of the human immuno-deficiency 
virus, the causative agent of AIDS, within the male homosexual 
population of the U. K. should be seen as the first stage in 
the production of a more comprehensive model which will inform 
public policy on AIDS. This is not to denigrate the existing 
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model whiqh addresses spread within the risk group accounting 
for some 80% of known AIDS cases in the United Kingdom. 
However, cases within the other two main risk groups, 
intravenous drug users and non-monogamous sexually active 
heterosexuals, are now growing rapidly, far more so than in the 
male homosexual population. Because the total number of cases 
in the heterosexual community is potentially so much greater, 
there is a pressing need to produce models which will focus 
debate on what could conceivably happen in this risk group and 
when, and also to identify the scope for effective intervention 
by the various agencies involved. 
The model of the spread of HIV disease is, first and foremost, 
to be viewed as an initiative in producing a public policy sup- 
port tool. However, in going some way towards achieving this 
goal, a degree of medical and scientific detail has been 
unavoidably incorporated. It is possible that one outcome of 
the work will be some new pointers for the conduct of 
epidemiological modelling but, if this should transpire, it is 
to be regarded as a by-product and not the primary purpose of 
the research. Any promising avenues of inquiry in this direc- 
tion can be explored further by the relevant specialists in 
epidemiology and public health. 
Having described two, quite different, system dynamics models 
in the work situation it is perhaps appropriate to include also 
an example showing how such models can be harnessed in the 
teaching situation. System dynamics models have a quite 
considerable potential to offer insights to students as part of 
their learning process almost irrespective of their subject of 
study, although clearly business and economics students have 
I 
page 79 
most to gain. 
Four specific target groups of individuals can be identified 
covering post-experience / continuing education and 
undergraduate / postgraduate studies. These groups are (i) 
senior managers or directors who help to shape policy in a firm 
or in government, (ii) middle managers who take decisions 
within a given policy framework, (iii) MBA students on Business 
Policy type courses and finally (iv) students on business and 
other courses who have a reasonably high standard of numeracy. 
The first group are typically very -senior people and their 
'learning' is best conducted as part of their normal policy- 
making activities at work. The steel model described in chap- 
ter-3 might be typical of the kind of policy model with which 
they are confronted in an effort to challenge accepted beliefs 
(their 'mental models'). They -would rarely, if ever, leave 
their work situation in order to receive continuing education. 
This is not the case with managers in category (ii) who can be 
placed in workshop and-learning laboratory situations designed 
to help them better understand, through model-based gaming 
activities, the consequences of their particular role in the 
operations of their firm. Kim (1989) describes one such 
"managerial practice field" designed for claims managers in the 
insurance industry. Gaming activities are hardly appropriate 
for category (i) people. As DeGeus (1988) comments, "We didn't 
feel we could go to executives who run some of the biggest com- 
panies in the world and say, 'Come on, let's have a little 
game I ". 
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Model-based games for students in category (iii) are also 
starting to appear (Sterman, 1988). Along with the model 
content of the learning laboratory concept for category (ii) 
people, such initiatives are driven by the fact that the 
'students$ cannot be expected to formulate model equations and 
therefore have to be presented with a simple interface which 
can allow the model (play) to be stopped at periodic intervals 
and action choices polled from the teams. But do the 
participants actually learn anything from such games? As soon 
as an element of competition is introduced into the workshop 
situation, 9playing to win' may overcome the notion of 'playing 
to learn' Halting the model at pre-determined intervals is 
questionable also. In real-life, executives will intervene 
strategically when they agree that action needs to be taken. 
The corollary for system dynamics modelling software is quite 
clear in this context: real time colour graph plotting needs 
to be augmented with a capability to intervene at any time in 
order to revise policies and not only when the model has 
reached one of the periodic 'decision points'. 
The model of a real-life case study presented in chapter 5 is 
designed for category (iv) students. No element of competition 
is involved. A small group would study the case and then 
either create a model which represented the situation as it 
existed, following this with explorations investigating alter- 
native strategic policies, or merely conduct the explorations 
using a model reflecting the 9as was, situation and which had 
been formulated previously by the instructor. In either 
choice, avoidance of a gaming environment would be achieved. 
Via the model, students would obtain rapid feedback on the 
effects of chosen alternative policies and their learning 
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concerning the formulation of system dynamics models would be 
consolidated with their learning concerning business policy. 
Moreover, the inevitable small-group debate and discussion 
would prepare such students well for their subsequent work 
experience. If the students of today are used to learning via 
dialogue based around scenarios derived from a computer model, 
then there is every reason to expect that the policy-makers of 
tomorrow will want to do the same. 
0 
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2 THE BRITISH STEEL INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, TECHNOLOGY AND POLICIES 
2.1 A History of the Organisation of the Steel Industry since 
1967 
The production of steel in the United Kingdom is dominated by 
the British Steel Corporation (now British Steel p1c) formed 
through the Iron and Steel Act of 1967. This Act transferred, 
on 28 July 1967 (Vesting Day), the fourteen largest crude steel 
producing companies to public ownership. Companies whose 
annual crude steel output averaged less than 482,600 tons 
remained in the private sector and in the same year the British 
Independent Steel Producers Association (B. I. S. P. A. ) was 
created to represent the interests of such firms who numbered 
some one hundred and fifty initially (Vaizey, 1974). 
The role of the independent steel producers should not be 
underplayed; throughout the 1970's they averaged 22% of steel 
delivered to UK consumers and stockholders (Bryer et al, 1982). 
While the majority were re-rolling and finishing concerns, tak- 
ing the bulk of their supplies. from the Corporation itself, a 
number of them were engaged in iron making, to supply foundries 
with pig iron, and steel making of predominantly special 
grades. The re-rolling and finishing firms possessed twin 
advantages of small size and flexibility; they could easily 
handle small orders for particular sizes or quality of product. 
Further, inasmuch as the independents are virtually the sole 
propagators of the "mini-mill" concept in UK steel production, 
their role could be even more important, as is explained later. 
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Of the firms taken into public ownership by the British Steel 
Corporation there were thirty-nine crude steel producing works, 
including twenty-one that were fully integrated, which means 
that they possessed a blast furnace(s) from which molten iron 
could be generated, for use in steel making. 
Following renationalisation in 1967 the Corporation was 
organised around individual companies mainly grouped according 
to a geographical basis. There were four groups established 
and their main constituent companies are indicated below: 
Midland Group based on English Steel and United Steel 
in the Sheffield/Rotherham area, together 
with Appleby/Frodingham at Scunthorpe and 
the Workington and Barrow works of United 
Steel. 
Northern and based on Dorman Long; South Durham; 
Tubes Group Stewarts and Lloyds and Consett. 
Scottish and based on Colvilles; John Summers and Lan- 
North West Group cashire Steel. 
South Wales Group based on Richard Thomas and Baldwins; 
The Steel Company of Wales and Guest 
Keen's Cardiff works. 
Using figures provided by Cockerill- (1974) it is possible to 
estimate the respective shares of these groups to the national 
total of such companies' finished steel production. This is 
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given in Table 2.1 
Midland Group 20% 
Northern & Tubes Group 26% 
Scottish and N. West Group 21% 
South Wales Group 33% 
100% 
Table 2.1 Estimated proportion of Finished Steel Production 
accounted for by the four geographical groupings on formation 
of the B. S. C. 
N. B. (i) Based on 1964-65 figures for finished steel 
production, with 1963-64 figures used for three 
works. 
(ii) Certain works output figures were spread over more 
than one of the above groupsý 
Despite deficiencies in the compilation of Table 2.1 it is 
still possible to discern the importance of sheet, strip and 
coil products to the total national output, for these are 
predominantly the product types made in South Wales and which 
are purchased mainly by the consumer durables and motor vehicle 
industries. 
This scheme of multi-product groupings was to last but three 
years Following arguments, put f orward by the Corporation, 
that employees' loyalty was more to their individual company 
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than to the Corporation as a whole, pressure was put on 
Ministers to dissolve the company structure and transfei, their 
entire assets fully to the British Steel Corporation. Further 
advantages said to be obtainable from this move concerned the 
promotion of rationalisation and the effective planning of 
capacity on a product basis. Accordingly, in the Iron and 
Steel Act of 1969, the company structure was dissolved and one 
year later emerged an organisation by product grouping which 
was to last for some seven years. 
Six products divisions were created in 1970 but two involved 
constructional engineering and chemicals. The four remaining 
steel product groups were General Steels, based on Glasgow; 
Special Steels based on Sheffield; Strip Mills Division based 
on Cardiff and Tubes Division based on Corby. 
An analysis of the Annual Report and Accounts of the Corpora- 
tion for 1987-88 shows that the Strip Products Group accounted 
for 45% of total liquid steel production, 47% of total 
deliveries and contributed 45% of the home and export turnover 
of E3.7 billion. Therefore, given its prominence together with 
the known fluctuations in demand for the products-of this sec- 
tor, it is the strip mills which seem a reasonable focus of 
attention although it must be stated that the model developed 
in chapter 3 could apply equally well to a works producing 
general steels. 
Demand fluctuations arise through the unique chain of supply 
leading from the steel mills to steel stockholders and thence 
to the motor vehicle/durable consumer goods industries. The 
fortunes of end-user firms in the motor vehicle and durable 
goods manufacturing sector are inextricably linked to the 
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demand for steel and this is widely recognised (NEDO, 1986; 
Jones and Cockerill, 1984). In the case of crude steel making 
(the "heavy-end" of operations) it is the same production 
structure irrespective of which finished products are made-, 
product differentiation arises from the ingot stage onwards and 
is described in the next section. 
Organisational restructuring did not end with the scheme 
implemented in 1970, however. On 4 April 1976 yet another new 
divisional set-up was created which bore some resemblance to a 
synthesis of the two previous schemes. Five manuf acturing 
divisions were formed on a geographical basis, each being 
related to one of the major steelmaking areas and acting, 
previously as a profit centre, but now as a cost or performance 
centre. These were: Scunthorpe; Teesside; Sheffield; Scot- 
tish; Welsh. Additionally certain smaller steelworks and also 
non-integrated rolling mills were to be allocated to one or 
other of the five manufacturing divisions on the basis of 
either geographical proximity or affinity of product, providing 
they were not otherwise incorporated into one of the continuing 
or new profit centres. 
An important consequence of this was that marketing policies, 
along with individual plant loadings, were not to be handled by 
the manufacturing divisions themselves but rather by four 
Product Units, each of which would be responsible for a range 
of products across the entire Corporation. These were: - 
BSC Billet, Bar & Rod Products 
BSC Sections 
BSC Plates 
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BSC Strip Mills Products 
In effect, three of the existing four product divisions in 
being in 1975 (General Steels, Strip Mills and Special Steels) 
were replaced; the fourth, Tubes Division, remained intact but 
was extracted from the mainstream iron and steelmaking sector 
to form a profit centre in its own right. 
The new organisation effectively implied, for those three 
steelmaking divisions replaced, that changed circumstances had 
prevented control of their manufacturing and commercial func- 
tions continuing through the same organisation., This feature 
was satisfactory where sales and manufacturing of a single 
product division could be carried on without significant over- 
lap but, in the climate anticipated in the mid-19709s, multi- 
product plants in certain of the Corporation's major steelmak- 
ing centres (e. g. South Teesside and Ravenscraig) were seen in 
part as essential to sound development. 
Another feature, which, it is suggested by Charteris (1975), 
had surrounded the pattern of organisation adopted from 1970 to 
1975, was that the separate divisions, each then possessing 
their own commercial and plant loading responsibilities, could 
choose to manufacture what was convenient and profitable from 
their own point of view, rather than what the overall market 
situation dictated. With the removal of the divisional 
management layer, the necessary degree of control could now be 
exercised directly over the steel producing centres. 
A White Paper (H. M. S. O., 1975) which was laid before Parliament 
on 7 August 1975 contained the details of the new 
organisational structure outlined above and, in particular, 
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stressed how emphasis was to be placed on customer service 
through the Product Units. Customer service staff, providing a 
fundamental element in the link between manufacturing and 
sales, were to be introduced at every works under the line com- 
mand of the sales function but operating closely with works 
management. Under this regime, it was hoped the best possible 
relationship between works and customer would be established. 
The crucial function of future capacity planning was also to be 
continued on a product basis. Development planning units for 
the main product groupings were to be established. These, 
although part of Head Office, would be located near the related 
Product Unit and would work closely with that unit so that 
proper account was taken of commercial considerations from the 
early stages of planning investment proposals. 
Subsequent to 1975 little happened on the organisational front 
within the BSC. The period coincided with a downturn in the 
market which became much more severe over the turn of the 
decade. The Corporation were concerned with external issues 
rather than internal organisational matters. The external 
threat emanated from Brussels; the BSC needed to fight their 
corner because the EEC declared a Manifest Crisis in the steel 
industry in 1980. 
In the mid 1980's profitability returned and the government 
decided it was time for the largest organisational change yet. 
The British Steel Corporation became British Steel pic with the 
passing of the British Steel Act of 1988. The prospectus was 
issued in November and the company returned to private owner- 
ship (albeit as a single entity) one month later (Aylen, 1988). 
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2.2 The Technology of the Steel Industry since the Bessemer 
process 
2.2.1 Iron Making 
Apart from electric arc steelmaking, whichever process is 
employed for the production of molten (crude) steel it is 
necessary, firstly, to provide a source of molten iron (or pig 
iron) which is the product of one or more blast furnaces. A 
flow block diagram of the main inputs and outputs in the 
production of pig iron is shown in figure 2.1 . 
COKE Coal Ore fines 
PLANT SINTER 
MACHINE Limestone (flux 
Coke fines (breeze), 
Mill scale 
& Flue dust 
(recycled from 
4 Sinter downstream 
BLAST Iron ore, pellets 
processes) 
Coke % FURNACE 
Limestone 
Heated Air. L. Slag 
Molten 
(pig) 
Iron 
Figure 2.1 Flow Block Diagram of the production of pig iron 
The coke plant heats coal in the absence of air thus resulting 
in the separation of some portion of the non-carbon 
constituents of the coal from the product itselfs which is coke 
(a mixture of 90% carbon, the remainder being ash and sulphur). 
page 96 
Sintering is the process that agglomerates fine ore particles 
to form an iron-rich clinker which is charged into the blast 
furnace. It has the effect of increasing blast furnace 
efficiency by decreasing the weight of the charge required in 
the furnace to produce a ton of pig iron. The production of 
the clinker is accomplished by mixing heated coke dust with an 
ore and flux charge. This offers an additional advantage in 
that mill scale and flue dust, from the downstream finishing 
and steel making processes respectively, can be recycled, 
further justifying the term "integrated steelworks". 
Iron-making in the blast furnace(s) is the essential first 
process in the manufacturing cycle for finished steel products. 
Molten iron is produced by the reduction of iron ore (a 
chemical term which in this context means that elemental iron 
is separated from the oxygen with which it is combined in iron 
ore) and this comprises the main proportion of the "burden" or 
charge fed in at the top of the furnace. Other components of 
the burden are sinter, coke and limestone in controlled 
proportions. The whole of the charge is f ired and f anned to 
white hot intensity by blasts of superheated air blown in from 
the bottom. This results in the separation of molten iron from 
slag which floats on the surface and which is periodically 
drawn off. 
The metallic part of the ore is thus separated from the non- 
metallic and from impurities. It is then tapped off ready for 
the steel conversion process. "Hot metall"is the term used in 
the industry to describe this molten iron which is 90%-95% pure 
but which still contains certain impurities, the most important 
of which are carbon, sulphur, phosphorus, manganese and 
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silicon. 
By the nature of the processes involved, therefore, the produc- 
tion of molten iron in a blast furnace is a continuous one. 
The charging of the burden at the top carries on alongside the 
tapping of the slag and the molten iron from the bottom. It is 
a cycle which can often continue uninterrupted for anything up 
to six years or more until such time that the refractory (heat- 
resistant) brick lining of the furnace begins to deteriorate, 
at which point re-lining is indicated. This continuity of 
production from a blast furnace, with interspersed periods of 
enforced downtime, is an important feature of the overall steel 
making process and plays a significant part in the model of the 
strategic technology issues in the industry, described in the 
following chapter. Further, the physical output per unit time 
is obviously fixed by the capacity of the furnace and only 
variations in the quality of the burden allow a yield variation 
from the furnace. This is typically of the order of 15% of the 
furnace's nominal capacity. 
Over the years, blast furnaces have reduced in number while the 
output per furnace per annum, has increased quite markedly. 
Figure 2.2 shows a graph depicting this long-term trend in the 
case of the UK steel industry. The increased volume of output, 
achieved in circumstances where the average number of furnaces 
in blast was falling, was a direct result of an increase in the 
size of furnaces installed; figure 2.3 presents this feature 
through two histograms of blast furnace hearth diameter, one 
relating to 1955 and the other to 1988. In 1955 the largest 
furnace had a hearth diameter just in excess of 7 metres while 
by 1988 the largest had increased to 14 metres. This stemmed 
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directly from the desire to achieve economies of scale in both 
construction and operating costs, a desire that was apparently 
in evidence world-wide. In Japan, for instance, where steel- 
making only took off in the 1950's, their reliance on large 
scale plant led to the position in- 1968 where they "had seven 
of world's ten largest blast furnaces" (Cockerill, 1974). 
AVERAGE NUMBER OF FURNACES IN BLAST AND OUTPUT PER FURNACE PER ANNUM 
(Source: Iron G Steel Statistics Bureau) 
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Figure 2.2 Average number of furnaces in blast and output per 
furnace per annum 
An analysis of the number of blast furnaces of all sizes, using 
the data underlying the two histograms in figure 2.3, reveals a 
reduction from 138 furnaces in -1955 to 17 furnaces in 1988. 
The data underlying the graph in figure 2.2 gives 99 furnaces 
in 1955 and 11 in 1988. However, figure 2.2 is based on the 
average number of furnaces in blast while the histograms merely 
relate to furnaces in existence; the need to 'blow out' fur- 
naces for relining explains the discrepancy in the figures. 
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BL AST FURNACE HEARTH DIAMETERS IN 1955 AND 1988 (BROKEN 
LINE) SOURCE: ISSB 
0 
da 
c 
L 
D 
LL 
4- 
0 
L 
at 
.0 
-.  I ---.  
468 10 12 
Mid-point of Hearth Diameter Range In metres 
(Largest ceLL Is >10m) 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Figure 2.3 Frequency distribution of blast furnace hearth diameters 
2.2.2 Steelmaking: Overview 
While iron-making employs the chemical reaction of reduction, 
steel-making makes use of the opposite, which is oxidisation. 
The various impurities in the molten iron, listed above, are 
removed from the metallic charge because they combine with 
oxygen (oxidise) according to their affinity for oxygen at the 
prevailing temperatures. The practical result of this is that 
a slag is formed on the surface of the molten metal and this 
slag is then drawn off. With the impurities removed, the mol- 
ten iron is converted into molten steel. 
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In this century there have been essentially four main tech- 
nologies involved in the production of molten (liquid) steel, 
the earliest of which was the Bessemer process. Cockerill 
(1975) notes, though, that as early as the First World War the 
Bessemer process had begun to be replaced by the Siemen open- 
hearth process which, in turn, has been superseded by the Basic 
Oxygen System (B. O. S. ). Electric arc furnaces, however, have 
been around for some time and lately their attractiveness has 
come to be recognised more widely. 
An account will now be given of each of these latter three 
technologies in some more detail. 
2.2.3 Steelmaking: Open Hearth Process 
This incorporates a long shallow bath (hearth) into which the 
hot metal is poured, along with scrap and limestone, and then 
the charge is exposed (open) to a sweep of flames. The high 
temperature reaction causes unwanted elements to oxidise and 
combine with the limestone to form slag which separates from 
the metal. This process can be assisted by the injection of 
oxygen into the furnace through water-cooled lances. Af low 
block diagram of the process is shown as figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4 Flow Block Diagram of the Open Hearth Process 
Because the operation takes so much longer than the Bessemer 
process, a greater degree of control over the composition of 
the charge (and the resultant quality of the steel) can be 
exerted. Indeed, sampling of the metal takes place at regular 
intervals in order to assess its quality. 
Further advantages which this process has, relative to the Bes- 
semer process, are as follows: 
I 
(a) A larger proportion of scrap may be used in the charge. 
The open hearth process is the most flexible of the three in 
this respect. Anything from 30% to 100% of scrap may be 
utilised in the charge (Russell and Vaughn, 1976). Obviously, 
this was the main reason for its popularity over the Bessemer 
process earlier in this century, because the supply of steel 
scrap dramatically increased with the output of manufactured 
goods. 
(b) The - process is more adaptable with regard to impurity 
content- since the molten iron does not have to provide 
sufficient impurities to keep the charge molten as in the Bes- 
semer process. 
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(c) Air-blasting is required in the Bessemer process and the 
nitrogen 'component in this can dissolve, adversely affecting 
the quality of the mild steel demanded by the motor vehicle 
industry. In the Open Hearth process air is not blasted 
through the molten metal. 
The adoption of the Open Hearth process meant that, by the 
beginning of the 1950's, almost 90% of British steel was made 
using that technology (Cockerill, 1975). The last plants using 
this process were finally closed in 1980. 
2.2.4 Steelmaking: Basic Oxygen Process 
In the decade beginning 1950 much research effort was exerted 
on improving the efficiency of the steel conversion process. 
The breakthrough came in Austria where the Linz-Donawitz (L-D) 
process was devised. This involves blowing oxygen down onto 
the surface of the charge using a water-cooled lance held two 
feet above it. It represented a viable proposition given the 
newly available capabilities of large-scale oxygen generating 
plant. 
The charge is placed in a cylinder-shaped converter which is 
tilted to facilitate this operation. On returning to its 
vertical position, oxygen blowing commences while lime is added 
as a flux to help carry off the oxidised impurities as a float- 
ing layer of slag. Once the metal has been refined, it is tap- 
ped out into a ladle until only the slag remains. The vessel 
is turned completely upside-down to remove the slag which is 
disposed of to a slag pool. A flow block diagram of this 
process is shown below as figure 2.5. 
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Figure 2.5 Flow Block Diagram of the Basic Oxygen Process 
The essential features and advantages of the process can be 
summarised as follows: - 
(a) Raw materials of varying phosphorus content may be used 
and a wider range of steels produced. 
(b) Oxygen converter steel does not suffer from nitrogen 
brittleness and so has an improved quality. 
(c) The scrap added to the charge acts as a coolant thereby 
improving the thermal efficiency which is high enough to offset 
the cost of tonnage oxygen. (However, the scrap content is not 
as variable as with the Open Hearth process nor as significant 
as in the Electric Arc process; normally no more than 30% of 
the charge will be scrap, the rest being molten iron or high 
grade iron ore. ) 
(d) The process is capable of higher production rates than 
the Bessemer or Open Hearth methods. 
Perhaps its most significant advantage stems from (d) above. 
The increased speed with which this process could rid the mol- 
ten iron of impurities allowed considerable cost savings per 
ton of steel produced. These savings were reinforced by the 
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potential for increasing the size of the steel converter ves- 
sels and reducing the production cycle time. Whereas an Open 
Hearth furnace might take 10 hours to convert 350 tonnes of 
iron into steel, a Basic Oxygen furnace will take a charge of 
350 tonnes or more and convert it into steel in 40 minutes 
(British Steel Corporation, 1972). Comparisons between the 
Basic Oxygen System and the Open Hearth method can be found in 
Rosegger (1980) and Dilley and McBride (1967). 
The Basic Oxygen System (B. O. S. ) became the industry standard 
for bulk steel-making and lay at the heart of international 
developments that dramatically increased the optimum scale of 
steel-making operations from the point of view of production 
efficiency. Increasing the rate of steel conversion generated 
the expansion of blast furnace size (previously discussed) 
because, with about 70% of the total charge being hot iron, the 
process can be installed only at works having blast furnaces. 
However, the consequences of all these developments could be 
more damaging than beneficial and one of the purposes of the 
model described later is to assess the effects of the vastlY 
increased scale of operations such as has occurred. 
2.2.5 Steelmaking: Electric Arc Furnace 
Originally, this method of steel-making was confined to special 
high quality steel but now it can be employed in the production 
of large tonnages of the more widely used steels. Indeed, it 
is claimed to be on the point of being one of the technologies 
capable of producing flat steel products (Barnett and Crandall, 
1986). The furnace itself consists of a circular bath with a 
movable roof through which three carbon electrodes are either 
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raised or lowered. At the start of the process the electrodes 
are withdrawn and the roof is swung clear allowing the steel 
scrap (the sole content of the charge) to be dropped in. Next 
the roof is swung back, the electrodes inserted and a powerful 
electric current is passed through the charge. An arc is 
struck and the heat generated melts the scrap. Lime, fluorspar 
and iron oxide additions are made and these combine with the 
impurities in the metal to form a slag. Once this has been 
removed the furnace can be tilted and the molten steel is tap- 
ped off. In this way a large electric arc furnace produces 
about 150 tonnes of steel in 4 hours (British Steel Corporation 
1972). A flow block diagram of this process, which eliminates 
the need for coking, sintering and blast furnaces, is given 
below in figure 2.6 . 
Scr, ap Addttions 
Electricity ELECTRIC 
ARC 
FURNACE Slag 
Molten Steel 
Figure 2.6 Flow Block Diagram of the Electric Arc Process 
The main advantages of electric arc furnaces, from the point of 
view of metallurgical processes, are listed below. 
(a) A definite and reliable removal of sulphur is achieved. 
(b) The carbon content of the steel can be held steady. 
(c) The addition of alloying elements can be made with 
precision. 
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(d) All the conditions are chemically clean. 
(e) Temperature control is easy. 
However, as will be described in the following chapter, this 
method of steel-making also has certain technological, 
financial and operational advantages which have propelled it to 
the forefront of discussion as regards choice of process route. 
Clearly, its total reliance on the availability of scrap ren- 
ders the electric arc process one which cannot be sited without 
due consideration to sources of supply. However, relative 
movements in the prices of fuels, scrap and hot metal mean that 
its popularity is growing. Smaller scale steelworks (known as 
mini-mills) have grown up using this technology, usually allied 
with continuous casting, which is described later. These works 
originated in the USA, where there are considerable numbers 
often located close to industrial areas that both supply the 
scrap and consume the finished product. Now, more of these 
smaller configurations are to be found in Western Europe and 
the UK, with outputs of anything up to one million tonnes per 
year, although half of Italy's mini-mill capacity, for example, 
is in plants making 200,000 tonnes a year or less (Aylen, 
1989). Mini steel works have fewer of the enormous overheads 
associated with large integrated works; a comprehensive assess- 
ment of their advantages can be found in Barnett and Crandall 
(1986). 
Figure 2.7 shows crude steel production by process over the 
last four decades. It is clear that both electric arc and 
B. 0. S. production suffered as a result of the 1980 steel 
strike and the UK recession during the period 1980-86, although 
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B. O. S. production has recovered significantly towards the end 
of the decade. 
It is readily apparent that, of the three steel making proces- 
ses, the Open Hearth method was one which experienced somewhat 
rapid decline. A glance at figure 2.7 serves to emphasise just 
how more important B. O. S. technology in the UK had become dur- 
ing the 1960's, although Cockerill (1975) notes, on the basis 
of an international comparison, that by 1968 only just under 
33% of UK steel was produced using the B. O. S. process whereas 
in Japan the corresponding figure stood at almost 75%. For 
1974 he claims that the UK figure for B. O. S. produced steel 
was still less than 50% of the total and figure 2.7 confirms 
this. 
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Figure 2.7 UK Crude Steel Production by Process 
U. K. CRUDE STEEL PRODUCTION BY PROCESS 
(Source: Iron G Steel StatistIcs Bureau) 
page 108 
2.2.6 Semi-Finished Shaping via Ingot Casting 
The ingot is the basic unit of the steel industry. It is 
formed when molten steel is poured into a special mould and 
allowed to cool. Afterwards, the mould is removed and the 
solidified steel remains. Moulds can be of differing 
dimensions and weights depending on the ultimate use to which 
the ingots are going to be put; they are reheated in soaking 
pits and rolled to produce Isemis' -- either slabs, blooms or 
billets. A slab is the basic semi-finished shape in the strip 
mills and in cross-section it is rectangular with a typical 
size being 6 inches thick and up to 60 inches wide (or at least 
twice as wide as it is thick). A bloom is square in cross- 
section, being up to 8 inches square, while a billet is 
normally much smaller than a bloom although retaining its 
square cross-section. It is likely to measure up to 4 inches 
square. Both the latter two semi-finished shapes are charac- 
teristic of output from what was the General Steels Division 
until 1976. 
A billet is derived by hot-rolling of a bloom and the extra 
rolling makes billets suitable for lighter steel section 
products, while blooms are used for heavy sections. This is 
depicted in figure 2.8 
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Figure 2.8 Hierarchical tree diagram of the processing of blooms 
Slabs, on the other hand, are input to the strip mills to be 
flat-rolled into plate, sheet and strip, such products being 
differentiated according to their thickness. 
Blooms, billets and slabs are subject to further processing at 
the finishing stage (described below) either within an 
integrated steel -mill or, following sale, by one of the 
independent steel producers who have finishing (but no produc- 
tion) facilities. Such firms are often called 'Ire-rollers". . 
Two points should be noted in respect of semi-finished shaping 
via, the ingot casting route. Firstly, there is a time delay 
between the ingot being cast, its subsequent removal from the 
mould and-immersion in the soaking pits. Therefore, it is pos- 
sible to stockpile ingots at this point although the industry 
prefers to keep little more than an in-process inventory 
because of the need to subsequently re-heat the ingots in soak- 
ing pits. Thermal loss occurs if ingots are stocked for any 
appreciable length of time and so most are processed quite 
quickly into semi-finished shapes. 
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Secondly, as in many stages of steel production, there is a 
loss in yield due to scrap, scale and dust. In particular, 
scrap loss occurs in pouring, unmoulding, rolling and trimming. 
Russell and Vaughan (1976) have estimated the scrap loss from 
steel furnace to semi-finished shape at 14.3%; overall losses 
in yield between these two stages are put at 16%, the figure 
for slabs being slightly higher while that for blooms and bil- 
lets is slightly lower. 
2.2.7 Semi-Finished Shaping via Continuous Casting 
This is a technique for directly producing the desired semi- 
finished shape from Crude steel and has the advantage of by- 
passing- the increasingly expensive and time-consuming 
operations of ingot casting and primary rolling. The molten 
metal is poured into a trough from which it flows into one or 
more water-cooled moulds which cause the metal to solidify on 
the outside. From this point on, rollers propel the shape 
through further direct water sprays and eventually hydraulic 
shears or torches cut the desired length. Yields are somewhat 
higher with this method; the estimate given by Russell and 
Vaughn (1976) is 96.3% from molten steel to semi-finished 
shape. 
Given below -is a flow block diagram of the casting of semi- 
finished shapes by, both methods. 
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Figure 2.9 Flow Block Diagram of the Casting of Semi-Finished Steel 
2.2.8 Steel Finishing Processes 
It will be convenient if-- the finishing processes are 
illustrated by the sequence appropriate to slabs because these 
are converted into flat products (coil and strip) the product 
sector suffering the most volatile customer demand. While the 
finishing processes in the case of blooms and - billets are 
similar to those for slabs, they exhibit less variety. 
Slabs held at the head of the hot strip mill (the first of the 
finishing processes) are the main strategic stock of semi- 
finished steel. Indeed, the end of the slabbing mill can be 
thought of as representing the dividing line between the 
continuous process phase of steel-making (the "heavy end") and 
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batch production runs of finished products. Customer orders 
are associated with specific quantities of steel only after the 
slabbing stage. 
Initially, slabs are reheated to bring them up to the required 
working temperature. While this process is similar to that 
undergone by ingots it is less extensive, hence the preference 
in the industry for stocking slabs as opposed to ingots. A 
further reason for a strategic stock of slabs is, as mentioned 
above, that it just happens to represent the primary source of 
steel which can be sensibly earmarked to a customer order. 
Steel stocked downstream from this point is usually just in- 
process stock necessitated by the physical need to decouple 
successive processes from one another. In addition, changes in 
the chemistry of the metal after hot-rolling (e. g. age har- 
dening) make it financially important that no stocked steel is 
scrapped due to lack of sufficient customer orders. 
Once the required reheating temperature is attained the white- 
hot slab is passed between rolls (hence the term "hot-rolling") 
to break off the scale present on the surface of the metal and 
latterly to promote a reduction in thickness and an increase in 
length. A consequence of this is an increase in speed: a slab 
may enter the hot strip mill at 4 to 5 m. p. h measuring 20 feet 
long and 5 inches thick and be transformed in the space of a 
few minutes into a strip of steel 1000 feet long and about one- 
tenth of an inch thick travelling at 30 m. p. h. along the run 
out table. The hot-rolled steel can then be presented as 
either guillotined lengths (plate and sheet) or rolled onto a 
core (coil) . The difference between plate and sheet/coil is 
one of thickness; plate refers to any flat steel product at 
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least 3mm thick. 
In scheduling the hot strip mill a certain sequence of width 
and guage changes is adhered to in order to prevent an exces- 
sive rate of wear on the rolls. For a given guage of steel the 
metal is processed in a sequence of widths which, from one run 
to the next, f orm the pattern of a cof f in, as depicted in 
figure 2.10. A maximum limit on the amount rolled of any width 
is set according to quality standards. Exceeding this limit 
causes fleck scale to appear on the surface of the metal. 
Figure 2.10 The usual sequence of widths used for Hot Rolling 
batches 
One complete sequence, according to the above pattern, is cal- 
led a "round" and a series of rounds, of increasing guages of 
steel, is done each week. Every 1-2 weeks it is necessary to 
replace the rolls with the back-up group and this involves a 
machine set-up. 
While hot rolling of steel produces a material which can be 
sold "as is", the process itself limits the thickness to which 
the metalýcan be rolled together with the quality of the sur- 
f ace produced. For very thin guages or metal with a high 
quality surface finish it is necessary to have the steel sub- 
jected to cold reduction which is the next process downstream. 
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Hot rolled coil is sold for heavier end-use applications than 
cold reduced while the private sector re-rolling concerns also 
take hot rolled steel, as an alternative to slabs, for input to 
their own finishing operations. 
Prior to entry into the cold reduction mill it is necessary to 
pass the coils through a continuous pickling line. This is a 
series of baths containing dilute acid that have the effect of 
removing surface scale, which has formed during storage of the 
steel or as part of the hot rolling processes. 
The major finished product arising from the processing of slabs 
is cold reduced sheet or coil. The latter is more common 
nowadays because customers have available their own de-coiling, 
slitting, trimming and guillotining equipment and so accepting 
the steel in coil form (an average length of 8000 feet) 
presents no difficulties. Quantities of fixed lengths to 
requested dimensions (sheets) are still available but comprise 
a very small proportion of total production. 
The route followed in the cold reduction mill depends on 
whether the steel is to be sold "as is" or sent for further 
processing, for example as tinplate, widely used in the food 
processing industry, galvanised or plastic coated steel-. For 
standard cold reduced coil (e. g. for use in the motor industry 
and durable goods industries) the steel is merely passed 
through a four-stand (four pairs of rollers) cold reduction 
process. Because no heat is involved, thinner guage metal can 
be obtained whilst at the same time a finer surface quality can 
be achieved. 
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When the steel is to be subject to further processing, however, 
it must be annealed and tempered. The cold reductiorý process 
work-hardens the strip as well as reducing its thickness and 
the metal becomes brittle. Annealing (or softening) involves 
slow heating and cooling in an oxygen free atmosphere, takes 
anything from 15 to 45 hours to accomplish, and rids the metal 
of its brittleness. Finally, temper rolling allows the 
restoration of a reasonably hard surface to the strip while 
maintaining the ductility brought about during the annealing 
process. This is achieved by passing the metal through a pair 
of hard steel rolls which are loaded heavily enough to restore 
the hard surface of the metal without further reducing its 
thickness. 
The flow block diagram below, figure 2.11, shows the detailed 
processes involved in finishing and which have been described 
above. Beyond the temper rolling stage it can be seen that the 
steel can be subject to a process of coating. Which process is 
involved depends on the final use of the steel. For example, 
electrolytic tinning is used for the tinplating process while 
dipping the metal in baths of zinc produces galvanised steel. 
Plastic-coated steel is also available in a variety of colours. 
British Steel has a technological lead in this process which is 
carried out at its plant in Shotton, North Wales. 
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Figure 2.11 Flow Block Diagram of the Steel Finishing Processes 
The diagram above indicates that scrap loss occurs yet again in 
the processing of the metal. This feature is as common in the 
finishing stages as it is in the "heavy-end" of steel making. 
Russell and Vaughn (1976) estimate that the overall yield of 
final finished shapes from semis is 0.866 and from molten steel 
0.73 
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Clearly there is a considerable range of finished steel 
products and it might be useful to establish a percentage split 
in the total amount produced. Data shows that Llanwern steel- 
works, for example, exhibits the following split: 
Hot Rolled Coil 
Hot Rolled Sheet 
Cold Reduced Coil 
Cold Reduced Sheet 
Pickled Coil 
Pickled Sheet 
39% 
4% 
41% 
9% 
5% 
2% 
100% 
These figures also serve to reinforce the point made earlier in 
relation to sales of cut lengths (sheet) ; this is now only a 
relatively small proportion of total output. 
At another major works in (what was) the Strip Mills Division, 
Port Talbot, the following end-use split of production has been 
estimated. Here, no subdivision exists as between sheet and 
coil. 
Hot Rolled 15% 
Cold Reduced 35% 
Tinplate 40% 
Electrozinc 10% 
100% 
The importance of Port Talbot9s output going into tinplating is 
underlined by the above figures. 
Finally, to complement the above locally-produced figures it is 
perhaps worth presenting the national picture of the split in 
net home deliveries by UK steel producers. This table excludes 
material for conversion into other products listed and covers 
the entire product range. 
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Ingots, blooms, billets and slabs 5: 6% 
Rods and bars for reinforcement 7.0% 
Wire rods and other rods and bars in coil 7.5% 
Hot rolled bars in lengths 7.5% 
Bright steel bars 4.0% 
Light sections other than rails 2.2% 
Heavy and light rails and accessories 1.5% 
Other heavy sections 12.8% 
Plates 3mm thick and over 14.3% 
Sheets, under 3mm thick, coated and uncoated 14.3% 
Hot rolled strip 2.1% 
Cold rolled strip 3.6% 
Tinplate and backplate 6.1% 
Tubes and pipes (all sizes) 8.4% 
Tyres, wheels, axles and rolled rings 0.4% 
Forgings (other than drop forgings) 0.7% 
Castings 2.0% 
100.0% 
Table 2.2 Percentage split into the main product areas in 
the supply and disposal of finished steel 
From this table it can be seen that flat products account for 
40.4% of net home deliveries and this would certainly be higher 
if a more detailed split of the 5.6% of the total accounted for 
by "ingots, blooms, billets and slabs" were available. 
This part of the chapter has dealt in some detail with the 
processes and technology involved in present-day steelmaking. in 
Great Britain. For the purposes of the model outlined in the 
following chapter, however, some of this detail will be super- 
fluous. Nonetheless, it is necessary to cover this ground in 
order that the reader can appreciate the complexity of 
operations in the industry and obtain an enhanced understanding 
so that both numerical estimates of model parameters and tech- 
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nological policy options can be appraised intelligently. 
In conclusion figure 2.12 is presented. This shows, in sim- 
plified form, an overall schematic diagram of iron and steel 
making (flat products). In the diagram finished products, as 
opposed to processes, are set in a double rectangle. The split 
between the 'heavy end' and finishing operations is important 
and is encapsulated in the model described in the following 
chapter. 
I IRON MAKING I 
HOT METAL 
STEEL CONVERSIONf HE 
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Figure 2.12 Simplified schematic diagram of steelmaking operations 
and major finished items in the flat products division 
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2.3 A History of Policy in the Steel Industry over the last 
twenty-five years 
The initial period following vesting of the British Steel 
Corporation in 1967 concerned a preoccupation with what was 
termed the 'Heritage Strategy'. This involved concentrating 
developments on the large integrated steel plants inherited 
from the private sector. The corporation saw the future as one 
with the main bulk production of steel concentrated in large 
hot metal based plants using the basic oxygen system (B. O. S. ) 
for steel making. These plants were to be located at or near 
coastal sites and served from major iron ore terminals. 
By 1971 the results from many of these proposals were in place. 
Two-vessel B. O. S. plants were installed at the five main 
sites: Llanwern, Port Talbot, Ravenscraig, Teesside and 
Scunthorpe. Further, - much of the older open hearth plant had 
been closed down or was scheduled for closure. Coincident 
developments of iron ore ports to serve the large steelworks 
were also largely completed during this period. 
Whilst the Heritage Strategy was, to all intents and purposes, 
carried through, it was not particularly profitable. B. S. C. 
had stated in their Annual Report and Accounts for 1967/68 that 
proposals for new capital expenditure would be judged on the 
profitability of the investment and its discounted cash flow 
return. But by the early seventies it had become clear that, 
despite surviving government scrutiny and subsequent approval 
of the capital expansion, the Heritage Strategy was not going 
to be particularly profitable even when fully completed. The 
Corporation were in a dilemma. Their solution was to back the 
technological implications of the Heritage Strategy with all 
page 121 
the strength they could muster but in the form of a brand new 
Corporate Plan. A Corporation Development Plan was initiated 
in 1971 and this formed the basis of the B. S. C. 9s Ten Year 
Development Strategy published as a White Paper in 1973 
(H. M. S. O., 1973). 
The appearance of this document effectively signalled the death 
of the Heritage Strategy. In its place came a policy to build 
even larger plants at an even lower cost per tonne than 
anticipated by the abandoned strategy. Unit costs were 
paramount with little attention being given to the consequences 
of demand (and hence revenue) forecasts failing to be achieved. 
On this score, the only concession made by the B. S. C. was that 
the cons . truction of the proposed new plants would merely be 
delayed should market forces dictate. The plan outlined a 
programme that would take B. S. C. 's capacity from 27 million 
tonnes of liquid steel per annum (1973) to 33-35 million tonnes 
by the late 19709s and to 36-38 million toqnes during the first 
half of the 1980's. The five major steelmaking plants were 
each to be brought up to optimum capacity (which in the case of 
Port Talbot meant 6 million tonnes per annum) and a brand new 
steel complex would be created on the South bank of the Tees. 
Although the government had trimmed back B. S. C. 's expansion 
plans (for their 1971 Corporate Plan had opted for two new 
works) the entire plan was, within five years of its inception, 
shown to be hopelessly optimistic. A detailed analysis of the 
Corporation's economic planning (and much else besides) is 
contained in a book written by three University of Warwick 
academics (Bryer, Brignall and Maunders, 1982) who describe 
I themselves as management scientists but appear to have strong 
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accounting and financial expertise. Their analysis shows how 
optimistic B. S. C. had been. In 1973 B. S. C. forecasted that 
liquid steel consumption would be 30 million tonnes in 1980. 
The out-turn was not much above 20 million tonnes. 
The Bryer et al analysis is a strong indictment of the 
Corporation9s planning processes. Forecasts were made as point 
estimates with no consideration of possible deviations from the 
trend line. D. C. F. techniques and a Icomputerised economic 
planning model' were deployed as part of the evaluation of the 
available options prior to selection of the plan adopted. 
There is independent evidence that this was indeed the case 
(Morris, 1974). Sensitivity tests carried out on the discount 
rate chosen by the Corporation (16%) amounted to plus or minus 
2%. Overall, it would appear that the level of sophistication 
brought to bear on the background modelling work was not far 
from being -diametrically opposite to the methods it is the 
objective of this thesis to promulgate. 
In 1975/76 it was patently obvious that a significant recession 
had enveloped the UK steel industry. This recession heralded 
an important phase in the trend of steel consumption. For the 
first time since the Second World War, the trough in the steel 
cycle was at a point significantly lower than the previous one 
and it took production levels back to where they had been in 
the early 1960's. This is shown in f igure 2.13 along with 
another f eature which has been investigated already by other 
authors and is discussed in chapter 3: steel production fluc- 
tuates far more than consumption of finished steel. (The 
severe drop in production in 1980 was due to a major strike in 
the industry. ) 
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The growth in imported steel (also shown in figure 2.13) is 
disturbing. Imports rose markedly in the years 1971-74 during 
a period of rapid economic expansion and much of the imported 
steel was a direct result of B. S. C. 's inability to supply. But 
it appears as though a ratche, t mechanism operated in the 
19709s, perhaps for the first time. Once imports had ramped up 
they stayed that way, possibly because good customer relations 
were subsequently forged between UK steel importers and the 
(mainly EEC) foreign suppliers. The recent further increase in 
imports (coincident with another economic boom) is even more 
disturbing. It will be interesting to see if the ratchet 
effect of the 19709s is repeated. 
U. K. ANNUAL CRUDE STEEL PRODUCTIOK FINISHED STEEL CONSUMPTION AND 
IMPORTS OF TOTAL STEEL INDUSTRY PRODUCTS (SourCes: EConoMIC Trends & ISSS) 
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Figure 2.13 Crude steel production, finished steel consumption 
and imports of steel products 
During the 1970's the private -sector of the UK steel industry 
had been making significant progress. B. S. C. lost productive 
output to the private sector, to imports and, to a much lesser 
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extent, to a fall in the overall UK steel market. As mentioned 
earlier, the private sector share of the market was around 22% 
throughout the 19709s. Up until they began to lose market 
share B. S. C. included an analysis of the split in deliveries 
to U. K. consumers and stockholders in their annual report. 
Bryer et al (1982) attempted to extract figures for the latter 
years of that decade from the Corporation but were refused. A 
copy of the correspondence is included as an appendix in their 
book. 
The reasons for B. S. C. 9s losses to the private sector have been 
put down to the latter increasing its independent steel making 
capacity, modernising its rolling plant and increasing 
profitability (N. E. D. O., 1986). Private sector new investment 
rose from E36 million in 1968 to E120 million in 1975. The 
analysis by Bryer et al (1982) is quite unequivocal in its 
assertion of the reason for the success of the private sector. 
In modernising from the Open Hearth steelmaking technology they 
had gone for Electric Are furnaces (E. F. ), producing steel in 
small-scale plants which have become known as 'mini-mills'. 
These had several cost advantages over the large integrated 
steel works. Capital costs per tonne, operating costs per 
tonne and better labour productivity combined to ensure that, 
for certain throughput rates, the mini-mill was a more 
desirable production configuration than an integrated works. 
W. F. Cartwright, one time Deputy Chairman of B. S. C., suggested 
that the unit cost curves of the Blast Furnace/Basic Oxygen 
System and the Electric Furnace process routes were as shown in 
figure 2.14. The diagram is extracted from a paper he 
published in 1971 (Cartwright, 1971). 
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COMPARISON OF UNIT OUTPUT COSTS (TO THE START OF CONTINUOUS CASTING STAGE) 
FOR THE BLAST FURNACE AND ELECTRIC ARC PROCESS ROUTES 
I 
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Index of total unit cost for electric arc furnace 
Figure 2.14 Comparison of cost per tonne graphs for the BF/BOS 
and EF process routes 
The exact cut-off point between the two methods of steel making 
is determined by factors such as the price per tonne of coking 
coal and iron ore used by the integrated works set against the 
price per tonne of scrap and of electricity both used by the 
electric arc furnaces in the mini-mills. Despite the obvious 
support of a Deputy Chairman, the B. S. C. never embraced the 
mini-mill concept. In the 1971 Ten Year Development Plan the 
construction of two small new works based on the electric arc 
steelmaking technology was mentioned but construction had not 
even started before yet another White Paper called a halt to 
any expansion of steelmaking capacity. 
The epitaph on the Ten Year Development Strategy came with the 
publication of the 1978 White Paper, this time entitled 
9British Steel Corporation - the Road to Viability$ (H-M-S*099 
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1978). This was as gloomy a document as its predecessor f ive 
years earlier had been expansionist. Now B. S. C. policy was to 
get back to profitability by closing down either the entirety 
or the steel making end (heavy end) of those works which were 
not $large-scale producers9. In other words they proposed to 
buttress their arguments concerning low cost production in 
large integrated plants by closing down the smaller ones which, 
by implication, must be high cost plants (Bryer et al, 1982). 
Despite the initiation of' a government review of the closure 
proposals (conducted by Lord Beswick) steelmaking ceased at 
Corby, Consett and Shotton over the following five years. 
Bryer et al claimed that all three of these plants were 
financially viable. 
The recession deepened over the turn of the decade and the EEC 
was forced to declare a period of 'Manifest Crisis' in the 
industry in 1980. In 1980 alone UK crude steel production fell 
by 48% to 11.3 million tonnes from 21.5 million tonnes the year 
before, although 1980 was somewhat exceptional in that it also 
was the year of a three month steel 'strike (N. E. D. O., 1986). 
The EEC Declaration heralded a community-wide quota system for 
output and this was to last five years. B. S. C. policy dic- 
tated severe retrenchment. The labour force had already been 
cut by 42% between 1974 and 1980. It fell by a further 45% in 
the four years 1980-84 (N. E. D. O., 1986). Things reached such a 
critical state that steelmaking at one of the 'big five' 
integrated works (Ravenscraig) was likely to cease and the 
plant was earmarked for closure. However, the Scottish plant 
survived following a government review in 1985 but it lost its 
associated cold rolling plant at Gartcosh. 
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The steel cycle turned for the better in 1985-86 when, for the 
first time in a decade, B. S. C. made a profit. From that point 
onwards, and at least until the time of writing, policies on 
technology have not been called into question. Until the last 
eighteen months or so, demand has been trending upwards and in 
1987-88 B. S. C. made its largest ever profit. It was 
privatised, to become British Steel (B. S. ), at what will pos- 
sibly turn out to be the peak of the current steel cycle. 
Postscript In 1990 it was announced that Ravenscraig was to 
lose its hot strip mill in April 1991. With three hot strip 
mills in the Strip Products Group (Ravenscraig, Llanwern and 
Port Talbot) each was running at only, say, 70% of capacity 
because of a demand downturn. B. S. C. financial policy dic- 
tated that this was highly disadvantageous. The closure of one 
would mean that the other two could then operate at around, 
say, 95% of capacity and be profitable even after allowing for 
the extra transport costs of moving slabs from Scotland to 
South Wales. While this policy might provide a short-term gain 
to British Steel plc it begs the question of whether the 
organisation will be able to respond when demand turns up again 
in the mid to late 909s. The import ratchet may then once more 
move up a notch. 
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3A MODEL FOR TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
3.1 Introduction 
Having outlined the different technologies available in steel- 
making and the way these have changed over the last three 
decades, together with the policies adopted by B. S. C. 
management, it is now appropriate to evaluate, with the help of 
a model, those and other strategic policies insofar as they 
relate to the steelmaking technology employed. It will be seen 
that strategic policy in this industry fuses strongly with the 
technology in use. As already explained, the British Steel 
Corporation (B. S. C. ) declared that the way forward for the UK 
steel industry involved large integrated works which, in turn, 
implied a commitment to a certain type of steel technology. 
Profitability (arising directly from low unit costs of produc- 
tion) was paramount in the criteria which the directors of 
B. S. C. assessed when deciding on their policy. 
Unfortunately the achievement of low unit costs of production 
and its continued attainment over the course of the, typical 
four year economic cycle do not always go hand in hand. Their 
seeming neglect of the revenue side of the profitability equa- 
tion meant a potent force which could undermine the selected 
strategy went ignored. For a more robust strategic policy to 
emerge, especially in connection with an industry where the 
chosen technology is such an important facet to evaluate, the 
market as well as the cost side needs to be considered. 
The model described below attempts to capture the essential 
facets affecting strategic policy considerations in the steel 
industry insofar as they relate to the available steel making 
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technologies. Perhaps for the first time a policy support tool 
is provided which considers both the cost and market aspects of 
strategic policy choices. Further, it is hoped that the model 
will act as a focus of debate by industrial economists who, 
while able to conduct sound empirical and theoretical analyses 
of the cost side of the industry, are denied a suitable 
analytical tool which is capable of handling the implications 
of strategic policy choices for the revenue side. 
Before the detail of the model is described it will be useful 
to set the whole thing in context by describing some of the 
other modelling work which has been conducted in the steel 
industry. This involves techniques ranging from OR type 
optimising approaches through to econometric methods and system 
dynamics. 
3.2 A Review of Modelling Studies in the Steel Industry 
It is hardly surprising that the steel industry has been the 
subject of numerous modelling studies over the years. Given 
the large-scale nature of integrated steelworks, the fact that 
the production function features strongly in the studies 
reported is also unexceptional. The work undertaken can be 
categorised into O. R. type projects dealing with tactical and 
operational problems, econometric models examining the industry 
in aggregate and finally systems studies which concentrate 
either on a particular works, division or the entire industry. 
In very general terms and devoid of references to specific 
projects Disley (1990) gives an account of some of the problem 
areas which have been the subject of OR Studies in the British 
Steel Corporation (and now British Steel p1c). One much more 
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detailed account is given by Sutton and Coates (1981) and this 
is a prime example of the sort of project which examplifies the 
classical OR approach. The problem was to "provide a more 
scientific and objective base for the buying and use of raw 
materials" by BSC Stainless, a part of BSC Holdings. With an 
annual raw material purchase bill of E100 million the incentive 
was certainly there to optimise on the raw material mix used 
each day. The system developed was based on a mathematical 
programming model with results available for interrogation by 
personnel at several different locations within BSC by means of 
VDU screens and printers. A typical mix calculation considered 
up to 50 materials and up to 23 elements in each material with 
up to 10 calculations executed in any one working day. This 
was a vast improvement over the manual approach previously 
undertaken by Mixture Clerks. 
In a similar vein Jagers and Huisjes (1986) describe OR studies 
done in the Dutch steel industry, specifically for the 
Hoogovens Group. One concerns the decision of which finished 
products to produce in a strip mill and in what quantities. 
Again mathematical programming was employed to maximise the. 
profit subject to constraints such as the capacities of the 
rollers and the finishing lines together with bounds on the 
sales of different finished products. 
Another project described by these two authors concerned the 
problem of combining coils for pickling lines. Hot-rolled 
coils of steel have to be stripped of scale (an oxide skin) 
before being cold rolled. This involves uncoiling the steel 
and drawing it through a number of tubs filled with acid. 
Unpickled coils, on entry to the process, are welded to form an 
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unending strip and at the end of the production line the strip 
is sheared to form coils. A pickled coil has to contain an 
integer number of coils for the customer. 
In combining the input coils to form the output coils, 
questions like at which point should the strip be sheared and 
which order to enter the coils into the pickling line need to 
be answered with the objective of, amongst others, minimising 
the number of welds in the output coils. To carry out this 
project a heuristic approach was devised consisting of two 
parts. In the first part the most important cost component 
(called - the basic cost) of all possible solutions is 
determined. In the second part a more precise study of costs 
takes place, starting with the most promising point emerging 
from the first part. The authors note that the cost analysis 
inherent in the solution methodology led to insights which 
resulted in improvements in the production process and these 
improvements were independent of the method adopted for combin- 
ing coils. 
Noordman, Gillebaart and Seeder (1986) describe other projects 
carried out for the same Dutch steel company. One project, for 
the tubes manufacturing division, involved the determination of 
how to best slit narrow steel strips longitudinally from wide 
steel rolls, the strips to be eventually welded to form tubes 
(seam-welding). Objectives included maximising the roll-width 
utilisation and standardising the strip widths cut by each 
machine in order to minimise the number of machine set-ups. In 
its simplest form this is (again) a standard mathematical 
programming problem but such an approach could not be employed 
because complications in the formulation meant that the resul- 
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tant model became too large for computer solution in a 
reasonable time and with regard to the computing facilities 
available to the company. Consequently a heuristic method was 
devised and programmed in FORTRAN. This provided results in an 
acceptable amount of time but the accuracy of the resultant 
solutions was doubtful. 
Discrete-event simulation has (in addition to mathematical 
programming) been used reasonably often in the steel industry 
and Noordman, Gillebaart and Seeder go on to describe one such 
study involving coke manufacture. This process takes place 
prior to producing hot metal in the blast furnaces. In fact, 
coke is an irreplaceable raw material in the blast furnace and 
it is manufactured by heating coal in an enclosed oven so as to 
remove undesirable volatile gases. Once the coal has been con- 
verted to coke, the heat source to the ovens has to be 
extinguished and the coke dampened with water. 
Many coke ovens exist side-by-side. In the plant under 
investigation there were 100 coke ovens in a space 200 metres 
long and 15 metres high. These produced 1.5 million tons of 
coke per annum. The production process involves successively 
emptying and filling the ovens. Filling is carried out by a 
coal charging car which takes coal from a bunker and charges it 
into the coke oven which has just been emptied. (The emptying 
is done by a machine involving a sequence of operations. ) Each 
oven must be emptied and filled during the minimum cooking time 
for the previous coke oven. The production process has a 
cyclic form: as one operation is completed the next to be per- 
formed becomes due in the sequence. 
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The simulation program, written in the SIMULA language, allowed 
the evaluation of trade-offs such as that between greater out- 
put and uniformity of cooking time. It may well be, given the 
possibility of machine breakdown, that a more uniform cooking 
time will make it easier to control the process. However, a 
longer cooking time automatically reduces production output. 
With many factors affecting the operations in the coke oven 
plant it is clear that the analysts were correct in using a 
discrete-event simulation model. It was the obvious form which 
the OR model should take for that particular type of production 
problem. 
While all of these studies are important in the context of the 
individual firm concerned (and indeed they may generate 
interest by other steel making firms) they are not studies at 
the policy level. It is unlikely that such problems would 
preoccupy the minds of the board of directors of those firms in 
discharging their role of providing strategic guidance. 
A more strategic orientation is taken by Anandalingam and Bhat- 
tacharya (1985). They describe a process model of the Indian 
iron and steel industry which handles material and energy flows 
within the industry. The objective of their study was to 
assess the impact of different technologies on those flows and 
to compute an overall production cost with particular emphasis 
on energy costs. The electric are furnace technology was not 
included (presumably because it did not then exist in India) 
and so the comparison was primarily between the Open Hearth and 
Basic Oxygen systems. After analysis using a deterministic 
process simulation they concluded that, although a number of 
cost-effective energy-conservation measures exist, none of them 
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would lead to large reductions in energy use in the Indian 
steel industry. 
In a subsequent paper Anandalingam (1987) describes extensive 
parameter sensitivity analyses on the model which was program- 
med in LOTUS 1-2-3 and executed on a microcomputer. As before, 
analysis of the results revealed that energy-conservation tech- 
nologies would have an insignificant impact on performance. 
Econometric studies are often conducted at a high level of 
aggregation and although such models are hampered by complete 
reliance on the availability of time series data and the need 
to obtain a good statistical fit, two studies, which are useful 
in the context of this thesis, have been reported. 
Blake (1965) investigates the phenomenon mentioned in chapter 
two: that fluctuations in steel consumption are somewhat less 
than the fluctuations in steel production. Although more data 
are now available than he had at his disposal, it is clear from 
figure 2.13 in the previous chapter that the phenomenon still 
exists. For an econometric study, Blake's contribution is 
unusual in that, firstly, he uses tonnage (not monetary) data 
and, secondly, he is concerned with inflexibility in supply 
(and the reasons for it) which makes the study interesting to 
management and not Just other economists. 
ýI 
He recognises that consumption and production have to be 
related by an information flow: in this case orders booked by 
steel consumers and stockholders. His model consists of two 
hypotheses, firstly, the way in which consumption of steel 
affects future orders booked and, secondly, the way order flow 
determines output. He states that "both relationships are 
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inter-connected by a complicated feedback mechanism, according 
to which current orders and current output are separately 
affected by ...... the change in the, backlog of undelivered 
orders ...... .ý 11 Had he been aware of the tools of system 
dynamics there is no doubt that he. would have been able to more 
easily explain the phenomenon than by using multivariate least 
squares techniques on what data he could uncover. 
His supply hypothesis relates the changes in steel deliveries 
to changes in orders booked and the change in the order back- 
log. The demand hypothesis relates orders booked to the 
difference between finished steel consumption and deliveries 
together with a variable representing stock adjustment by 
consumers. In both cases a reasonably good statistical fit to 
the data was obtained. 
In the conclusions section of his paper Blake makes some 
interesting observations which touch on the purpose of the 
steel works model described later on in this chapter. He 
describes a "characteristic sequence" whereby, once steel 
demand changes, delivery dates are adjusted and capacity is 
brought in or taken out. There then follows a burst of 
precautionary orders from customers (when demand has 
increased). Thus, true demand is somewhat accelerated, produc- 
tion of steel eventually responds but it overshoots when demand 
falls away again and consequently consumers, stocks of steel 
then grow rapidly. At the next general demand upsurge these 
stocks are used up first and then the entire cycle is repeated. 
Two enhancements would have been useful in the research conduc- 
ted by Blake. Firstly, he might have investigated the role of 
the steel stockholders in amplifying customer demand by virtue 
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of their stock control procedures. He recognises that these 
independent firms provide an information barrier to the steel 
producers, standing as they do between producer and end- 
consumer. That such amplification takes place and the detailed 
reasons for it are recounted in Forrester9s classic study 
(1961). Secondly, he might have given further thought as to 
why steel producers respond rather slowly to overall demand 
changes. One factor contributing to this important facet of 
the steel market, with ensuing disadvantages to all parties 
involved, is offered in a later section of this chapter. 
Vinell (1973) uses econometric methods in his comprehensive 
study of demand-generated steel cycles in Sweden. His study, 
while examining a broader sweep of issues, has much in common 
with the work of Blake. Vinell's objectives were to explain 
why the steel market in Sweden showed such a markedly cyclical 
behaviour, how demand cycles spread through the steel sector 
and how they affected the short-term marketing policies of 
steel producers. 
Vinell's statistical work confirmed that steel cycles were a 
function of firms, inventory behaviour. Although a short sec- 
tion of his work examines the activities of steel stockholders 
there is no apparent attempt at isolation of the role of stock- 
holders in amplifying steel cycles. The stockholders are 
strongly associated with the cyclical patterns of Swedish 
imports. These, in turn, are sensitive to variations in the 
capacity: demand ratio, a variable he used as a proxy indicator 
of the delivery flexibility of the Swedish steel works. 
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Vinell asserts that cycles can best be explained by consuming 
firms' investments in 'goods in process'. Because firms pur- 
chase both for consumption and for stockbuilding, total steel 
purchases (and hence orders on the steel mills) will fluctuate 
around steel consumption. 
Although he admits that the stockholding behaviour of consuming 
firms plays a part in generating cycles in orders placed with 
the mills, like Blake he does not investigate how the mills 
themselves may contribute to an exacerbation of that cycle. 
However, in common with other authors on the steel industry he 
does accept the inflexibility of the large integrated works. 
He states: 
if ...... a. we know that steel production capacity 
is inflexible in the short run. The producing 
units have always (at least in modern times) been 
comparatively large and the optimum size of plant 
has been Increasing. To raise capacity sub- 
stantially is a very time consuming process. The 
time elapsing from investment decision to increase 
of output is a matter of years. The steel works 
have therefore no possibility of quickly adjusting 
their capacity to an upswing in demand". 
He goes on to consider the situation prevailing when demand 
turns down. Excess capacity prevails and "firms will try to 
supply a quantity equal to their available capacity in order to 
get some contribution to their big fixed costs". 
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In the model dealing with an explanation of Swedish steel 
imports, delivery times feature as an explanatory variable. 
Not untypically for an econometric investigation Vinell has no 
data on delivery times directly available and resorts to 
manufacturing some from those data series he does have, in this 
case using estimated realised demand divided by the production 
capacity one period ago. His conclusion on Swedish imports 
states that the formulated function "received a certain amount 
of empirical support from the variables discussed" 
At least two studies have been conducted on the steel industry 
using the methods of system dynamics. The purpose of the model 
created by Kumar (1983) and Kumar and Vrat (1989) is quite 
different from that developed by Carnell (1974) and, although 
the latter shares some common ground with the model described 
later, neither overlap it to any great extent. 
Kumar describes a study examining the future of steel making in 
India. It is an assembly of a number of separate but connected 
models, running to some 3500 statements. Modules represent the 
general Indian economic situation, steel demand, steel produc- 
tion, the supply of coking coal and power, inventories and, 
finally, a financial model. The purpose is to identify, for 
the steel plant management, potential production bottlenecks 
over a ten year planning horizon and to permit the evaluation 
of rationalisation and modernisation projects already contem- 
plated. 
Kumar's model differs from the other Indian model described 
earlier (due to Anandalingam) in that, besides employing a 
different modelling methodology, it was carried out for a 
specific (named) steel plant and is also much more wide-ranging 
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in its coverage and content. 
The steel demand model is related to the model describing the 
general Indian economic situation. Within the demand model is 
generated the demand for nine different varieties of steel. In 
turn, the steel demand model drives the production model which 
considers in detail 26 production sectors covering such as coke 
ovens, sinter plant, blast furnaces, open-hearth furnaces, mel- 
ting shops and all the finishing facilities. It can be seen 
that the production model is at the core of the whole thing 
and, to employ the dichotomy developed in chapter 1, it 
generates a set of internal scenarios. But it is also embedded 
within a system of models which allow for the generation of 
external scenarios too, the latter directly impinging on the 
steel production model via the demand model. 
Compared to the model developed later in this chapter, the 
Indian one is much more wide-ranging. There is no mention of 
any specific examination of the technology used at the heavy 
end and the part that this sector might play in supply 
inflexibility. Despite its enormity, which predisposes it to 
stifle effective managerial learning, it is nonetheless a 
notable example of a system dynamics model which has actually 
been used in a practical policy-making context. 
The final study reviewed in this section, - that by Carnell 
(1974), comes the nearest to touching on facets of the model 
developed subsequently in this chapter. It was a study conduc- 
ted in the early 1970's while he was working in the OR depart- 
ment of the (then) Strip Mills Division of the British Steel 
Corporation. System dynamics models were constructed to 
examine two major aspects of steelmaking: the industry-market 
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interactions and production flows. 
Of these two models, aspects of the former one are also 
considered in the model developed below. The market model 
examines the relationships between BSC and its customers. it 
probes the purchasing behaviour of end users of steel and also 
that of stockholders. In contrast with the model below, these 
sectors are modelled explicitly. Equations are included which 
represent the assumed forecasting and stock control procedures 
adopted by BSC's customers. In other words these sectors are 
endogenous to the model of the Corporation's activities. 
Carnell explores detailed features of BSC9s order processing 
procedures and stock-holding policies with a view to showing 
that market dynamics have potentially internal causes. For 
instance, the delay in responding quickly to new customer 
orders in a boom leads to a flood of precautionary orders 
because purchasing officers in the consuming firms wish to 
cover themselves against loss of supply. This, of course, is 
exactly what Blake (1965) was saying in his paper discussed 
above. Carnell demonstrates that certain delays inherent in 
the processing of steel orders, together with the Corporation's 
stockholding policies, are tending to exacerbate this 
undesirable behaviour pattern by its customers. 
The role of steel stockholders is also investigated and, as 
would be expected from a priori considerations, this sector, 
standing as it does between producer and end-user, amplifies 
any fluctations induced by the behaviour of the steel consuming 
industries. Imports and orders for imports are specifically 
included, showing one more consequence of BSC9s inability to 
supply quickly enough. However, at no point does Carnell 
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consider the inflexibility of steel making technology at the 
heavy end (especially the blast furnace) as possibly conýribut- 
ing to the problem of supply lags. 
Although this is arguably one of the first in-house system 
dynamics studies conducted in the UK it is clear that the 
author had a grasp of the realities of utilising models such as 
this. He notes that "the conclusions reached and recommen- 
dations made are only likely to influence the general tide of 
opinion". Further, he notes that #$the simulation aspect must 
be viewed as a tool used during the (policy) analysis processes 
rather than as the purpose of the study". 
The production flow model, Carnell's second one, represents 
each main aspect of the steel making process from ingot produc- 
tion through to deliveries. This dovetails less well with the 
model developed later in that it was constructed mainly to 
analyse inter-process stocking policies and finishing mill 
scheduling. Of particular importance was an examination of 
process interruption, caused by plant breakdowns, and the way 
in which the subsequent undesirable dynamics are transmitted 
through the works., This model runs to several hundred 
equations and the author clearly feels it to be of some merit 
claiming that it was probably the most detailed production flow 
model, outside of the petro-chemical industry, then in 
existence in the UK. 
To the present author, the production flow model resembles what 
may be called 9classic system dynamics' with an emphasis on 
operational procedures and the need to consider the totality of 
the production system in order to be able to improve matters. 
This comment is no way meant in a derogatory sense, but rather 
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to emPhasis. e the difference between that type of study and the 
purposes for which system dynamics should now be used if it is 
to fulfill its potential: namely to act as a fulcrum for 
debate in the strategic policy-making process. Models of 
multi-echelon production and distribution systems will doubt- 
less continue to be built, but system dynamics has the 
potential to be elevated to a much more significant, and as yet 
underutilised, role in corporate management. 
Carnell's contribution was an early one yet there is 
unfortunately no postscript describing how the market dynamics 
model (in particular) was received by senior management and 
whether it had any perceptible influence on attitudes. Given 
that it must have been one of the first occasions when the 
method had been used in the UK, it is difficult, when judging 
the two studies as a single entity, not to come to the 
conclusion that the technique came before the applications. It 
was as though Carnell's department felt they could do something 
useful with the method and subsequently picked out two main 
areas for investigation. Certainly his thesis and its title 
strongly emphasises the technique whereas nowadays it would be 
more fruitful to work from a policy issue orientation. 
Concentrating on a relatively focussed issue -- like the role 
of blast furnaces in supply inflexibility -- implies a trend 
away from more all-embracing models, such as those developed by 
Kumar and Carnell. This is surely the key to grabbing the 
attention of senior management and hopefully challenging their 
preconceived mental models. 
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3.3 Description of the Steel Industry model 
3.3.1 Overview of model purpose and model boundary 
The purpose of the model should be made quite clear at the 
outset. It is to provide the B. S. directors with a tool which 
should inform their debates about future policy. While it 
might not contradict the view that mistakes have been made in 
the past, the model has been created not in a spirit of assess- 
ment but rather in one of learning. (That policy planning is a 
learning process has been well documented by De Geus (1988) who 
has been referred to earlier in this thesis. ) If the ideas 
generated by collective interaction with the model help B. S. 
to define policies which are robust enough to see the company 
through the 1990's, then it will have served the purpose for 
which such a model should be created. The model will have 
enshrined the true role of a policy support tool. 
In the light of this model purpose, along with the need to 
consider certain features of different steel making tech- 
nologies, it seems sensible to draw the model boundary around a 
single works, together with its market interactions. Accor- 
dingly, a model has been created of a works which supplies a 
nominal total of 2.88 million ingot tonnes per annum. The set- 
ting should be considered primarily as a works in what was once 
called the Strip Mills Division, supplying sheet and coiled 
steel to motor manufacturers and other durable household goods 
manufacturers, for example those producing white goods such as 
washing machines, fridges, and freezers. This does not rule 
out its applicability to other (also now organisationally 
redundant) product divisions, most notably General Steels 
Division. However, it is within the flat products sector that 
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the bulk of sales by volume are generated. Some 44% of all 
products sold in the 1987/88 operating year came from tlie flat 
product mills (Financial Times, 1988). 
Throughout, the units of production and sale are measured in 
ingot tonnes. It is well known that, for instance, production 
of one tonne of cold rolled coil requires rather more (in fact 
some 30% more) than the ingot equivalent. This is primarily 
because of shearing loss during the various processes of 
manufacture. Both shearing loss and chemical reaction loss 
affect yields at all stages of steel production. Standard con- 
version factors have been established at each stage but, for 
the purpose of the present model, it is not important if such 
complications are ignored. Comparative runs are conducted 
across technology options. Yield changes are cancelled out as 
a result. This would not be the case if the model's purpose 
was to explore, say, interprocess stocking policies within a 
structure determined by a given technology. 
The broad outline of the assumed structure of the model is 
given in figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1 Broad overview of the model structure 
Industry - market interactions are centred around the ordering 
of steel and its eventual delivery. Lead time is a crucial 
determinant of supplier performance and in the case of a 
product like steel it is essential for supplies to be 
maintained, especially in times of economic booms. 
Unfortunately this is not always the case and steel users 
(particularly motor vehicle manufacturers) are forced to source 
their supplies from other steel makers. over the previous 
twenty years more and more this has meant that supplies are 
imported. Imports are a safety valve which steel users can 
activate if the home industry cannot supply in the required 
quantities. 
A more detailed picture of the model's structure is given by 
the influence diagram in figure 3.2 . The loop which links the 
customer order backlog, the delivery lead time perceived by 
customers and the volume of home orders placed is a crucial 
feedback loop. It embodies the processes described above for, 
when lead times become so extended that customers find that 
their own production schedules are being jeopardised through 
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lack of sufficient raw material, they must source elsewhere. 
In the case of the British steel industry this means going 
abroad, to European steel producers for example. 
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Figure 3.2 Influence diagram for the model 
3.3.2 Detail of the Finishing End sector 
The Customer Order Backlog (COBG) is the only variable which 
the market has collective sight of. Relating this to the 
Average Delivery Rate (ADR) of steel calculated over a period 
of three months, enables customers to acquire market intel- 
ligence about the steel mills, delivery performance. 
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Unfortunately all too often in the past steel users have been 
victims of extended delivery periods to such an extent that 
steel buyers in both end-user and stockholder industries over- 
order at the first sign of supply difficulties. The argument 
runs'along the lines of: "If we send in duplicate orders then 
at least one is likely to be satisfied". It almost amounts to 
the reasoning which suggests that if you have more tickets in a 
large lottery the greater your chance of success. 
While customers have knowledge of the total order backlog the 
mills decompose this into two groupings. Firstly, there are 
UNALLocated Orders (UNALLO) which represent the sum total of 
orders received from consumers and stockholders which have not 
yet been 'associated with semi-finished steel in the process of 
being rolled. In_the context of the description of the stages 
of steel production given in the previous chapter, it will be 
recalled that it is prior to the hot rolling mill that customer 
orders are "allocated" to specific semi-finished steels, be 
they slabs, billets or blooms. Once allocated customers cannot 
normally cancel an- order. The variable concerned with 
ALLOCated Stocks (ALLOCS) represents what in the finishing 
mills is effectively "work-in progress" and when the steel has 
passed through the final stage of the appropriate finishing 
process it is delivered to the customer immediately. Because 
it is not the intention here to examine detailed production 
processes, the variable ALLOCated Stocks covers a range of pos- 
sible finished steels which emerge from successive processes in 
the finishing mills. These are hot rolled strip and coil, cold 
reduced strip and coil, annealed steel and galvanised and 
coated steel. 
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Inter-process stocks are held between each stage of crude steel 
making and between the various finishing processes. Saveýfor 
the strategic holding of SEMi-finished steel Stocks (SEMS) 
referred to above, all the other stockholdings are genuine 
inter-process buffer stocks. There are sound production and 
metallurgical reasons why steel is not held at any other of 
these points in great volume. For instance, ingots (one stage 
upstream from the semi-finished stage) require re-heating which 
can be very expensive if they have been allowed to cool exces- 
sively. Also cold reduced products are subject to surface 
deterioration if they are left in store too long. Customers 
may not be willing to accept such a reduced quality when taking 
delivery. It can be seen, therefore, that stocks of "semis" as 
they are known in the industry occupy a pivotal role in terms 
of customer delivery performance. If these stocks are too low, 
hot rolling cannot commence; they therefore represent an 
important constraint to the finishing mills. 
In normal production and delivery circumstances a customer 
would expect delivery some six 'weeks following receipt of an 
order at the mills. This time would be split into two com- 
ponents: some two weeks (or half a month) in the UNALLocated 
Order backlog and four weeks (one month) going through the 
finishing processes. When there is a general increase in 
customer orders it is the UNALLocated orders which can grow 
excessively. If this general increase coincides with a lack of 
semi-finished steel then the effect can be quite startling. 
Figure 3.3 depicts the movements in the lead time for cold 
reduced sheet steel between 1970 and 1980. This spans the 
steel boom which took place in 1973/74 and gives testimony to 
sharp changes which can occur in demand. Lead times increased 
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over four fold in that period, reaching in excess of twenty 
weeks (five months). As a consequence the B. S. C. were forced 
to, exceptionally, introduce a system of prohibition on further 
orders to try and contain the backlog and enable them to'quote 
realistic delivery dates. Whilst lead time data of this nature 
is of enormous help to the analyst it is not the sort that is 
widely available. (The Government, for instance, do not appear 
to include any data on lead times in their vast array of 
published statistics. ) Unfortunately the data below could not 
be extended beyond 1980 as the trade magazine concerned became 
a victim of the economic recession. 
MEAN LEAD TIME FOR COLD-REDUCED SHEET STEEL 
(Source: Industrial Purchasing News) 
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Figure 3.3 Mean lead times for cold reduced sheet steel 1970-80 
The delay in progressing allocated steel through the finishing 
processes, assumed to be a month on average, is explained in 
terms of the batching system which goes on. Were a single 
uniform product to be rolled then the delay would be much less 
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because, in consequence, no changes to the settings on the 
machines would be required. As it is, a range of products of 
varying widths and guages have to be rolled and so batches of 
each are rolled out. This means that a- given product 
specification can, once a batch of that product has been rolled 
out, take up to a month or even longer before another batch of 
the same specification is processed. The normal regime is to 
roll out in accordance with a coffin shape as described in the 
previous chapter. 
The incorporation of the finishing processes into the model is 
managed using a third order delay with the average delay 
constant, the Finishing Process Lead Time (FPLT) , set at one 
month. Thus, Delivery Rate (DR) is simply a third order delay 
of the Order Launching Rate (OLR) which represents the flow of 
hot rolled steel through the rolling mills. This is the first 
process involved in converting semis into -finished steel and 
also the point at which a customer order is associated with the 
product. 
3.3.3 Detail of the Heavy End sector 
Having described features of the model as they pertain to the 
finishing end of the process, it is now appropriate to move 
upstream and consider those aspects of the model which relate 
to the so-called 9Heavy-End9. These are the stages involved in 
the manufacture of liquid steel and its ultimate presentation 
in stocks of semis. - 
The heavy end operates continuously and this is an important 
feature of steel making which should not be lost sight of. 
Whilst the scope for variation in output at the finishing end 
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is considerable (and is caused by variations in the size of the 
unallocated order pool together with the stock of available 
semis) variation in output at the heavy end is nothing like as, 
flexible. This makes for considerable management problems and 
it is the purpose of the model to evaluate the consequences of 
these problems. 
The blast furnace may be at the centre of the inflexibility. 
once fired, such a furnace will continue to produce pig iron 
for anything up to six years or more, usually until their heat- 
resistant refractory linings need replacing. The model 
assumes, initially, that three of these furnaces are operating 
at the works. Their current cumulative throughputs have been 
selected so as to ensure that they are withdrawn for refractory 
relining at different points in time. This is in line with 
B. S. C. 's normal policy, for bunching of relines has to be 
avoided if at all possible. Once a blast furnace has been 
taken out of commission its entire pig iron output is, of 
course, lost to the downstream processes for an average of 
3.5 months (the reline itself) together with losses associated 
with a slow build up to maximum output when it has been 
refired. For environmental and safety reasons, molten pig iron 
cannot be moved from one works to another and so bunching of 
relines can ultimately have a serious effect on availability of 
finished steel for delivery. (This happened to the B. S. C. 
with some degree of severity in 1974 (Waterstone, 1975). ) 
The diagram below (figure 3.4) shows the cumulative throughputs 
of each furnace by way of a vertical bar chart. Normal blast 
furnace throughput before a reline is required is set at 5 mil- 
lion tonnes although this can be extended if market conditions 
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warrant it.. Initially, three blast furnaces are assumed to be 
operating and with their average annual output being 
960,000 tonnes this means there is an overall throughput of 
2.88 million tonnes per annum of pig iron. An explanation of 
the detailed operational policies for blast furnaces which has 
been incorporated in the model is given below. 
CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION FROM EACH OF THE FURNACES AT START OF 
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Figure 3.4 Cumulative production from each blast furnace at 
the start of the simulation 
The flow of pig iron from the blast furnaces is passed through 
to the steel furnaces. In the first runs of the model two 
Basic Oxygen System (BOS) converters form the assumed tech- 
nology and such a configuration, allowing up to 3.5 million 
tonnes per year of liquid steel to be produced (Cockerill, 
1974), is entirely compatible with that found nowadays in 
integrated steel mills the world over. 
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Steel is drawn of ff rom the BOS converters at intervals of 
approximately 45 minutes and then either passed through the 
ingot casting and semi finishing mill or, as is more commonly 
the case nowadays, continuously cast into semi finished shapes. 
B. S. C. now claims over 80% of its steel is produced using 
continuous castihg plant (Financial Times, 1988). Figure 3.5 
summarises the flow of production at the heavy end. 
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Figure 3.5 Schematic diagram of the production flow 
configuration assumed in the initial model 
As is the case with the finishing end, the model's purpose is 
not compatible with inclusion of the degree of detail 
encountered in practice. Production from the blast furnaces is 
assumed to cover the flow through to semi-finished steel. 
Stocks of semis are included in the model but not ingot stocks 
or pig iron stocks. These are not strategic stocking points 
and the quantities arise as a consequence of the processes 
going on directly upstream and downstream from them. 
It is a matter of hours between iron being smelted in the blast 
furnace and its subsequent progress through the BOS converters, 
ingot mill and slabbing mill. Thus these processes, which are 
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effectively delayed actions consequent on blast furnace 
operations, are not included directly. In System Dynamics 
terms they represent material delays with very small average 
delay constants when taken in the context of the 120 month 
duration of the present simulations. To include these proces- 
ses in the model would implicitly require an extremely small 
value for DT because this value needs to be a sufficiently 
small fraction of the smallest average delay time in the model 
so as to prevent mathematical instability in the results. 
To summarise, it can be seen that any exploration of 
"inflexibility" in the industry centres primarily on the heavy 
end of steel mills and that, for the purposes of the model, 
blast furnace production is equated with semi production. The 
intervening stocks are ignored but the available stock of semis 
is crucial and is obviously included. Semis stocks are the 
watershed between the heavy and finishing ends of steel produc- 
tion. 
3.3.4 Blast furnace operations: equations and table 
relationships 
In view of the strategic importance of blast furnace 
operations, both in the B. S. C% and in the model, the detailed 
aspects of operational policy on blast furnaces are now 
described. Capturing this assumed policy unfortunately 
involves some fairly complicated equation structures and these 
are given, along with a detailed commentary, rather than 
restrict the reader to studying the full computer listing of 
the model in the appendix at the end. 
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As mentioned previously, three furnaces are assumed to be 
operational initially. Their monthly outputs are 75,000, 
80,000 and 85,000 tonnes respectively. The combined total out- 
put exactly matches the assumed customer demand of 240,000 ton- 
nes per month or 2.88 million tonnes per annum. 
Naturally there are week-to-week variations of both blast fur- 
nace output and incoming customer orders for steel. This noise 
element is handled through the NORMRN function available in 
DYSMAP2 (Dangerfield and Vapenikova, 1987) which returns 
normally distributed values with given mean and standard 
deviation. In the case of customer orders the standard devia- 
tion is assumed to be 10,000 tonnes per month. For the blast 
furnace output in total to exhibit the same extent of 
variation, each furnace's standard deviation for output is set 
at 10000/J3 - 5773.5 tonnes per month. 
The following operational policies are handled in the blast 
furnace sector of the model: 
(a) A furnace will normally be de-commissioned for a reline 
af ter a campaign throughput of 5 million tonnes. At average 
model throughput rates this would be between 5 and 5.5 years. 
(b) If demand at the time is strong, a furnace's campaign 
life can be extended by a period equivalent to the lesser of 
the time for a further one million tonnes throughput and the 
time of a subsequent fall-off in demand. 
(c) Following completion of a reline, a furnace will not be 
re-f ired unless customer demand warrants it. In ef f ect, the 
interregnum period is extended. 
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(d) If, customer demand falls to a critically low level than 
a furnace can be de-commissioned in advance of its anticipated 
reline , date. Strategically this is a major decision (Gold, 
Rosegger and Boylan, 1980). 
In addition, the following normal features of blast furnace 
operations are included: 
(e) Towards the end of a campaign a furnace will exhibit a 
greater number of operational problems than normal and 
consequently its usable output is somewhat reduced (Gold, 
Rosegger and Boylan, 1980). 
M Once relined and re-fired, a furnace will not 
immediately yield its maximum output but will exhibit a learn- 
ing curve effect over a period of months until full output is 
attained. 
(g) Variability in blast furnace output (over and above the 
variations caused by noise) is extremely limited and maximum 
output is assumed to be only 15% higher than the nominal rated 
throughput for the furnace. The variation in driving rate is 
engineered by varying the quality of the burden in the furnace 
(Boylan, 1980). 
(h) When one furnace is within six months of its 'expected 
reline date, in a feed-forward effect the output from- the 
others at the works is boosted so as to generate a build up of 
stocks of semis to attempt a compensation for the loss of Pig 
iron over the duration of the reline. This action is abandoned 
if demand falls off during the six months lead-in period. 
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In the case of all example equations listed below, blast fur- 
nace number 1 is used. However, these equations are replicated 
for the other two blast furnaces. The only differences concern 
the assumed cumulative campaign throughputs at the start of the 
simulation, together with the slight difference in mean produc- 
tion per month across the three furnaces. The equations below 
handle features (a), (e) and (f) above. 
A PFI. K=CLIP(PFlEC. K, PFlN. K, 6, (NTF-CPFl. K)/MNPFl) 
A PFlEC. K-SWITCH(MNPF1, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF1, SDPF1)*REFElC. K, CPFl. K, 
X MXTFl. K), TIME. K) 
A REFElC. K=TABHL(REFECT, (NTF-CPFl. K)/MNPF1,0,6,1) 
T REFECT=0.6/0. '72/0.82/0.9/0.95/0.98/1 
A PFlN. K-SWITCH(MNPF1. CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF1, SDPF1)*PFFl. K*BEF. K, 
X CPFI. K, MXTFI. K), TIME. K) 
A PFFl. K=TABHL(PFFT, MPFl. K, 0,2,0.2) 
T PFFT-0.05/0.07/0.11/0.185/0.28/0.39/0.53/0.705/0.875/0.97/1 
A MPFl. K=CPFl. K/MNPF1 
D CPF1=(T) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 1 
D MNPF1=(T/MTHS) MEAN PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D MPF1-(MTHS) MONTHS2 OF PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY 
BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D MXTF1=(T) MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT BY BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 (BEFORE 
RELINE REQUIRED) 
D NTF=(T) NORMAL THROUGHPUT OF BLAST FURNACE (BEFORE 
RELINE REQUIRED) 
D PFIEC=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION FOR B. F. 1 AT END OF CAMPAIGN LIFE 
D PFlN=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE 
NO. 1 NORMALLY 
D PFF1=(l) PRODUCTION BUILD-UP FACTOR FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D REFElC=(l) REDUCED EFFICIENCY FACTOR AT END OF B. F. 11S CAMPAIGN 
The term (NTF-CPFl. K)/MNPF1 in the CLIP function for PF1 
determines whether the blast furnace is within six months of 
its expected reline date. If it is, then the equation for 
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PFIEC is used for the production rate. Embedded in this equa- 
tion is another CLIP function which assesses whether the fur- 
nace9s cumulative throughput has exceeded its maximum for that 
campaign (CPF1. K > MXTF1. K). If so, the production rate is 
zero, otherwise it equates to a value returned from a normal 
distribution with a mean of 75000 tonnes per month and standard 
deviation 5773.5 tonnes per month. However, the value returned 
is multiplied by a factor between 0 and 1 which reflects the 
greater extent of operational problems encountered with a fur- 
nace towards the end of a campaign. The table function for 
this variable is illustrated in figure. 3.6 . 
REDUCED EFFICIENCY OF BLAST FURNACE TOWARDS END OF CAMPAIGN 
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Figure 3.6 Table function for reduced efficiency of a blast 
furnace towards the end of a campaign 
As the number of months of its campaign life fall below six, 
the output from the furnace is trimmed, slowly at first but 
then more quickly as the time for the reline nears. At this 
point output is 60% of normal. If the furnace9s campaign is 
6 
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extended because of market conditions (see below) then the term 
(NTF-CPFl. K) will go negative. Output will then remain at 60% 
of normal because a TABHL function is used. 
Returning to the equation for PF1 it is now necessary to 
consider the equation used for blast furnace production when 
the furnace is not within six months of a reline. The relevant 
equation here is PF1N which, with its embedded CLIP function, 
is of exactly the same form as that for PF1EC. The difference 
between the two concerns the factors which adjust the value for 
production rate returned by the normally distributed random 
number function. In the case of the production rate in the 
normal situation (PF1N), being within six months of the end of 
a campaign is not considered. PF1N handles the situation at 
all other stages of a campaign and takes into account the 
Production build-up Factor for the Furnace (PFF1) at the begin- 
ning of a campaign as well as the variable which handles 
adjustments 'to the driving rate of the furnace via changes in 
the quality of the materials constituting the burden, the Bur- 
den Efficiency Factor (BEF). This is discussed below. 
The SWITCH functions used in the equations for PF1EC and PF1N 
ensure that, at the start of each simulation run, the relevant 
production rate is equal to the mean production rate for that 
furnace. 
The table relationship which models the Production build-UP 
Factor for the Furnace (PFF1) is shown in figure 3.7. It is a 
relationship between the average number of months of production 
to the proportion of nominally rated throughput actually 
achieved. When a blast furnace begins a campaign it is assumed 
to take up to two months f or it to regularly achieve the 
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anticipated throughput value. There are inevitable teething 
problems to overcome, for the furnace will have been cold for 
3.5 months undergoing refractory relining. 
PRODUCTION BUILD-UP AFTER REFIRING A FURNACE 
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Figure 3.7 Table function of production build-up factor for a 
blast furnace at the start of a campaign 
The driving rate for a blast furnace, controlled in the model 
by the Burden Efficiency Factor (BEF), was mentioned above and 
is now considered in more detail. This is item (g) in the list 
of features of blast furnace operations. 
A blast furnace is, in its very nature, a rather inflexible 
item of production plant. It must be operated continuously and 
offers little scope for increasing output if conditions warrant 
it. An assumed value of 15% over the nominal rated throughput 
is used in the model. One particular instance when output 
needs to be at this maximum is if another of the furnaces is 
due f or a reline. For a period of six months prior to an 
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expected reline date, production is increased to enhance stocks 
of semis so that rolling of customer orders is little com- 
promised while the furnace is out of commission. This is 
item (h) in the list of features. The equations for items (g) 
and (h) are as follows. 
A BEF. K=NCLIP(l. 15, PBEF. K, 6, (NTF-MALLF. K)/AMTPF, MUNO. K, 2) 
A PBEF. K=TABHL(PBEFT, MUNO. K, 1,6,1) 
T PBEFT=1/1.005/1.035/1.088/1.135/1.15 
A MUNO. K=UNALLO. K/NOLR 
D AMTPF=(T/MTHS) AVERAGE MONTHLY THROUGHPUT PER FURNACE 
D BEF-(l) BURDEN EFFICIENCY FACTOR 
D MALLF-(T) MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE THROUGHPUT OVER ALL BLAST FURNACES 
D MUNO=(MTHS) MONTHS9 OF UNALLOCATED ORDERS 
D NOLR=(T/MTHS) NORMAL ORDER LAUNCHING RATE 
D NTF=(T) NORMAL THROUGHPUT OF BLAST FURNACE (BEFORE RELINE 
REQUIRED) 
D PBEF-(l) POTENTIAL BURDEN EFFICIENCY FACTOR 
D UNALLO=(T) UNALLOCATED ORDERS 
In normal circumstances, the Potential Burden Efficiency Factor 
(PBEF) will operate. The table function which relates this to 
the number of months' equivalent of outstanding orders takes 
into account only the unallocated orders, that is those for 
which hot rolling has not yet commenced. It is calculated by 
dividing the amount of UNALLocated Orders (UNALLO) by the 
Normal Order Launching Rate (NOLR). 
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ADJUSTMENT OF BLAST FURNACE BURDEN (DRIVING RATE) Ih 
RESPONSE TO ORDER BACKLOG 
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Figure 3.8 Table relationship between Potential Burden 
Efficiency Factor and Months of Orders on Hand 
Obviously, as the number of months' equivalent of UNALLocated 
orders increases there is a stronger pressure to increase, the 
supply of semis so as to maintain the necessary hot rolling 
rate. The graph shows that this pressure increases slowly at 
first, but as the number of Months' of UNALLocated orders 
(MUNO) increases so does PBEF, eventually smoothing-off at 15% 
over the nominal rated throughput for the furnace. 
on the occasions when one of the furnaces is within six months 
of a reline, the Burden Efficiency Factor (BEF) is set 
permanently at the maximum extra 15% of output and this factor 
will be applied to the production rates at the other 
operational furnaces. However, there is one important caveat 
to this policy. If the Monthsq of UNallocated Orders (MUNO) 
falls below 2.0, the Burden Efficiency Factor falls back to 
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whatever is dictated by the table function in figure 3.8 above, 
regardless of whether a reline is due. This assumption seems 
appropriate, for a low level of unfilled customer orders should 
not cause the absolute maximum driving rate to be implemented. 
The consequential growth in stocks of semis would not be 
warranted. 
If the furnace with the largest cumulative throughput has a 
reline deferred because of market conditions then the value of 
(NTF-MALLF. K) in the equation for BEF will go negative. In 
this eventuality, the Burden Efficiency Factor stays at 1.15. 
The value of MALLF will fall back after the newly relined fur- 
nace's cumulative campaign production is reset to zero for the 
beginning of the next campaign. MALLF will then take on the 
value of the maximum cumulative production from the remaining 
furnaces. 
of the list of features of blast furnace operations listed ear- 
lier on only items (b), (c) and (d) have not yet been expoun- 
ded. Item (b) is relatively simple and is covered next. This 
feature centres on the maximum furnace throughput in a campaign 
before a total reline of the refractory brickwork is required. 
The normal campaign throughput is set at 5 million -tonnes but 
this can be extended by up to a further 1 million tonnes should 
market conditions dictate. Four equations handle this and are 
listed below. 
A MXTFl. K=NTF+EXTFl. K*SWEXTFl. K 
A SWEXTFI. K=NCLIP(1,0, AVMOH. K, 4, CTDECF1. K, (NTF-CPFl. K)) 
A EXTFI. K=CLIP(O, lE6, CPFl. K, NTF) 
A CTDECF1. K=(MNPF1+3*SDPF1)*PNDEC 
A AVMOH. K=DLINF3(MOH. K, TRCMOH) 
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D AVMOH-(MTHS) AVERAGE MONTHS' OF ORDERS ON HAND 
D CPF1-(T) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 1 
D CTDECF1-(T) CRITICAL THRESHOLD FOR DECISION ON EXTENDING 
B. F. 1 CAMPAIGN 
D EXTF1-(T/MTHS) EXTRA THROUGHPUT OF B. F. 1 (IN ADVANCE OF RELINE) 
D MNPFI-(T/MTHS) MEAN PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D MOH=(MTHS) MONTHS9 OF ORDERS ON HAND 
D MXTF1-(T) MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT BY BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 (BEFORE 
RELINE REQUIRED) 
D NTF-(T) NORMAL THROUGHPUT OF BLAST FURNACE (BEFORE RELINE 
REQUIRED) 
D PNDEC-(MTHS) PRIOR NOTICE FOR DECISION ON EXTENDING A B. F. 
CAMPAIGN 
D SDPF1-(T/MTHS) STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRODUCTION FOR BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 1 
D SWEXTF1-(l) SWITCH TO CONTROL EXTRA THROUGHPUT FOR B. F. 1 
D TRCMOH=(MTHS) TIME TO RECOGNISE CHANGES IN MONTHS' OF ORDERS 
ON HAND 
The maximum campaign throughput (MXTF1) is enlarged to six mil- 
lion tonnes only when the switching constant (SWEXTF1) is 
activated. Two conditions have to be met for this to occur. 
Firstly, the critical threshold for a decision to extend the 
campaign must have been reached. The prior notice required in 
order to make this decision is related to the furnace's normal 
statistical maximum throughput (three standard deviations above 
the mean throughput) in one month. It is determined whether 
this has become greater than the remaining throughput which 
could be achieved before relining at the normal due date. If 
it has and the Average Months of Orders on Hand (AVMOH) is 
above 4.0 then a decision would be taken to extend the campaign 
for that furnace. However, if at any time during the extended 
campaign the value for AVMOH falls below 4.0 then the switching 
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constant is de-activated, cumulative production for the furnace 
would be above the ma); imum and the furnace would be de- 
commissioned. 
In reality there is some risk attached to extending a blast 
furnace campaign. They have to be relined eventually (they can 
literally fall apart otherwise) and the phasing between relines 
across the group of furnaces can be progressively eroded as a 
result. In a three furnace arrangement deliberately having two 
furnaces out simultaneously at the same works would not be 
contemplated save for a slump in demand of unprecedented 
proportions. The B. S. C. suffered from a bunching of blast 
furnace relines across the flat products division in the latter 
phases of the last major upturn in steel demand (1974) prior to 
the present one (Yaterstone, 1975). This was caused by exten- 
ded campaigns and neglect of the normal reline schedules. 
The Average Months of orders on Hand (AVMOH) is obviously a 
critical variable in the above decision. It is modelled using 
a DLINF3 function with a smoothing constant of three months. 
This reflects the quarterly assessment by the B. S. C. of the 
order position and such a discrete delay in the planning 
process justifies the use of DLINF3 rather than SMOOTH 
(DLINF1). AVMOH includes both UNALLocated Orders (UNALLO) and 
ALLOCated Stocks (ALLOCS). On the face of it only the former 
should affect blast furnace decisions, but extending a campaign 
is nearly as important a decision as terminating one 
prematurely and the senior management would wish to take a 
rounded view of the total order position before sanctioning an 
extended campaign. 
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The most complicated equations centre on the remaining features 
of blast furnace operations -- premature interruption of a cam- 
paign because of market conditions and delayed re-firing of a 
furnace for the same reason, items (d) and (c) respectively. 
The following active equations are used and it is not possible 
to disentangle the separate effects of (c) and (d). Hence, the 
explanation for these two features is given as one. The 
equations now follow. 
A FSCMC. K=NCLIP(O, lOE6,1.5, AVMOH. K, SEMSR. K, 1.5) 
A TPICF1. K-CPFI. K-MALLF. K-FSCMC. K 
R ADDRPICl. KL=NCLIP(lOE6/DT, O, TPICFI. K, O, MXTFl. K, CPFl. K) 
L CPFI. K=CPFI. J+DT*(PFl. J+ADDRPICl. JK-RZCPFl. JK) 
N CPF1=3.4E6 
A IVLFl. K=CLIP(LENGTH, DT, CPFl. K, MXTFl. K) 
A HTMFl. K=SAMPLE(TIME. K, IVLFl. K, O) 
R RZCPFl. KL=NCLIP(PULSE(CPFl. K/DT, TIME. K, DT), O, TIME. K, (HTMFl. K+ 
X TRLF-DT), FSCMC. K, l) 
D, ADDRPIC1-(T/MTHS) ADDITIONAL RATE FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION 
OF B. F. 1 CAMPAIGN 
D AVMOH=(MTHS) AVERAGE MONTHS' OF ORDERS ON HAND 
D CPFI-(T) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
FURNACE NO. I 
D FSCMC=-(T) FACTOR FOR SUSPENSION OF CAMPAIGN DUE TO MARKET 
CONDITIONS 
D HTMFI=(MTHS) HELD (I. E. FROZEN) TIME FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D IVLFI=(MTHS) INTERVAL OVER WHICH FROZEN TIME IS HELD FOR BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 1 
D MALLF=(T) MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE THROUGHPUT OVER ALL BLAST FURNACES 
D MXTFI-(T) MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT BY BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 (BEFORE 
RELINE REQUIRED) 
D RZCPF1=(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE 
NO. 1 
D SEMSR=(I) SEMI STOCKS RATIO 
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D TPICF1-(T) TEST FACTOR FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF CAMPAIGN 
IN B. F. 1 
D TRLF-(MTHS) TIME TO RELINE A BLAST FURNACE 
The value of FSCMC is set to either zero or an arbitrarily 
large number (10E6). If it is zero then a blast furnace cam- 
paign will be suspended. It'will only ever be set to zero when 
two conditions are met -- when the AVerage number of Months' 
orders on Hand is below 1.5 and the SEMis Stocks Ratio (months' 
of semis stocks relative to normal) is in excess of 50% above 
normal. Only if FSCMC is zero is it possible for TPICF1 to 
also equate to zero. Yet this will not happen unless fur- 
nace 1's cumulative production is equal to the maximum 
cumulative production for all furnaces (MALLF). If it is not 
then the chosen furnace will be one of the others. Only one 
furnace will have TPIC made equal to zero on any occasion when 
FSCMC permits it. Hence it is impossible for more than one 
furnace to be de-commissioned prematurely. 
Also, if one furnace happens to be out already for a scheduled 
reline when FSCMC becomes zero then that coincidence will be 
deemed to equate with a premature decommissioning. No other 
furnace will then have its campaign terminated early. However, 
a furnace on a scheduled reline can join one already de- 
commissioned. Having more than one idle blast furnace arises 
in the rare situation when demand conditions have been such 
that a de-commissioned furnace has been kept cold for so long 
it coincides with a scheduled reline by one of the other fur- 
naces. 
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The importance of the test variable TPICF1 can be seen by 
considering the way it is used in the equation for ADDRPIC1. 
If TPICF1 equates to (or is greater than) zero (remember for 
most of the time it will be a large negative number), and the 
furnace9s cumulative production has not yet exceeded its 
allowed maximum prior to a reline, then ADDRPIC1 will be set to 
such a large value (dimensioned in tonnes per month because 
ADDRPICI models a rate of flow) that it will push cumulative 
production well over the threshold for requiring a reline. 
Production from that furnace will then cease and a period for 
relining will commence. 
The second check, as to whether cumulative production is larger 
than the campaign maximum, is necessary to prevent successive 
pulses of ADDRPICl (equal to 1OE6/DT) from being generated. 
Only one pulse is necessary to trigger a de-commissioning and 
no pulses at all are required if the chosen furnace happens to 
be out already for a scheduled reline. 
Once cumulative production is in excess of the maximum 
cumulative campaign production, the variable IVLF1 will change 
from an interval of DT to an arbitrarily long interval (LENGTH, 
the duration of the simulation). The equation for HTMF1 will 
then "hold" the sampled value of the system variable TIME for 
as long as is necessary to carry out the reline (assumed to be 
3.5 months) and ensure that market conditions are compatible 
with a re-firing of the furnace. 
Re-zeroing cumulative campaign production, handled by the 
variable RZCPF1, will not happen unless both the reline has 
been completed and market conditions are favourable. It will 
be recalled from earlier discussion that it is necessary for 
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CPF1 to be less than MXTF1 before the furnace can re-commence 
production. The first argument in the NCLIP function used in 
the equation for RZCPF1 generates the required pulse height to 
re-zeroise cumulative production. The fact that this will be 
calculated every time step is of no consequence because, being 
embedded in an NCLIP function, it is activated only when the 
third argument is greater than or equal to the fourth and the 
fifth argument is greater than or equal to the sixth. If both 
of these conditions are not simultaneously met, then RZCPF1 
will be zero. 
The third argument, the system variable TIME, determines, by 
comparison with the expression making up the fourth argument, 
when the reline is completed. This is TRLF months on from the 
point at which the furnace was de-commissioned (HTMF1). The 
11-DT11 term is required so that cumulative production can be re- 
zeroised during the final time step of the reline period. A 
new campaign will commence in the following time step unless 
the value of FSCMC is less than 1.0 . There is only one value 
which FSCMC can hold which is less than 1.0 and this value is 
zero. FSCMC holding a value of zero prevents a new campaign 
starting if the market conditions do not warrant it. The tests 
for this are deemed to be exactly the same as those assessments 
used in deciding whether to prematurely de-commission a fur- 
nace. 
3.3.5 Other Table relationships in the model 
In the previous section table relationships relating to blast 
furnace operations were explained at appropriate points. It is 
now necessary to examine other uses of table relationships in 
page 172 
the model.. A discussion of these relationships can assist the 
reader in following important assumptions built into the 
equations. 
It will be recalled that orders are attached to specific steel 
semis prior to hot rolling. The Order Launching Rate (OLR) 
determines the flow of production "starts" and it is equated to 
a Normal Order Launching Rate (NOLR) tempered by the operation 
of two factors -- one is a factor which transmits the effects 
of semis stock availability, SEMis Stocks Factor (SEMSF), and 
the other is a factor which reflects the influence of the size 
of the backlog of outstanding unallocated orders, the Order 
BackloG Factor (OBGF). 
The table relationship for SEMSF is depicted in figure 3.9 . 
It has a maximum value of 1.0 which means that it can only 
reduce the value of the Order Launching Rate (OLR). This seems 
a reasonable representation of reality, for, if the amount of 
semis stocks falls (causing a fall in the Months' of SEMi 
Stocks (MSEMS)) then the Order Launching Rate must be com- 
promised. Little effect will be experienced at first, but as 
MSEMS becomes lower the effect is felt more and more strongly. 
In the unlikely event of there being no stocks of semis 
available, then there will be no hot rolling. 
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INFLUENCE OF STOCKS OF SEMIS ON THE HOT ROLLING (ORDER 
LAUNCHING) RATE 
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Figure 3.9 Table relationship between the stock of semis 
and its effect on the hot rolling rate 
The Order BackloG Factor (OBGF) has a maximum of 1.2 
(figure 3.10) which prohibits order rolling of more than 20 
percent in excess of the nominally rated throughput for the 
plant. in times of extremely strong customer demand. This 
maximum throughput rate is achieved only when the Months' of 
UNallocated orders Ratio (MUNOR) approaches a value double what 
it is normally. The maximum extra throughput at the heavy end 
is only 15% above normal but it is not unusual in steel works 
for the finishing end capacity to be slightly higher than that 
at the heavy end. As MUNOR falls below 1.0, reflecting a 
weaker-market, the value of OBGF falls almost in line with the 
drop in MUNOR. Were there ever to be no unallocated customer 
orders then no hot'rolling'would take place. ' 
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INFLUENCE OF ORDER BACKLOG OWTHE HOT ROLLING (ORDER 
LAUNCHING) RATE 
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Figure 3.10 Table relationship between unallocated orders 
and their effect on the hot rolling rate 
2.0 
Figure 3.11 below shows the effect the Delivery Lead Time Per- 
ceived by the Customer (DLTPC) has on the generation of mul- 
tiple orders for the same steel. As the delivery time climbs 
in excess of 3 months in a boom then multiple ordering is 
assumed to take place, slowly at first but more quickly as the 
delivery position worsens. If the lead time reaches 5 months, 
which has been known to happen and was discussed in the 
previous chapter, then overbooking will occur at a maximum rate 
of 20 percent. That means one-fifth of the tonnage ordered 
each month is over and above that required to satisfy 
customers, real needs. Customers' steel buyers overbook as an 
insurance against the B. S. C. 's likely inability to be able to 
ship the, required amount in the normal delivery time. 
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Figure 3.11 Table relationship between delivery lead time 
experienced by customers and excessive orders 
Finally in this review of table relationships in the model 
comes that concerned with customers ordering abroad. If the 
lead time on steel delivery climbs then not 'only is there a 
multiple ordering effect as described above, but steel buyers 
turn to overseas sources, particularly in Europe, in order to 
obtain much needed supplies (N. E. D. O., 1986). ' Figure 3-12ý 
shows that the Fraction of Orders PLaced Abroad (FOPLA) rises 
such that if the delivery lead time reaches six months then all 
orders placed will go abroad. ' This may not be particularly 
unrealistic. In 1973 when lead times reached values at the 
upper end of the DLTPC axis, the British Steel Corporation 
prohibited any further orders until such time as they had 
managed to reduce the backlog. 
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EFFECT OF STEEL AVAILABILITY ON FRACTION OF CUSTOMERS' 
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Figure 3.12 Table relationship between delivery lead time 
experienced by customers and the fraction of orders 
being placed abroad 
It was the 1973 boom in steel and B. S. C. 's inability to supply 
which saw inroads starting to be made into the UK market by 
European producers. Bryer et al (1982) quote the case of 
British Leyland who reduced their intake of British steel from 
79% of their sheet requirements in 1973 to 64% in 1974 simply 
because B. S. C. could not supply enough. (It will be recalled 
from the previous section that during 1974 B. S. C. experienced 
bunching of blast furnace relines: supply difficulties were 
particularly acute at this time. ) Bryer et al quote a British 
Leyland executive: 
"In the event of supply constraints within B. S. C. 
it is essential that our supply of vital raw 
materials is safeguarded. Therefore, it is 
important to have connections with the EEC mills so 
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I 
that in the event of additional tonnage being 
required we receive consideration and help due to a 
regular, customer". 
It appears that similar views were taken by a large number of 
B. S. C. customers. P-E Consulting Group, retained by B. S. C. 
in 1976 to carry out a survey of the opinions and attitudes of 
B. S. C. 9s customers, reported (according to Bryer et al p. 159) 
11 ........ part of the market share left in the past 
five years will not be retrieved because some of 
the customers who now import have adopted a policy 
of second-sourcing. ft 
3.4 Explorations using the model 
This section describes various experiments conducted with the 
model. These experiments are illustrative of the way in which 
System Dynamics models can aid thinking and learning about 
effective policy design. The runs conducted and results 
described are obviously those chosen by the author. other 
people, working in the steel industry itself, may have chosen 
quite different issues to address and may even have structured 
their model rather differently from the one described above. 
Nonetheless this does not undermine the utility of System 
Dynamics models in the policy process. Such models will 
exhibit differing structure and content depending on the 
purpose for which they were created. of more importance is a 
willingness on the part of senior executives to expand (or 
revise) their mental policy models in the light of interactions 
with a simulation model based on the concepts of information 
page 178 
feedback. 
I 
3.4.1 Three blast furnace configuration 
An initial experiment involved running the model of the three 
blast furnace situation with demand described by normally 
distributed random values such that the mean was 240,000 tonnes 
per month and the standard deviation 10,000 tonnes per month. 
At this stage no cycle was superimposed to reflect market 
dynamics. This will be introduced in a later experiment. 
Figure 3.13 shows that as blast furnaces are taken out for 
relining, oscillations are set up in the customer order back- 
log. A furnace taken out deprives all the downstream processes 
of their feedstock and this obviously eventually affects the 
ability of the works to satisfy customer orders as quickly as 
is the case when all three furnaces are operating. 
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MODEL OF A TYPICAL OF/BOS STEEL WORKS 
Demand Is Normal random noise 
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Figure 3.13 Oscillations in customer order backlog and orders for 
imports arising from blast furnace relines: demand is normal 
random noise 
Customers eventually appreciate the changed supply position and 
over-order to compensate. Ultimately they may despatch orders 
abroad and thereby swell the imports of steel into this 
country. 
This is not a particularly novel result. But it does offer the 
view that actions taken within the industry can have repercus- 
sions in the market. Customers' behaviour is not something 
which can be viewed as a purely exogenous influence. In 
manufacturing generally, mismanaged production policies on 
either product availability or quality (or both) can store up 
an unfavourable market reaction which may take many months to 
manifest itself. The sudden loss of one-third of pig iron 
production for between 3 and 4 months every 5 years or so may 
not seem a particularly significant event to a steel plant 
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manager intimately involved, but the results provide evidence 
that market repercussions are felt despite anticipatory actions 
like the build-up of stocks of semi-finished steel in advance 
of the reline. 
As mentioned previously, Carnell (1974) had looked at market 
dynamics as one aspect of his studies. He concluded that 
seasonal and longer term cycles in order placement were 
amplified by consumers and stockholders but that the Strip 
Mills Division itself further exaggerated these fluctuations. 
He deduced from this that capacity was not being used effec- 
tively. 
Although Carnell did not specifically consider the role of 
blast furnaces in any of his models, it is clear from the above 
graph that elimination of the pig iron output from a furnace 
undergoing a reline is one of the contributory mechanisms 
whereby the steel industry itself can effect an exaggeration of 
order variations. He instances some other internal mechanisms 
such as the rate of release of customer orders by the sales 
office to production and the availability of adequate 
interprocess stocking capacity at peak periods. These aspects 
obviously contribute, as will any other managerial process 
which increases the delivery lead time to such an extent that 
customers react by submitting duplicate orders. The areas 
selected by Carnell are recognised as legitimate areas of 
concern but are not included in the model described here which 
is attempting to focus on a central issue: the role of the 
blast furnace. 
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Because the demand for finished steel does vary cyclically, 
principally related to movements in aggregate demand in the 
national economy, it is more realistic to augment the variable 
handling demand in the model (OPL, Orders PLaced) with a 
cyclical component, rather than leaving it as just normal ran- 
dom noise. Accordingly, a sine wave with an amplitude of 48000 
tonnes per month (equivalent to plus or minus 20% of mean 
annual demand) and a periodicity of 48 months (typical of post- 
war economic cycles) was superimposed on the mean annual 
demand. Figure 3.14 shows the effect of this change on the 
order backlog. Since the same variable arising in the situa- 
tion of no cyclical component in demand is also plotted 
(reproduced from figure 3.13) the difference in severity of the 
oscillations in the backlog of customer orders, arising direc- 
tly from cyclical'demand, can be readily seen. 
Operational policy in respect of the blast furnaces is hardly 
rendered any easier by the presence of a demand cycle. If it 
turns upwards while a large furnace is out for relining (as 
happened in 1973-74) then lead times extend rapidly and 
customer dissatisfaction is manifest. 
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Figure 3.14 Oscillations in customer order backlog arising from 
demand modelled as (i) normal random noise (ii) a four year 
cycle superimposed on (i). 
3.4.2 Configurations of three and five blast furnaces: volume 
comparisons 
The trend towards larger blast furnaces (documented in chap- 
ter 2) and driven by unit output (and capital) cost 
considerations means that a more significant proportion of 
material for steelmaking is lost to the works on the occasion 
of a reline. Hence it seems reasonable to investigate the 
effects of having a configuration comprising a larger number of 
smaller blast furnaces. Accordingly an assessment has been 
made of the effects of operating with five blast furnaces (each 
having an average throughput around 48000 ingot tonnes per 
month) compared to the existing configuration assumed (outputs 
close to 80000 tonnes per month). Obviously the overall output 
MODEL OF A TYPICAL SF/SOS STEEL WORKS 
Effect of introducing a business cycle element In demand 
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for each specimen configuration is the same, being 240,000 ton- 
nes per month. 
It should be made clear at the outset that a five blast furnace 
operation is potentially much more costly. Increasing 
economies of scale have been avidly pursued in respect of 
process plant, propelled it seems solely by industrial 
engineering estimates which derive from the fact that the 
volume increases more rapidly than the enclosing surface of 
rectangular, cylindrical and spherical shapes and that output 
is highly correlated with volume and investment and operating 
costs with size of the enclosing surface. A rule of thumb in 
common use suggests that a doubling of capacity requires 
investment of only about six-tenths. 
Bela Gold has conducted empirical studies of economies of 
scale, for instance in respect of Japanese blast furnaces 
(Gold, 1974), and claims no evidence as to the existence of 
such economies can be unearthed. In a number of studies on 
economies of scale (Gold, Rosegger and Boylan, 1980; Gold, 
1982) he questions whether this aspect of theoretical 
industrial economics is one possessed of any empirical sub- 
stance. The study described below can be seen in some small 
way as contributing to this growing store of knowledge on 
economies of scale. 
Initially, the results are reported without reference to a 
financial performance measure. However, it is clear that no 
comparison can be made between the two blast furnace con- 
figurations under investigation without including costs. 
Accordingly, this performance measure is developed in the sub- 
sequent sections. 
page 184 
0 
For the momentj consider figure 3.15 which depicts the produc- 
tion of semi-finished steel and the lead time perceived by 
customers under the two alternative configurations. Demand is 
modelled as normal random noise with a business cycle component 
superimposed. 
MODEL OF A TYPICAL BF/OOS STEEL WORKS 
Comparison of three large and five smaller bleat furnaces 
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Figure 3.15 Semi production and lead times perceived by customers 
arising from (i)-a configuration of three large blast furnaces and 
(ii) five smaller blast furnaces 
Clearly production is rather less volatile under the five blast 
furnace configuration and lead times are somewhat lower. This 
is important: when lead times do not escalate as much, steel 
buyers are tempted less to switch their purchase orders abroad. 
The flexibility of the smaller plant is the essential point 
here. Time and again contributions to the literature on 
economies of scale - in the case of the steel industry Barnett 
and Crandall. (1986); Jones and Cockerill (1984); and 
Bryer et al (1982) -- make the point that, while the larger 
sized plant can produce at a lower cost per unit of output, 
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these large production units lack "flexibility". Precisely 
what is meant by this term is. not often spelt out. But here is 
offered one potential feature in connection with the steel 
industry: blast furnaces, their system downtime for relines 
and their limited variability of output. System dynamics as a 
tool for policy evaluation can, moreover, take into account 
both the revenue/market consequences of plant inflexibility as 
well as the cost of production aspects developed in the follow- 
ing section. 
3.4.3 The costing of blast furnace and other operations 
There is little doubt that money is the appropriate metric to 
employ in policy evaluations of technology in the steel 
industry. The evidence in the literature, particularly from 
Bryer et al (1982), confirms what might be intuitively expec- 
ted: that strategic planning has involved the consideration of 
various options which have all been reduced to a financial 
measure. Not only that but discounted money values are adopted 
for the evaluations. This is entirely expected in view of the 
long term nature of most strategic planning. Accordingly, the 
model (reproduced in full as an appendix to this chapter) 
incorporates a financial sector which brings together under a 
common measure all the operational issues under consideration. 
To declare such a laudable goal is one thing, but to unearth 
appropriate figures to employ in the model is very much 
another. Operating costs can be found in a number of books and 
published articles but they are invariably quite general, do 
not always indicate the capacity utilisation being achieved and 
do not declare either the blast furnace size assumed or the 
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overall plant output. 
Inescapably, artificial financial data have had to be employed. 
Nevertheless, the internal consistency of the numbers used was 
held relative to the proportions of cost allocated to the 
various processes and also to the proportions as between fixed 
and variable costs. Furthermore, the unit price figure (per 
ingot tonne) was chosen such that it was simultaneously in line 
with recent quoted prices and yielded a reasonable break even 
point for the hypothetical works under consideration which, it 
will be recalled, produces approximately three million ingot 
tonnes per annum. The derivation of all cost coefficients will 
now be given in detail. 
The most up-to-date and comprehensive costing data was found in 
Barnett and Crandall (1986 p. 120) and is based on U. S. 
experience. These authors cite all the relevant unit costs, in 
1985 dollar terms, for a representative integrated steel mill 
operating at 90% of capacity and producing cold-rolled coil. 
The data sources are calculations by those authors based on 
confidential figures. Table 3.1 shows the split as between 
fixed and variable costs assuming, as do Jones and Cockerill 
(1984), that labour costs are classified as fixed. Also shown 
are the cost per tonne figures attributed to each of the major 
stages of production in an integrated steel mill, from the 
heavy end right through to the cold finishing stage. 
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0 
HEAVYEND 
Fixed Cost 
31.3 Coke Oven 
31.85 Blast Furnace 
19.7 BOS Furnace 
12.0 Ingot Caster 
15.8 Slab Mill 
Variable Cost 
65.1 
101.8 
67.75 
3.6 
26.55 
===============================_===_=== ====-==-- --- 
INISHINGEND 
Total 
27.45 
58.7 
196.80 
Hot Strip Mill 
Cold Finishing 
Total 
23.0 
41.9 
329.70 
Table 3.1 Allocation of unit production costs ($ per ton) for a 
typical integrated steel mill (from Barnett & Crandall, 1986) 
It can be seen that the following approximate proportionate 
allocation of unit costs prevails. 
Fixed Costs: 
Variable Costs: 
Heavy End: 
Finishing End: 
Total Unit Costs 
Heavy End 56% 
Heavy End 80% 
Fixed Costs 30% 
Fixed Costs 57% 
Fixed 37.4% 
Finishing End 44% 
Finishing End 20% 
Variable Costs 70% 
Variable Costs 43% 
Variable 62.6% 
Assuming that the total cost (E) of output rises linearly with 
output, a pair of cost equations which satisfy the above 
proportions are: 
y- 152.03E6 + 118.58 x 
and 
y- 120.1E6 + 30.41 x 
y- 272.13E6 + 148.99 x 
x- throughput per annum 
Heavy End 
Finishing End 
Total 
The above assumes that the plant is operating at go% of its 
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capacity, which is 2.88 million tonnes x 1.15 x 0.9 - 2.98 mil- 
lion tonnes. The 15% increase accounts for upward vaAations 
which can be achieved at the heavy end by altering the blast 
furnace burden (handled by the Burden Efficiency Factor in the 
model). This flat-out capacity at the heavy end can 
furthermore be accommodated by the finishing end, where output 
can be increased by up to 20% (handled by the Order Backlog 
Factor in the model). These potential variations are 
represented in the model by table functions and have been 
described in an earlier section. 
For the heavy end, costs are 
152.03E6 + 118.58 (2.98E6) - E505.4E6. 
This is E51.02 per tonne (fixed), E118.58 (variable) and E169.6 
(total) . 
For the finishing end the equivalent costs are 
120.1E6 + 30.41 (2.98E6) - E210.7E6 
This is E40.3 per tonne (fixed), E30.41 (variable) and E70.7 
(total). 
Fixed costs per tonne can be seen to be allocated with 56% to 
the heavy end and 44% to the finishing end, as required. For 
variable costs the figures are 80% to the heavy end and 20% to 
the finishing end, again as required. 
I 
Further, the heavy end has 51.02/169.6 X 100 per cent of unit 
fixed costs which is the required 30% with 40.3/70.7 X 100 per 
cent of unit variable costs for the finishing end, which also 
meets the required 57% of the total. 
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Finally, the total unit fixed cost of 51.02 + 40.3 - L91.32 per 
tonne is very close to the required 37.4% of total overall unit 
costs. 
Variable costs are 118.58 + 30.41 - E148.99 or nearly 62.6% of 
the total. 
If a revenue per ingot tonne of E250 is assumed then the break- 
even point for the plant is - 2.69 million tonnes throughput or 
81% of its flat-out capacity. This is depicted in the static 
break-even graph below (figure 3.16). 
STATIC BREAK-EVEN GRAPH FOR THE THREE BLAST FURNACE CONFIGURATION 
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Figure 3.16 Static break-even graph for the 3 blast furnace 
works with assumed cost and revenue figures 
Having explained the derivation of the cost coefficients for a 
three blast furnace configuration, it is now necessary to turn 
to the five (smaller) blast furnace configuration and repeat 
the exercise. This is not carried out ab initio but rather by 
adjusting the fixed cost coefficient associated with the heavy 
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end for the (existing) three blast furnace configuration. It 
is assumed that unit variable costs at the heavy end and both 
fixed and variable costs at the finishing end are unchanged by 
the size of the blast furnaces installed. Overall output is 
the same as before. 
From table 3.1 it can be seen that the blast furnaces and coke 
ovens account for 57% of the heavy end fixed costs per ton. 
Thus E86.66 million of the assumed E152.03 million fixed costs 
can be thought of as representing three blast furnaces and 
associated coke ovens in the model. This is E28.89 million per 
furnace. Assuming each furnace is operating at 90% of capacity 
(as before) its throughput per annum is 
960000 x 1.15 x 0.9 - 993600 tonnes 
yielding a cost per tonne of E29.07. 
The size of a blast furnace is governed by its hearth diameter 
and so to find the increase in fixed cost per tonne from fur- 
naces averaging 960,000 tonnes per annum to those averaging 
576,000 tonnes per annum, it is necessary to make an assumption 
about the relationship between hearth diameter and achievable 
annual output. The influential Battelle Institute (1977, 
p. 181) have published some German data which are graphed in 
figure 3.17. 
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Figure 3.17 Relatlonship between blast furnace hearth diameter to 
(i) average annual output and (ii) an index of operating costs 
The curve was fitted to the data by eye. An output of 576,000 
tonnes per annum comes from a furnace of hearth diameter 7.5 
metres and an output of 960,000 tonnes per annum from one of 
8.75 metres diameter. Also shown in figure 3.17 are some 
additional data from Battelle (1977, p. 182) which yield an 
estimated increase in operating costs of 16% between a 7.5 
metre and an 8.75 metre furnace. This, then, represents the 
supposed diseconomies of smaller scale plants. 
Returning to the derivation of the revised fixed costs for the 
smaller blast furnaces it is now possible to gross up the cost' 
per tonne figure for the larger blast furnace and so obtain an 
estimate of the same appropriate to a smaller furnace. This 
gives 29.07 X 1.16 - L33.72 per tonne. Recall that total'out- 
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80 0 u 
4-0 
60 
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20 
put is 
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2.88E6 X 1.15 x 0.9 - 2.98 million tonnes 
at 90% of capacity. Hence the revised total fixed cost is 
2.98E6 X E33.72 - E100.51 million. 
This is an increase of 
100.51E6 - 86.66E6 - E13.85 million. The two linear cost 
equations for the five blast furnace configuration are now 
given below. 
y= 165.88E6 + 118.58 x 
and 
y- 120.1E6 + 30.41 x 
Heavy End 
Finishing End (unchanged) 
y= 285.98E6 + 148.99 
x= throughput per annum 
Total 
With revenue per ingot tonne kept at E250 the above equations 
mean that the plant now breaks even at an annual throughput of 
2.83 million tonnes or 140,000 tonnes per annum more than in 
the three blast furnace configuration. Break-even moves to 
85.4% of capacity. 
Stockholding costs are also included in the overall financial 
performance measures. Costs are added in to cover the holding 
of semi-finished steel and allocated steel. In each case an 
average monthly stock figure is obtained by adding together two 
months holdings and dividing by two. This average stock figure 
is then SAMPLEd each month (using the DYSMAP2 SAMPLE function) 
and multiplied by the cost of holding stock, assumed to be 15% 
per annum (applied at a monthly rate) of the unit value of the 
stock. Assumed unit values are E100 for semi-finished steel 
and E200 for allocated stock (at the finishing end). Relative 
to operating costs (fixed and variable), stockholding costs are 
a small component of total costs. 
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3.4.4 Configurations of three and five blast furnaces: 
financial comparisons 
Having derived the relevant cost data it is now possible to 
conduct simulation explorations using financial performance 
measures. Where discounted costs and revenues are used, the 
discount rate is set to 15%. The B. S. C. used 16% in their 
strategy planning calculations according to Bryer et al (1982). 
Figure 3.18 shows the annual profit with a three blast furnace 
configuration for each of the ten years of the 120 month 
simulation. Profit is calculated here, as it would be in a set 
of annual accounts, by cumulating revenues and costs over 
twelve months and then calculating the difference. At the end 
of each year the variables handling the cumulative data have to 
be reset to zero to allow the cumulations for the following 
year to commence. 
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Figure 3.18 Annual profit from a three blast furnace configuration 
Lurches between profitability and significant losses, so 
characteristic of a manufacturing business involving relatively 
high fixed costs and operating in the region of the break even 
point, are captured in the model. 
Figure 3.19 depicts the annual profits reported by the British 
Steel Corporation (now British Steel p1c) from 1967/68 to 
1988/89. The marked swings are again apparent. For instance, 
in 1972-73 B. S. C. turned a E12 million trading loss into a E45 
million profit. Between 1974/75 and 1975/76 a profit of E144 
million became a loss of E159 million. In 1985/86 a E91 mil- 
lion trading profit was reported when the year before a loss of 
E64 million had been posted. 
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Figure 3.19 B. S. C. (British Steel p1c) financial results before 
interest, taxation and extraordinary items 
While figure 3.16 gives a picture of the break even point in a 
static framework, it is perhaps appropriate now to show how the 
main financial variables behave in the dynamic situation where 
customer demand is cyclical. Figure 3.20 is, in effect, a 
dynamic break even graph. It shows how revenue compares to 
total cost when running the model with three blast furnaces. 
Clearly, on those occasions when total revenue fails to cover 
total costs a loss is the outcome. This is clearly the case in 
the second, third, fifth and ninth years, for example. It is 
not difficult to envisage a slump in demand so severe that even 
fixed costs are not covered. In such an eventuality af irm 
making steel would be in very serious financial trouble. 
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Figure 3.20 The behaviour of costs and revenue for the three 
blast furnace model when demand includes a business cycle 
Having depicted the results from the model when a configuration 
of three blast furnaces are used, it is now possible to offer 
comparative financial scenarios in the situation where, 
instead, five smaller blast furnaces are employed. Demand is 
kept exactly the same as with the three blast furnace runs. 
Figure 3.21 shows the cumulative discounted profit, over the 
ten year run, for each configuration. 
Recalling figure 3.18 it is not surprising that for both 
options a significant loss is revealed over the ten year 
period, but in terms of a financial comparison the supposedly 
less economic configuration is superior. 
MODEL OF A TYPICAL 6F/8OS STEEL WORKS 
Three large blast furnaces In oPeration 
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Comparison of three large and five sm&22@r b2set furnaces 
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Figure 3.21 Comparative scenario in terms of cumulative discounted 
profit for configurations of two different blast furnace sizes 
To uncover the reason for this result it is necessary to look 
at the two components of the profit equation -- costs and 
revenues, figures 3.22 and 3.23 respectively. Figure 3.22 
reveals that the configuration of larger blast furnaces is 
indeed the cheapest. The economies of scale are clearly 
available and utilised. 
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Figure 3.22 Cumul9tive costs discounted under the three and rive 
blast furnace configurations 
However, the picture is reversed when the revenue side of the 
equation is examined (figure 3.23). This is the nub of the 
issue. Although the five blast furnace operation is more 
expensive to operate, it is more flexible. Less business is 
lost abroad because lead times do not extend so far consequent 
on supply shortfalls due to relines. The gap between 
discounted revenue is wider in favour of the five blast furnace 
configuration than the gap between discounted cost is in favour 
of the three blast furnace configuration. 
MODEL OF A TYPICAL BF/BOS STEEL WORKS 
Comparison of three large and five smaller blast furnaces 
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Figure 3.23 Cumulative revenue discounted under the three and 
five blast furnace configurations 
It can be seen, therefore, that the graph of a comparison of 
the delivery lead time, presented earlier in figure 3.15, and 
which favoured the configuration of smaller furnaces, is a 
major determinant of the improved profitability (smaller los- 
ses) evidenced in their operation. Less revenue is lost to 
foreign competitors if order backlogs and lead times are better 
managed. Economies of scale might exist but these economies 
cannot be put to effective use if it implies a productive set- 
up which cannot cope in strong market conditions, leading to an 
adverse customer reaction. The revenue as well as the cost 
side of the equation needs to be considered. Tomlinson, 
Buzacott and Tsuji may be hinting at this when they say (1982): 
MODEL OF A TYPICAL OF/SOS STEEL WORKS 
Comparison of three large and five smaller blest furnace@ 
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"In fact, the more that one studies a real problem 
(of scale)o the more the dynamics seem to gather in 
importance, and the more one becomes aware that an 
optimum based on static information may be local in 
time, and extremely dangerous. " 
Figure 3.24 merely reflects the unit cost differences between 
the two configurations. It shows a scatter of points, one 
point for each year in the simulation, of the output cost per 
tonne actually achieved in that year. Each locus of points 
creates a curve reflecting economies attained through more 
effective capacity utilisation for a given scale. A curve of 
this shape is commonly seen in economics textbooks. Shifting 
to a smaller scale of plant causes a transfer to a different 
locus of cost per tonne points. 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE WITH 3&5 BLAST FURNACE CONFIGURATIONS 
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year simulation for each configuration of blast furnaces 
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To reinforce the argument in favour of the smaller furnaces it 
is worth pointing out that, in costing the five furnace 
operation, the amounts for coke ovens were included in the sum 
to which a loading factor of 16% was applied. If the figures 
for coke ovens are excluded, on the grounds that they will 
operate to supply five furnaces in exactly the same way as they 
operate to supply three with an identical total throughput, 
then the increase in fixed costs for the smaller furnaces is 
not as great. The break even point is consequently lower and 
the above results would favour the small furnace operation even 
more. The scatter of points between the two configurations in 
figure 3.24 would be even closer together. 
A sensitivity test concerning the mean demand has been conduc- 
ted on this model. In place of a mean demand of 240,000 tonnes 
per month, a figure of 200,000 tonnes was used. The cyclical 
component is left unchanged but the mean level around which the 
oscillations are occurring is now reduced by nearly 17%. The 
result for the lower mean demand is graphed in figure 3.25 
where the cumulative discounted profit is shown for the three 
and the five blast furnace configurations. 
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MODEL OF A TYPICAL OF/SOS STEEL WORKS 
Demand sensitivity comparison of three large and five smaller blest furnaces 
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Figure 3.25 Cumulative discounted profit for configurations of two 
different blast furnace sizes when mean demand is reduced to 
200,000 tonnes p. a. 
The result is quite interesting. Because demand is reduced, 
the works can now more easily cope. Blast furnace relines are 
not as critical. With the higher demand scenario, relines lost 
business by extending lead times and the cheaper (large) blast 
furnace configuration resulted in significant lost revenue, to 
such an extent that it emerged as the least -profitable 
arrangement. Here the situation is reversed. There is less 
pressure on capacity and although the five furnace configura- 
tion still manages the greatest revenue, the lower output costs 
of the larger furnaces are such that they outweigh any disad- 
vantages on the revenue side and the result is that the three 
furnace configuration yields the smallest discounted loss and 
becomes the preferred configuration. The smaller furnaces are 
always the worst for cumulative costs discounted and best for 
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cumulative. revenue discounted but what matters are the relative 
sizes of the discrepancies in each case. 
of course, the absolute profit or loss values change markedly 
arising from the lower average demand. This reflects the point 
made earlier that industries with high fixed costs of produe- 
tion require consistently strong throughput in order to remain 
profitable. For the three furnace operation the cumulative 
discounted loss rises from E115 million to E166 million 
consequent on demand being reduced to 200,000 tonnes per month. 
For the five furnace operation, with higher fixed costs, the 
cumulative loss discounted rises from E65 million to E221 mil- 
lion. 
It is worth reflecting on these results in terms of their 
implications for policy. There is no doubt that unit output 
costs can be reduced by increasing the scale of the operation 
as represented here by blast furnace hearth diameter. However, 
unless a margin of throughput capacity over average demand is 
tolerated, larger furnaces will lead to rapid extensions of the 
lead time in times of sharply increased customer demand, to 
such an extent that their ex ante economies of scale are wiped 
out. The narrower is the gap between capacity and average 
demand the more economies of scale are turned on their head: a 
smaller scale operation may be more profitable. 
These experiments with the model may have had an input to the 
debate concerning strategic policy in the UK steel industry in 
the late 1970's and early 1980's. over this period (as is 
documented in some detail by Bryer et al (1982)) the British 
Steel Corporation closed the Consett and Corby steel works and 
the heavy end at Shotton works. All were described as posses- 
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sing plant on too small a scale to be profitable. B. S. C. were 
to concentrate production on five main steelworks in the UK 
where large-scale operation would secure extremely low unit 
costs per tonne of output. To this end plant improvements were 
to take place at these five major works. Port Talbot, for 
instance, would have the benefit (sic) of a large new blast 
furnace. It would cope with the output of three smaller ones 
at that site and these small furnaces would, in consequence, be 
de-commissioned. 
Juxtaposed against this action by the British Steel Corporation 
stands the stkategic initiative taken by Kaiser Steel in the 
U. S. A. in 1978. With the rapid growth in steel demand in 
1973-74 optimism flourished and Kaiser steel built a new basic 
oxygen facility capable of producing 2.8 million tons of crude 
steel per year and a continuous caster that could produce 
700,000 tons of slabs annually. The facilities, which came on- 
stream in 1978 and which cost $240 million, were closed in 
1983. Demand had not proved strong enough to make the plant 
profitable. The entire plant was subsequently sold for $110 
million. Only the finishing end has been used by the new 
owners to roll slabs imported from abroad. 
3.4.5 A configuration including Electric Are Furnaces 
Over the last three decades the electric are furnace technology 
in steelmaking has grown such that by 1985 it represented 
around 30% of total crude steel output in the U. S. A., 27% in 
the UK and 45% in Italy (Aylen, 1989). Quite simply it 
represents the 2new9 technology for making steel and is now on 
the verge of being a major competitor to the BF/BOS system even 
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for the production of slabs (Barnett and Crandall, 1986). 
An electric are furnace offers operational, financial and tech- 
nological advantages over the BF/BOS process. Although 
inherently smaller in scale (a typical electric furnace yields 
around 500,000 tonnes of crude steel per annum) it has shown to 
be a significant competitor to the blast furnace and basic 
oxygen converter found in large integrated plants. An electric 
arc furnace uses steel scrap and, therefore, the generation of 
pig iron (carried out by a blast furnace) is not necessary. It 
is probably true to say, overall, the choice between the blast 
furnace and electric are process routes, at any one time, 
depends on an interplay between costs of coking coal and iron 
ore on the one hand and steel scrap and power on the other. 
Operationally, the electric furnace offers advantages because 
it does not require an extensive period for relining of refrac- 
tory materials. Regular maintenance can be performed over the 
weekend (International Iron and Steel Institute, 1983). 
Indeed, developments in water-cooled sidewalls have reduced the 
amount of refractory materials used in a modern electric fur- 
nace. Also, it is capable of being stopped and started in 
response to the prevailing level of demand. As Aylen notes 
(1989) it is relatively easy for an are melting shop to step 
down from 20 to 10 shifts a week and thereby save some manning 
costs. This is in sharp contrast to a blast furnace which, as 
has been mentioned earlier, operates continuously once it has 
been fired. 
On the financial side there is no doubt at all that an electric 
furnace is capable of producing steel at a lower capital cost 
per tonne. In times of high inflation this is reinforced by 
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the average construction time, between 1 and 2 years for a 
'mini-mill' (the type of steelmaking operation within which the 
electric arc furnace is central) and possibly up to 4 years for 
the first stage of an integrated steelworks (Case Clearing 
House, 1975b). 
Aylen (1989) summarises the difference between an integrated 
works and a mini-mill using electric arc steelmaking by stating 
that oxygen steelmaking is a high capital cost, low operating 
cost technique with high fixed costs but low and stable mar- 
ginal costs whereas electric arc steelmaking from scrap 
involves low initial capital costs and high and volatile 
operating costs: electric furnaces are a low fixed cost but 
high marginal cost route. 
Whether electric furnaces are a higher marginal cost option 
depends on the relative costs of their inputs compared to the 
inputs required by a blast furnace operation. Barnett and 
Crandall (1986) appear to dispute Aylen's claim. Although they 
have included both fixed and variable cost elements, their cal- 
culations reveal a lower cost per ton for the production of 
cold-rolled coil in a new mini-mill than in either an existing 
or brand new works utilising the blast furnace/BOS technology. 
Their figures are reproduced in table 3.2. 
per ton 
New Integrated Steel Mill 495.05 
Representative Integrated Steel Mill 445.45 
New Steel Mini-mill 398.00 
Table 3.2 Cost of Producing Cold-Rolled coil in three different 
works configurations each operating at 90% of capacity in 1985 
(Barnett and Crandall, 1986) 
Because the electric arc furnace is a new steelmaking tech- 
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nology it continues to benefit from advances in this tech- 
nology. The unit size of such plant is small and so renewal 
tends to be faster than with an integrated works. As pointed 
out by Aylen (1989), the enormous sunk costs of an integrated 
steelworks are a 'barrier to exit, causing renewal to be a much 
more slow moving process. However, with each successive 
renewal of an electric furnace-based steel making facility, 
management can gain the productivity advantages imbued in the 
current versions which incorporate the latest technological 
advances. 
For instance, Ultra-High Power (UHP) electric furnaces have 
appeared which yield long arcs and markedly reduce electrode 
consumption, particularly when melting scrap. Systems involv- 
ing such furnaces normally now incorporate micro-processors and 
powerful computers to monitor and control the on-going process 
in a technical sense. Water cooled linings to reduce reliance 
on refractories (which need more maintenance) have already been 
mentioned. Secondary steelmaking is much more commonplace. In 
this arrangement the arc furnace itself can be optimised for 
melting the charge while the refining processes are carried out 
in a second (steelmaking) vessel. This, incidentally, also 
allows a wider range of product types to be produced -- far 
wider than would be found in a single integrated works. 
All of these technological advances in electric steelmaking 
have combined to yield the improvements in furnace performance 
documented by Barnett and Crandall (1986, p. 57). 
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Criterion 1965 1975 1985 
Tap-to-Tap time (hours) 10 5 1.5 
Electrode use (lbs per ton) 14 12 9 
Electricity use (kw hours per ton) 550 525 520 
Labour use (man-hours per ton) 2.9 1.75 0.9 
Table 3.3 Electric Arc Furnace performance improvements over 20 
years arising from technological advances 
(Barnett and Crandall, 1986) 
Because the electric arc technology is still developing, it can 
be expected that additional improvements will take place yield- 
ing further significant competitive advantages arising from 
reductions in the unit output cost. Indeed, Barnett and Cran- 
dall (1986) believed that in 1985 in the U. S. A. the electric 
arc process route was on the verge of being competitive with an 
integrated works for the production of slabs, the forerunners 
of coil and sheet products, hitherto thought capable of being 
produced only in an integrated works. 
With many significant advantages offered in favour of electric 
arc steelmaking, it begs the question of why this technology 
has hardly been seen in UK steelmaking operating under the 
control of the British Steel Corporation (now British Steel 
Pic). It is necessary to go back to the Annual Report and 
Accounts for 1976/77 before mention is made of plans to 
construct a new electric arc plant: one was to be built at 
Shelton (Stoke-on-Trent) incorporating a single ultra-high 
powered arc and would "represent the application of the latest 
technology to this process". The cost was put at E22 million. 
In general, it seems that B. S. C. never considered the pos- 
sibility of giving electric arc based steel production a more 
prominent role in their affairs. The electric are process 
route was relegated to a role solely in the production of 
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specialist engineering steels and never in more mainstream 
I 
activities, despite the growing evidence, particularly from 
America, that the transition to such activities was now 
feasible. 
This doubtless reflects the 'Heritage9 and 'Development' 
strategies discussed earlier, which both emphasised the 
benefits of economies of scale and the expansion of large 
integrated works at coastal sites. The emphasis on large scale 
operations may have been an acceptable 9world view$ at one 
time, but given Barnett and Crandall's assertion that electric 
are based plants are now becoming competitive even for the 
production of slabs, it would appear that a careful 
reconsideration of policy is called for. 
While *the demolition of an entire integrated works and its 
replacement by an electric are based production facility is 
hardly a serious strategic consideration, the possibility of 
replacing a single blast furnace with a number of electric arc 
furnaces feeding a continuous casting plant (a mixed steelworks 
option) is surely worth contemplating. Such an option may seem 
somewhat iconoclastic to those in the industry and be summarily 
dismissed in consequence. Nonetheless it does have the 
advantage that, insofar as a BOS converter vessel uses steel 
scrap as well as molten iron, a supply of scrap to any BF/BOS 
works is already in place. If there are gluts and shortages in 
the availability of scrap, utilisation of two production tech- 
nologies which differ in their extent of scrap requirements 
must offer operational advantages to the works management. 
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Accordingly, the model described above has been amended to 
reflect a situation where one of the three large blast furnaces 
(producing 85,000 tonnes of crude steel equivalent, per month) 
is replaced by two electric arc furnaces (producing 42,500 ton- 
nes per month each). This means that the 9mix9 of steel 
produced is, in round terms, one-third electric arc and two- 
thirds blast furnace/basic oxygen furnace. 
Running an electric arc furnace as opposed to a blast furnace 
means there are operational differences which can be reflected 
in amendments to the influence diagram of the system presented 
previously (Figure 3.2, p. 148). The notion of required semi- 
finished steel production can be introduced. This represents 
the production needed to keep the average months of orders on 
hand and the semi stockholdings equal to the desired amounts. 
It is true that under the blast furnace technology option links 
between orders on hand/semis stocks and crude steel production 
exist but they operate only insofar as changes in burden 
content introduce some degree of flexibility into the system. 
The main managerial control, of cutting out a blast furnace 
altogether when demand is depressed, is an 9all or nothing9 
action which is often left too late anyway. 
Now, with electric arc furnaces available, it is possible to 
vary the output of crude steel over a much wider range and the 
degree of control made available for matching output to demand 
is that much closer in consequence. The two large blast fur- 
naces and associated basic oxygen furnaces can be loaded to the 
maximum since, if operating below capacity, a large increase in 
the unit cost of production will result arising from the high 
fixed costs. The electric furnaces can then be used to, respond 
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to the imbalance (negative or positive) between crude steel 
supply and customer demand. 
In figure 3.26 is shown a fragment of the influence diagram 
developed previously. This partial diagram depicts the 
revisions surrounding crude steel production in the amended 
model. For instance, it is not always necessary to have both 
electric furnaces operating if demand is depressed. In any 
event with much lower fixed costs their break-even point is 
significantly lower than that for a basic oxygen works. 
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Figure 3.26 Partial influence diagram showing the revisions 
consequent on use of electric arc furnaces 
Of particular importance is the link between unallocated orders 
and required steel production from the electric furnaces. As 
the level of unallocated orders moves up and down, the required 
steel production can move with it. In the case of blast fur- 
nace technology, however, the. link works only one way, 
signified by the two short lines across the arrow connecting 
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unallocated orders with crude steel production from the blast 
furnaces. Here, if unallocated orders rise, blast furnace 
production can respond only to the extent that the quality of 
burden can be adjusted upwards (and hence the driving rate of 
the furnace similarly). But if there is a fall in unallocated 
orders, the output from the furnace cannot suddenly be cut 
back. It may eventually be blown out prematurely, but that 
would be a top-level decision and as much assurance as possible 
would be sought in advance that the downturn was not merely a 
short-term phenomenon. 
This is all reflected in figure 3.27 where it can be seen that, 
under the mixed technology scenario, semi production holds up 
around the first 20 months and between the 70th and 85th months 
when blast furnaces go out for relining. Availability of steel 
is maintained and as a result there is less of a reaction from 
the market to the supply situation. As is also shown in figure 
3.27 the delivery lead time is somewhat lower during these 
crucial periods. 
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MODEL TO SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
Comparison of OF/DOS and a Mixed Technology option 
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Figure 3.27 Production of semi-finished steel and delivery lead 
times under Ma BF/BOS configuration and (ii) a configuration 
including electric arc furnaces 
Sensitivity tests involving reducing the mean annual demand to 
160,000 tonnes per month (a one-third reduction) show that the 
blast furnace configuration is then more able to cope with 
demand, despite the relines, and lead times do not rise in com- 
parison with the mixed technology option. Nonetheless, a new 
set of problems then emerges for the blast furnace option. Low 
demand means poor capacity utilisation (see figure 3.28) and, 
unless an entire furnace is mothballed for some considerable 
time, a large build-up of semi-finished steel stocks takes 
place. Both these eventualities have cost implications which 
are weighted against the blast furnace option and in favour of 
the electric are technology. 
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MODEL OF A-TYPICAL OF/SOS STEEL WORKS 
Demand sensitivity test an three blast furnace option 
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Figure 3.28 Heavy-end capacity utilisation and stocks of semi- 
finished steel (months' supply) when monthly average demand is 
reduced to 160,000 tonnes (blast furnace option) 
3.4.6 The Costing of Electric Arc Furnace Operations 
In order to make financial comparisons between configurations 
involving blast furnaces with facilities including electric arc 
furnaces it is necessary to revise the costings developed ear- 
lier. As with the calculations for the smaller blast furnacest 
the figures for the electric arc furnaces are derived by making 
appropriate adjustments to the cost data used for the three 
large blast furnaces. 
Once again the costings adopted are based on U. S. A. data in 
1985 and supplied by Barnett and Crandall (1986, p. 124). They 
give representative cost per ton figures for a new steel mini- 
mill (incorporating electric are furnaces), producing cold- 
0 
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rolled coil and operating at 90% of output. As before, the 
figures published are split into the various processes 
involved. 
The production technology mix being modelled involves the 
replacement of one of the blast furnaces by two electric arc 
furnaces. In terms of the original fixed costs, therefore, 
only those for the blast furnace and associated coke ovens need 
to be considered. Those for the BOS furnaces, slabbing and 
ingot mills will be untouched as these facilities will still be 
required by the remaining two blast furnaces. On the other 
hand, when considering variable costs a completely new set of 
figures are required for the electric arc process route, feeding 
a new continuous casting plant. None of the existing heavy end 
processes will be used by the new facility. I 
Table 3.4 shows the costs, in dollars per ton, for an electric 
arc furnace and an associated continuous casting plant. 
Fixed Cost Variable Cost, 
20.4 Electric Furnace 135.0 
18.15 Continuous Casting Plant 3.5 
Total 38.55 Total 138.5 
Table 3.4 Allocation of unit production costs ($ per ton) for the 
heavy end of a typical mini-mill (from Barnett & Crandalls 1986) 
Compared to the variable cost for a blast furnace shown earlier 
in table 3.1 ($101.8 per ton) it can be seen why an electric 
are furnace is said by some to possess a penalty in terms of 
marginal costs. 
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Because the electric are furnace and concast plant is new, it 
will attract much higher interest and depreciation charges than 
will an existing integrated works. Barnett and Crandall put 
this at $82.15 per ton for an entire new mini-mill. To extract 
from this that portion relating to the melting shop and concast 
plant alone it was necessary to use that proportion which fixed 
costs in these particular shops bear to the total of all fixed 
costs in a new mini-mill, some 37%. In the absence of a split 
of the $82.15 per ton this approach was thought to be the most 
reasonable-one to adopt. The total fixed cost per ton is now 
$38.55 + (0.37 X 82.15) - $68.95. 
Compared to the blast furnace costing in table 3.1, $68.95 per 
ton is 9% higher than the corresponding blast furnace plus coke 
oven fixed cost per ton of $63.15. Of the total heavy end 
fixed costs for the three blast furnace configuration assumed 
in the model (E152.03 million) blast furnaces plus coke ovens 
account for 63.15/110.65 - 57 per cent. ($110.65 per ton was 
the total heavy end fixed cost, detailed in table 3.1, for the 
BF/BOS technology option. ) Hence, the fixed cost for each fur- 
nace is 
((El52.03E6 X 0.57)/3) - E28.89E6. 
This result is then grossed up by 9% to yield a fixed cost for 
the electric are furnace operation of E31.49E6, representing an 
increase in fixed costs of E2,600,000 annually. E28-89E6 is 
also the amount by which the original total fixed cost of 
E152.03E6 is reduced, leaving E123.14 as representing fixed 
costs for the remaining two blast furnaces and associated plant 
not involved with the electric arc operation. 
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Turning now to the variable costs, it will be recalled that 
total variable costs per ton for the original blast furnace 
operation were $264.8 (table 3.1). The figure of $138.5 (from 
table 3.4) is 52.3% of the original total variable costs. 
Thus, the revised variable cost figure used in the model is: 
118.58 X 0.523'- E62.02. 
The revised linear cost equations are, therefore: 
y- 123.14E6 + 118.58 x Heavy End - BF/BOS operation 
y- 31.49E6 + 62.02 x Heavy End - Electric Arc operation 
and 
y- 120.1E6 + 30.41 x Finishing End (unchanged) 
x- throughput per annum 
3.4.7 Financial comparisons between the blast furnace and 
mixed technology options 
Having established the appropriate changes to the cost 
equations it is now possible to review some of the results when 
the model is run incorporating the new cost coefficients. 
Figure 3.29 shows that the mixed technology option of electric 
arc furnaces operating side-by-side with blast furnaces is a 
much more profitable operational strategy than to rely on the 
large blast furnace option alone. 
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MODEL TO SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
Comparison of OFAOS and a Mixed Technolooy option 
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Figure 3.29 Annual profit comparison between (i) large blast 
furnace option and (ii) a mixed technology option 
The profit advantage shown by the mixed technology option is 
perhaps not surprising from the cost point of view when the 
variable cost used for each electric are furnace is so much 
lower than that for the blast furnace. However, there is also 
a revenue advantage for the mixed option because the presence 
of the electric furnaces means that steel availability is 
maintained during the crucial reline periods for the blast fur- 
naces. Thus, the mixed technology option is capable of 
delivering a double benefit: a lower cost operation together 
with a capability to avoid market reactions consequent on what 
would otherwise be production-'pauses'. 
It will be recalled from the earlier comparisons between three 
and five blast furnaces that the latter could offer only 8 
single benefit. Revenue held up because a smaller proportion 
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of total steel production was lost during re-line periods but 
costs were still somewhat. higher because the smaller blast fur- 
nace option was, by definition, a higher cost option. Howeverg 
the mixed technology option additionally offers a cost as well 
as a revenue advantage. 
Sensitivity runs conducted on the mean demand reveal that the 
mixed technology option is still the preferred one. While both 
options show a cumulative loss in DCF terms when demand is 
reduced to as low as 160,000 tonnes per month, the mixed tech- 
nology option is the smaller loss (see table 3.5). At this 
level of demand, the blast furnace option suffers cost loadings 
arising from poor capacity utilisation and high stocks. During 
the period of maximum holding (around the 96th month in the 
simulation) the c9st of stockholding of semi-finished steel is 
running at E2 million per month. 
Cumulative profit (loss) 
discounted over 10 years, Emillion 
Demand 200E3 per month 
Mixed Technology option 52.459 
Demand 200E3 per month 
Blast Furnaces only option (165.962) 
Demand 160E3 per month 
Mixed Technology option (243.215) 
Demand 160E3 per month 
Blast Furnaces only option (430.268) 
Table 3.5 Effect of demand sensitivity tests on cumulative 
profit (loss) discounted for the two configurations 
In view of the difficulties, mentioned earlier, of unearthing 
reliable cost data split between the heavy and finishing ends; 
between fixed and variable costs; and taking account of the 
size and number of production units at a works, it would not be 
I 
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appropriate to undertake sensitivity tests on demand alone. 
Sensitivity tests on the cost coefficients are also essential. 
Unless the data used for parameter values is known to possess a 
high degree of integrity, any policy model should be subject to 
such tests on relevant parameters. Accordingly, in addition to 
the demand sensitivity tests, similar explorations have been 
conducted on both the variable and fixed cost coefficients 
employed in the mixed technology model. 
The results for changes in the variable cost per tonne, with 
demand at 240,000 tonnes per month, are shown in figure 3.30. 
MODEL TO SUPPORT TECHNOLOGY POLICY IN THE STEEL INDUSTRY 
Variable Cost sensitivity test with the Mixed Technology option 
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Figure 3.30 Sensitivity analysis on cumulative profit discounted 
with respect to the variable cost per tonne 
It can be seen that even a doubling of the variable cost per 
tonne leaves the mixed technology option as the preferred one. 
Between a variable cost per tonne of E100 and E120 the 
cumulative discounted profit turns into a loss but on no 
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occasion, over the range of possibilities considered, " is the 
mixed technology option inferior to the option involving blast 
furnaces only. A variable cost per tonne of E124.04 would 
imply a huge leap in scrap and/or power prices making the elec- 
tric arc process route extremely expensive when compared to the 
blast furnace/basic oxygen system route, assuming that no 
similar upward movement occurs in the prices of iron ore or 
coking coal. In fact, at E124.04, the variable cost per tonne 
is higher than the one assumed for the blast furnaces 
(118.58). 
Results for sensitivity runs incorporating a lower mean demand 
as well as changes in the variable cost coefficient are given 
in table 3.6. 
Variable cost 
per tonne E 
62.02 
80 
100 
120 
124.04 
Demand 
200,000 tonnes/month 
52.459 
(21.908) 
(102.308) 
(183.771) 
(201.442) 
Demand 
160,000 tonnes/month 
----------------- 
(243.215) 
(283.540) 
(323.290) 
(366.370) 
(375.982) 
Blast 
Furnaces only (165.962) (430.268) 
Table 3.6 Cumulative discounted profit (loss), Emillion, for a 
range of variable costs and two different mean demand levels 
The blast furnace option is not the worst case with mean demand 
set at 200,000 tonnes per month. This is mainly because annual 
total finishing end costs are higher with the mixed technology 
option. Being a more flexible option, electric furnaces can be 
brought in or out more often. In some years a higher through- 
put passes through the finishing end as a result and this 
pushes up total finishing end costs. On the other hand, the 
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blast furnace option results in one being blown out prematurely 
because of market conditions, saving variable costs both at the 
heavy and finishing ends. An additional reason for the result 
is that the mixed technology option does not secure the revenue 
advantage over and above the blast furnace option. The latter 
can now more easily cope with market demand, leakages to 
imports are not as severe as with a higher demand and the two 
configurations secure much the same cumulative revenue 
discounted. 
A similar sensitivity exercise has been conducted for the fixed 
costs also, with the results being given in table 3.7. 
Fixed cost Demand Demand Demand 
per annum 240,000 200,000 160,000 
Em. tonnes/month tonnes/month tonnes/month 
--------- -- 
31.49 215.451 52.459 (243.215) 
40 173.164 7.048 (289.740) 
55 93.931 (69.935) (364.366) 
70 18.014 (148.337) (444.119) 
80 (37.266) (200.856) (495.924) 
Blast 
Furnaces only (114.664) (165.962) (430.268) 
Table 3.7 Cumulative discounted profit (loss) im. for a 
range of fixed costs and three different mean demand levels 
The fixed costs considered show that in excess of a doubling of 
the annual figure would be needed before the mixed technology 
option became inferior to the option involving blast furnace 
technology only. Overall, the results lend support to the view 
that the choice of the mixed technology option is fairly robust 
with respect to reasonable variations in costs. 
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4 
3.5 Discussion 
Clearly there is considerable interest in the choice of heavy 
end technology for use in steelmaking. Similarly, there is 
debate about the extent to which economies of scale operate in 
the steel industry. By means of the policy model described 
above it is possible that, for the first time, a tool is 
available which can simultaneously handle the financial, 
operational and marketing aspects of these unresolved matters. 
It is a new tool used in this particular context. Certainly, 
system dynamics has been applied in the steel industry 
previously but not specifically for the chosen purpose accorded 
this model. 
That such a model might be welcomed by those associated with 
the industry (either managers or academics) is a distinct pos- 
sibility. Some of the authors previously cited mention factors 
such as 9flexibility' quite regularly but, in the opinion of 
the present author, no one has yet been able to explicitly 
quantify even one aspect of this important consideration when 
evaluating competing technologies. Consider the comments of 
Jones and Cockerill (1984). 
"To acquire the potential benefits of scale, demand 
must grow in line with capacity so that plants and 
firms can operate at, or near, full capacity. The 
recession in the Industry has meant that this has 
not been possible and in such circumstances large- 
scale units can suffer severe cost penalties 
because of their inevitable inflexibility. It can 
be costly and difficult to run complex equipment at 
rates well below those for which it was designed. 
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Plants using smaller-scale technology may be more 
appropriate and efficient in these conditions. 
Older plants with small if out-dated equipment can 
cope better with demand fluctuations. More 
significantly in steel, overhead costs may be 
reduced and flexibility increased by building 
small-scale plants using electric arc furnaces. 
This development has meant that units with annual 
capacities of one million tons or less can be com- 
mercially viable in many industrialised markets. " 
Cartwright (1972) writing some twelve years earlier seems 
reconciled to never being able to fully articulate the role of 
this intangible factor. He says: 
"There comes a point, which is ill-defined, where 
the increase in profitability from making a very 
large plant still larger is quite small, and may be 
offset by unquantifiable disadvantages such as loss 
of flexibility". 
It is to be hoped that the policy model offered above provides 
some food for thought to British Steel executives as they pon- 
der the strategic direction of the firm in the 1990's- In 
terms of its scope, the model is not devoid of criticism. It 
describes the operations of a single works when British Steel 
possesses five major steelmaking plants. The effects of blast 
furnace relines may be mitigated in the context of the 
operations of an entire firm because semis may be transferred 
from one works to another in an attempt to equalise supply 
availability. On the other hand it may be the orders them- 
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selves which are transferred. Provided a similar product 
capability is available at works IB2, works "A9 may transfer 
customer orders to works 9B9 in times of strong customer 
demand. But as the model and the history of UK steel in the 
mid-19709s has shown, it is precisely when demand is strong 
that the effects of blast furnace relines are most damaging to 
customer confidence. 
The components of steel demand are probably closely related. 
It is true that upturnsýin demand will be felt by works making 
sheet and strip before those making bar, rod and plate but not 
separated enough to allow significant inter-works transfers of 
orders. In any case transfers from a works making flat 
products to one producing general steels is almost certainly an 
impossibility by reason of the differing rolling and finishing 
facilities. 
Within a broad product grouping the only ways to cope with a 
large blast furnace undergoing relining would be either ýto 
ensure that this happened at a low point in the steel demand 
cycle or to consciously work with a margin of spare capacity'so 
as to ensure the effects on output were negligible. However, 
the economics of large integrated steelworks require a high 
capacity utilisation in order to break even. If spare capacity 
is needed, then it is best made available by using a mixed 
technology option the same (or similar) to the configuration 
modelled above. - 
When all things are considered the preferred option must be, if 
integrated works are to be the sole choice for the production 
configuration, to reline during a demand downturn. This 
carries grave risks should the upturn in the steel demand cycle 
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come more suddenly than expected or if a blast furnace, put on 
an extended campaign in order to maintain product availability 
during a high demand phase and to be 'blown out' as soon as 
this passes, creates so many engineering problems that its out- 
put is negligible. 
Irrespective of the reline problem, the lack of a capability to 
adjust output in an integrated works in response to changes in 
demand (coarse tuning as opposed to fine tuning) must present 
severe problems at the tactical level for the production plan- 
ners and directly contribute to the supply lags which Blake 
(1965) attempted to analyse with his econometric model. In 
turn, these supply lags are responsible for the' adverse market 
reaction identified by Carnell (1974) and underscored by the 
model reported abqve. This reaction is exacerbated by the role 
of the steel stockholders standing as they do between producers 
and consumers. 
Far from this study being presented as the last word on the 
matters which it addresses, it is probably true to say that it 
represents the first words written which describe a method 
allowing controlled comparisons between choices in technology 
policy. Further work along these lines would be both welcome 
and timely. Because a system dynamics model is able to 
quantify a factor (flexibility) which industrial economists 
often mention but seem unable to explicitly accommodate in 
policy analyses, it is possible that a new line of inquiry 
might be opened up into the evaluation of economies of scale 
and production technology choices in'industry. 
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LISTING OF THE THREE BLAST FURNACE MODEL 
* MODEL OF TYPICAL BF/BOS STEEL WORKS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ORDER BACKLOG AND ORDERS BOOKED(SHORT TERM) 
NOTE 
NOTE ORDER BACKLOG AND DELIVERY RATE EFFECT ON LEAD TIME 
NOTE 
NOTE ORDER BACKLOG AND DELIVERY RATE 
NOTE 
NOTE ORDER BACKLOG, DELIVERY LEAD TIME AND IMPORTS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L COBG. K=COBG. J+DT*(OPLH. JK-DR. JK) 
N COBG=NOLR*MUNON+ADR*FPLT 
SEED 0.5 
A OPL. K=SWITCH(OPLI, OPLI+NOR14RN(MOPL. K, SDOPL), TIME. K)*OVBF. K 
C OPLI-24OE3 
C SDOPL-10E3 
A MOPL. K=AMP*SIN(PI*2*TIME. K/PERD) 
C AMP=48E3 
C PERD=48 
C PI=3.141592654 
R OPLH. KL=OPL. K*(l-FOPLA. K) 
L UNALLO. K-UNALLO. J+DT*(OPLH. JK-OLR. JK) 
N UNALLO=36OE3 
R OLR. KL=NOLR*OBGF. K*SEMSF. K 
N OLR-NOLR 
C NOLR-24OE3 
A SOLR. K-SMOOTH(OLR. JK, TSOL) 
C TSOL-2 
L ALLOCS. K=ALLOCS. J+DT*(OLR. JK-DR. JK) 
N ALLOCS=FPLT*ADR 
A MUNO. K=UNALLO. K/NOLR 
A MUNOR. K=MUNO. K/MUNON 
C MUNON=0.5 
A OBGF. K-TABHL(OBGFT, MUNOR. K, 0,2,0.2) 
T OBGFT=0/0.223/0.447/0.65/0.84/l/1.107/1.171/1.193/1.198/1.2 
R DR. KL=DELAY3(OLR. JK, FPLT) 
C FPLT=l 
A ADR. K=SMOOTH(DR. JK, DRAT) 
C DRAT=3 
A OVBF. K=TABHL(OVBFT, DLTPC. K, 3,5,0.5) 
T OVBFT=1/1.06/1.16/1.194/1.2 
A DLTPC. K=COBG. K/ADR. K 
L COL. K=COL. J+DT*(OLR. JK-RZCOL. JK) 
N COL=O 
R RZCOL. KL=PULSE(COL. K/DT, 12,12) 
A ANNTOL. K-SAMPLE(COL. K, 12, O) 
S UFE. K=(ANNTOL. K/(NOLR*12*1.2))*100 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE SEMI STOCKS AND ORDERS LAUNCHED NEGATIVE LOOP 
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NOTE 
NOTE 
L SEMS. K=SEMS. J+DT*(SEMP. JK-OLR. JK) 
N SEMS=MSEMSN*SOLR 
C MSEMSN-0.25 
A SEMSF. K-TABHL(SEMSFT, MSEMS. K, 0,1,0.2) 
T SEMSFT-0/0.07/0.5/0.845/0.94/1 
A SEMSR. K-MSEMS. K/MSEMSN 
A MSEMS. K-SEMS. K/NOLR 
NOTE 
NOTE PRODUCTION 
NOTE 
R SEMP. KL-PFl. K+PF2. K+PF3. K 
S UHE. K-(ANNTSEMP. K/(2.88E6*1.15))*100 
A NFB. K=SWITCH(FlOUT, FlIN, PFl. K)+SWITCH(F20UT, F2IN, PF2. K)+ 
X SWITCH(F30UT, F3IN, PF3. K) 
C FlIN-1 
C FlOUT=O 
C F21N=l 
C F20UT=O 
C F31N-1 
C F30UT=O 
C TRLF=3.5 
A MOH. K=UNALLO. K/SOLR. K+ALLOCS. K/ADR. K 
A AVMOH. K=DLINF3(MOH. K, TRCMOH) 
C TRCMOH=3 
A BEF. K=NCLIP(l. 15, PBEF. K, 6, (NTF-MALLF. K)/AMTPF, MUNO. K, 2) 
A PBEF. K=TABHL(PBEFT, MUNO. K, 1,6,1) 
T PBEFT=1/1.005/1.035/1.088/1.135/1.15 
A FSCMC. K=NCLIP(O, lOE6,1.5, AVMOH. K, SEMSR. K, 1.5) 
A MFlF2. K=MAX(CPFl. K, CPF2. K) 
A MALLF. K=MAX(MFlF2. K, CPF3. K) 
T PFFT-0.05/0.07/0.11/0.185/0.28/0.39/0.53/0.705/0.875/0.97/1 
T REFECT=0.6/0.72/0.82/0.9/0.95/0.98/1 
C NTF=5E6 
C AMTPF=8OE3 
C PNDEC=l 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE LONG DELIVERY DELAYS LEADING TO IMPORTS OF STEEL 
NOTE 
NOTE 
R OIMS. KL=FOPLA. K*OPL. K 
A FOPLA. K=TABHL(FOPLAT, DLTPC. K, 3,6,0.5) 
T FOPLAT=0/0.0375/0.0913/0.175/0.2875/0.45/1 
R IMS. KL=DELAY3(OIMS. JK, DSOIMS) 
C DSOIMS=3 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE COSTS & PROFIT 
NOTE 
NOTE 
R REVR. KL-DELAY3(DR. JK, PAYDEL)*RPIT 
N DR=NOLR 
C RPIT=250 
C PAYDEL-2 
L CREV. K=CREV. J+DT*(REVR. JK-RZCREV. JK) 
N CREV=O 
R RZCREV. KL=PULSE(CREV. K/DT, 12,12) 
R COSTSEMP. KL=SEMP. KL*VCPTHE 
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C VCPTHE-118.58 
R COSTD. KL-DR. KL*VCPTFE 
C VCPTFE-30.41 
L CCOSTHE. K-CCOSTHE. J+DT*(COSTSEMP. JK-RZCCOSTIIE. JK) 
N CCOSTHE=FCHE 
C FCHE-152.03E6 
R RZCCOSTHE. KL-PULSE((CCOSTHE. K-FCHE)/DT, 12,12) 
L CCOSTFE. K-CCOSTFE. J+DT*(COSTD. JK-RZCCOSTFE. JK) 
N CCOSTFE-FCFE 
C FCFE-l20. lE6 
R RZCCOSTFE. KL=PULSE((CCOSTFE. K-FCFE)/DT, 12,12) 
A PREVSEMS. K=SAMPLE(SEMS. K, 1,60E3) 
A AVSEMS. K=(PREVSEMS. K+SEMS. K)/2 
A CHSEMS. K=SAMPLE(AVSEMS. K, 1,60E3)*CHSEMSPM. K 
A CHSEMSPM. K=0.15*SUCSEMS/12 
C SUCSEMS-100 
A PREVALCS. K=SAMPLE(ALLOCS. K, 1,24OE3) 
A AVALCS. K-(PREVALCS. K+ALLOCS. K)/2 
A CHALCS. K=SAMPLE(AVALCS. K, 1,60E3)*CHALCSPM. K 
A CHALCSPM. K=0.15*SUCALCS/12 
C SUCALCS=200 
L CCHALCS. K-CCHALCS. J+DT*(CHALCS. J-RZCCHALCS. JK) 
N CCHALCS=O 
R RZCCHALCS. KL-PULSE(CCHALCS. K/DT, 12,12) 
L CCHSEMS. K=CCHSEMS. J+DT*(CHSEMS. J-RZCCHSEMS. JK) 
N CCHSEMS=O 
R RZCCHSEMS. KL-PULSE(CCHSEMS. K/DT, 12,12) 
A CTCOST. K=CCOSTHE. K+CCOSTFE. K+CCHSEMS. K+CCHALCS. K 
A CPROF. K=CREV. K-CTCOST. K 
A ANNPROF. K=SAMPLE(CPROF. K, 12, O) 
A TFC. K=FCHE+FCFE 
L CD. K=CD. J+DT*(DR. JK-RZCD. JK) 
N CD=O 
R RZCD. KL-PULSE(CD. K/DT, 12,12) 
L CSEMP. K=CSEMP. J+DT*(SEMP. JK-RZCSEMP. JK) 
N CSEMP=O 
R RZCSEMP. KL-PULSE(CSEMP. K/DT, 12,12) 
A CPT. K=RATIO(CCOSTHE. K, CSEMP. K) 
S ANNCPT. K=SAMPLE(CPT. K, 12, O) 
A ANNTSEMP. K=SAMPLE(CSEMP. K, 12, O) 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE DCF EQUATIONS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
C R=0.15 
L CUMRDIS. K=CUMRDIS. J+DT*(REVR. JK/(l+R/12)**TIME. J) 
N CUMRDIS-O 
A TFCPM. K=(FCHE+FCFE)/12 
L CUMCDIS. K=CUMCDIS. J+DT*((TFCPM. J+COSTD. JK+COSTSEMP. JK+CHSEMS. J 
X +CHALCS. J)/(l+R/12)**TIME. J) 
N CUMCDIS=O 
S CUMPROFDIS. K=CUMRDIS. K-CUMCDIS. K 
NOTE 
NOTE EQUATIONS FOR FURNACE 1 
NOTE 
A PFI. K-CLIP(PFlEC. K, PFlN. K, 6, (NTF-CPFl. K)/MNPFl) 
A PFlEC. K=SWITCH(MNPF1, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF1, SDPF1)*REFElC. K, CPFl. K, 
X MXTFl. K), TIME. K) 
A REFElC. K=TABHL(REFECT, (NTF-CPFl. K)/MNPF1,0,6,1) 
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A PFlN. K-SWITCH(MNPF1, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF1, SDPF1)*PFFl. K*BEF. K, 
X CPFl. K, MXTFl. K), TIME. K) 
C MNPFl-75E3 
C SDPF1=5773.5 
L CPFl. K=CPFl. J+DT*(PFl. J+ADDRPICl. JK-RZCPFl. JK) 
N CPFl-3.4E6 
R ADDRPICl. KL-NCLIP(lOE6/DT, O, TPICF1. K, O, MXTFI. K, CPFl. K) 
A TPICF1. K-CPFl. K-MALLF. K-FSCMC. K 
A HTMFl. K-SAMPLE(TIME. K, IVLFl. K, O) 
A IVLFl. K=CLIP(LENGTH, DT, CPFl. K, MXTFl. K) 
R RZCPFl. KL-NCLIP(PULSE(CPFl. K/DT, TIME. K, DT), O, TIME. K, 
X (HTMFl. K+TRLF-DT), FSCMC. K, I) 
A MPFl. K=CPFl. K/MNPF1 
A PFFl. K=TABHL(PFFT, MPFl. K, 0,2,0.2) 
A MXTFl. K=NTF+EXTFl. K*SWEXTFl. K 
A EXTFl. K-CLIP(O, lE6, CPFl. K, NTF) 
A SWEXTFl. K-NCLIP(1,0, AVMOH. K, 4, CTDECF1. K, (NTF-CPFI. K)) 
A CTDECFI. K-(MNPF1+3*SDPF1)*PNDEC 
NOTE 
NOTE EQUATIONS FOR FURNACE 2 
NOTE 
A PF2. K-CLIP(PF2EC. K, PF2N. K, 6, (NTF-CPF2. K)/MNPF2) 
A PF2EC. K=SWITCH(MNPF2, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF2, SDPF2)*REFE2C. K, CPF2. K, 
X MXTF2. K), TIME. K) 
A REFE2C. K-TABHL(REFECT, (NTF-CPF2. K)/MNPF2,0,6,1) 
A PF2N. K=SWITCH(MNPF2, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF2, SDPF2)*PFF2. K*BEF. K, 
X CPF2. K, MXTF2. K), TIME. K) 
C MNPF2=8OE3 
C SDPF2=5773.5 
L CPF2. K=CPF2. J+DT*(PF2. J+ADDRPIC2. JK-RZCPF2. JK) 
N CPF2=4.6E6 
R ADDRPIC2. KL=NCLIP(IOE6/DT, O, TPICF2. K, O, MXTF2. K, CPF2. K) 
A TPICF2. K-CPF2. K-MALLF. K-FSCMC. K 
A HTMF2. K=SAMPLE(TIME. K, IVLF2. K, O) 
A IVLF2. K=CLIP(LENGTH, DT, CPF2. K, MXTF2. K) 
R RZCPF2. KL=NCLIP(PULSE(CPFZ. K/DT, TIME. K, DT), O, TIME. K, 
X (HTMF2. K+TRLF-DT), FSCMC. K, l) 
A MPF2. K=CPF2. K/MNPF2 
A PFF2. K=TABHL(PFFT, MPF2. K, 0,2,0.2) 
A MXTF2. K=NTF+EXTF2. K*SWEXTF2. K 
A EXTF2. K-CLIP(O, lE6, CPF2. K, NTF) 
A SWEXTF2. K-NCLIP(1,0, AVMOH. K, 4, CTDECF2. K, (NTF-CPF2. K)) 
A CTDECF2. K-(MNPF2+3*SDPF2)*PNDEC 
NOTE 
NOTE EQUATIONS FOR FURNACE 3 
NOTE 
A PF3. K=CLIP(PF3EC. K, PF3N. K, 6, (NTF-CPF3. K)/MNPF3) 
A PF3EC. K-SWITCH(MNPF3, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF3, SDPF3)*REFE3C. K, CPF3. K, 
X MXTF3. K), TIME. K) 
A REFE3C. K=TABHL(REFECT, (NTF-CPF3. K)/MNPF3,0,6,1) 
A PF3N. K=SWITCH(MNPF3, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF3, SDPF3)*PFF3. K*BEF. K, 
X CPF3. K, MXTF3. K), TIME. K) 
C MNPF3=85E3 
C SDPF3-5773.5 
L CPF3. K=CPF3. J+DT*(PF3. J+ADDRPIC3. JK-RZCPF3. JK) 
N CPF3=1.2E6 
R ADDRPIC3. KL-NCLIP(lOE6/DT, O, TPICF3. K, O, MXTF3. K, CPF3. K) 
A TPICF3. K=CPF3. K-MALLF. K-FSCMC. K 
A HTMF3. K-SAMPLE(TIME. K, IVLF3. K, O) 
A IVLF3. K=CLIP(LENGTH, DT, CPF3. K, MXTF3. K) 
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R. RZCPF3. KL-NCLIP(PULSE(CPF3. K/DTgTIME. K, DT), O, TIME. K, 
X (HTMF3. K+TRLF-DT), FSCMC. K, l) 
A MPF3. K=CPF3. K/MNPF3 
A PFF3. K-TABHL(PFFTsMPF3. KgO, 2,0.2) 
A MXTF3. K-NTF+EXTF3. K*SWEXTF3. K 
A EXTF3. K-CLIP(O, lE6, CPF3. K, NTF) 
A SWEXTF3. K-NCLIP(1,0, AVMOH. K, 4, CTDECF3. K, (NTF-CPF3. K)) 
A CTDECF3. K-(MNPF3+3*SDPF3)*PNDEC 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE OUTPUT CONTROL STATEMENTS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
C DT-0.125 
C LENGTH=120 
C PRTPER=4 
PRINT I)ALLOCS, UNALLO, COBG, OLR/2)DR, ADR, SOLR/3)SEMS, SEMP, MOH, MUNOR 
PRINT 4)COBG, DLTPC 
PRINT 5)CUMPROFDIS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLE NAMES 
NOTE 
NOTE T= TONNES MTHS- MONTHS PS-POUNDS STERLING 
NOTE BF= BLAST FURNACES YRS- YEARS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
D ADDRPIC1-(T/MTHS) ADDITIONAL RATE FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF 
* B. F. 1 CAMPAIGN 
D ADDRPIC2=(T/MTHS) ADDITIONAL RATE FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF 
* B. F. 2 CAMPAIGN 
D ADDRPIC3-(T/MTHS) ADDITIONAL RATE FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF 
* B. F. 3 CAMPAIGN 
D ADR=(T/MTHS) AVERAGE DELIVERY RATE 
D ALLOCS=(T) ALLOCATED STOCK 
D AMP=(T/MTHS) AMPLITUDE OF SINE WAVE 
D AMTPF-(T/MTHS) AVERAGE MONTHLY THROUGHPUT PER FURNACE 
D ANNCPT=(PS/T) ANNUAL COST PER TONNE 
D ANNPROF=(PS) ANNUAL PROFIT 
D ANNTOL-(T) ANNUAL TOTAL OF ORDERS LAUNCHED 
D ANNTSEMP=(T) ANNUAL TOTAL SEMI PRODUCTION 
D AVALCS=(T) AVERAGE ALLOCATED STOCK 
D AVSEMS=(T) AVERAGE SEMI STOCK 
D AVMOH-(MTHS) AVERAGE MONTHS' OF ORDERS ON HAND 
D BEF=(l) BURDEN EFFICIENCY FACTOR 
D CCHALCS=(PS) CUMULATIVE COST OF HOLDING ALLOCATED STOCK 
D CCHSEMS=(PS) CUMULATIVE COST OF HOLDING SEMI STOCK 
D CCOSTHE=(PS) CUMULATIVE COST AT THE HEAVY END 
D CCOSTFE=(PS) CUMULATIVE COST AT THE FINISHING END 
D CD=(T) CUMULATIVE DELIVERIES 
D CHALCS=(PS/MTHS) COST OF HOLDING ALLOCATED STOCK 
D CHALCSPM=(PS/(T*MTHS)) COST OF HOLDING ALLOCATED STOCK PER MONTH 
* PER UNIT 
D CHSEMS=(PS/MTHS) COST OF HOLDING SEMI STOCK 
D CHSEMSPM=(PS/(T*MTHS)) COST OF HOLDING SEMI STOCK PER MONTH 
* PER UNIT 
D COBG=(T) CUSTOMER ORDER BACKLOG 
D COL-(T) CUMULATIVE ORDERS LAUNCHED 
D COSTD=(PS/MTH) COST OF DELIVERIES 
D COSTSEMP=(PS/MTHS) COST OF SEMI PRODUCTION 
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D 
* 
D 
* 
D 
* 
CPF1-(T) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 1 
CPF2-(T) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 2 
CPF3-(T) CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 3 
CPROF=(PS) CUMULATIVE PROFIT 
CPT-(PS/T) COST PER TONNE 
CREV-(PS) CUMULATIVE REVENUE 
CSEMP=(T) CUMULATIVE SEMI PRODUCTION 
CTCOST-(PS) CUMULATIVE TOTAL COST 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
CTDECF1-(T) CRITICAL THRESHOLD FOR DECISION ON EXTENDING B. F. 1 
CAMPAIGN 
CTDECF2-(T) CRITICAL THRESHOLD FOR DECISION ON EXTENDING B. F. 2 
CAMPAIGN 
CTDECF3=(T) CRITICAL THRESHOLD FOR DECISION ON EXTENDING B. F. 3 
D 
* 
D 
* CAMPAIGN 
CUMCDIS-(PS) CUMULATIVE COSTS DISCOUNTED 
CUMPROFDIS-(PS) CUMULATIVE PROFIT DISCOUNTED 
CUMRDIS-(PS) CUMULATIVE REVENUE DISCOUNTED 
DLTPC=(MTHS) DELIVERY LEAD TIME PERCEIVED BY THE CUSTOMER 
DR-(T/MTHS) DELIVERY RATE 
DRAT-(MTHS) DELIVERY RATE AVERAGING TIME 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
DSOIMS=(MTHS) DELAY IN SATISFYING ORDERS FOR IMPORTED STEEL 
DT=(MTHS) SOLUTION INTERVAL 
EXTF1-(T/MTHS) EXTRA THROUGH PUT OF B. F. 1 (IN ADVANCE OF RELINE) 
EXTF2=(T/MTHS) EXTRA THROUGH PUT OF B. F. 2 (IN ADVANCE OF RELINE) 
EXTF3=(T/MTHS) EXTRA THROUGH PUT OF B. F. 3 (IN ADVANCE OF RELINE) 
FlIN=(BF) BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 IN BLAST 
FIOUT=(BF) BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 OUT OF BLAST 
F21N=(BF) BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 IN BLAST 
F20UT-(BF) BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 OUT OF BLAST 
F31N-(BF) BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 IN BLAST 
F30UT=(BF) BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 OUT OF BLAST 
FCHE=(PS) FIXED COSTS AT THE HEAVY END 
FCFE-(PS) FIXED COSTS AT THE FINISHING END 
FOPLA=(l) FRACTION OF ORDERS PLACED ABROAD 
FOPLAT=(I) FRACTION OF ORDERS Y 
FPLT=(MTHS) FINISHING PROCESSES 
FSCMC=(T) FACTOR FOR SUSPENSION 
CONDITIONS 
HTMFI=(MTHS) HELD (I. E. FROZEN) 
HTMF2=(MTHS) HELD (I. E. FROZEN) 
HTMF3-(MTHS) HELD (I. E. FROZEN) 
LACED 
LEAD 
OF C. 
TIME 
TIME 
TIME 
ABROAD -- 
TIME 
AMPAIGN DU 
FOR BLAST 
FOR BLAST 
FOR BLAST 
TABLE OF VALUES 
E TO MARKET 
FURNACE NO. 1 
FURNACE NO. 2 
FURNACE NO. 3 
IMS=(T/MTHS) IMPORTS OF STEEL 
IVLFI=(MTHS) INTERVAL OVER WHICH FROZEN TIME IS HELD FOR BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 1 
IVLF2=(MTHS) INTERVAL OVER WHICH FROZEN TIME IS HELD FOR BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 2 
IVLF3=(MTHS) INTERVAL OVER WHICH FROZEN TIME IS HELD FOR BLAST 
FURNACE NO. 3 
LENGTH=(MTHS) LENGTH OF THE SIMULATION RUN 
MFlF2=(T) MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE THROUGHPUT BETWEEN B. F. 1 AND B. F. 2 
MALLF=(T) MAXIMUM CUMULATIVE THROUGHPUT OVER ALL BLAST FURNACES 
MNPF1=(T/MTHS) MEAN PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
MNPF2=(T/MTHS) MEAN PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 
MNPF3=(T/MTHS) MEAN PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 
MOH=(MTHS) MONTHS' OF ORDERS ON HAND 
MOPL=(T/MTHS) MEAN OF ORDERS PLACED 
D 
* 
D 
* 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
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D MPF1-(MTHS) MONTHS9 OF PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
* FURNACE NO. 1 
D MPF2-(MTHS) MONTHS2 OF PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
* FURNACE NO. 2 
D MPF3=(MTHS) MONTHS' OF PRODUCTION (IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN) BY BLAST 
* FURNACE NO. 3 
D MSEMS=(MTHS) MONTHS9 OF SEMI STOCKS 
D MSEMSN-(MTHS) MONTHS' OF SEMI STOCKS NORMALLY 
D MUNO=(MTHS) MONTHS9 OF UNALLOCATED ORDERS 
D, MUNON-(MTHS) MONTHS OF UNALLOCATED ORDERS NORMALLY 
D MUNOR=(l) MONTHS' OF UNALLOCATED ORDERS RATIO 
D MXTFI-(T) MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT BY BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
* (BEFORE RELINE REQUIRED) 
D MXTF2=(T) MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT BY BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 
* (BEFORE RELINE REQUIRED) 
D MXTF3-(T) MAXIMUM THROUGHPUT BY BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 
* (BEFORE RELINE REQUIRED) 
D NFB=(BF) NUMBER OF BLAST FURNACES IN BLAST 
D NOLR=(T/MTHS) NORMAL ORDER LAUNCHING RATE 
D NTF=(T) NORMAL THROUGHPUT OF BLAST FURNACE (BEFORE RELINE 
* REQUIRED) 
D OBGF-(l) ORDER BACKLOG FACTOR 
D OBGFT=(l) ORDER BACKLOG FACTOR -- TABLE OF VALUES 
D OIMS=(T/MTHS) ORDERS FOR IMPORTED STEEL 
D OLR=(T/MTHS) ORDER LAUNCHING RATE 
D OPL=(T/MTHS) ORDERS PLACED 
D OPLH=(T/MTHS) ORDERS PLACED AT HOME 
D OPLI=(T/MTHS) ORDERS PLACED INITIALLY 
D OVBF=(l) OVER-BOOKING FACTOR 
D OVBFT=(l) OVER-BOOKING FACTOR -- TABLE OF VALUES 
D PAYDEL=(MTHS) PAYMENT DELAY FROM CUSTOMERS 
D PBEF=(l) POTENTIAL BURDEN EFFICIENCY FACTOR 
D PBEFT=(l) POTENTIAL BURDEN EFFICIENCY FACTOR -- TABLE OF VALUES 
D PERD=(MTHS) PERIODICITY OF SINE WAVE 
D PF1=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D PFlEC=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION FOR B. F. 1 AT END OF CAMPAIGN LIFE 
D PFlN=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
* NORMALLY 
D PF2=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 
D PF2EC=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION FOR B. F. 2 AT END OF CAMPAIGN LIFE 
D PF2N=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 
* NORMALLY 
D PF3=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 
D PF3EC=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION FOR B. F. 3 AT END OF CAMPAIGN LIFE 
D PF3N=(T/MTHS) PRODUCTION OF CRUDE STEEL FROM BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 
* NORMALLY 
D PFF1=(I) PRODUCTION BUILD-UP FACTOR FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 1 
D PFF2-(l) PRODUCTION BUILD-UP FACTOR FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 2 
D PFF3-(l) PRODUCTION BUILD-UP FACTOR FOR BLAST FURNACE NO. 3 
D PFFT=(l) PRODUCTION BUILD-UP FACTOR FOR BLAST FURNACES AFTER 
* RELINING -- TABLE OF VALUES 
D PI=(l) DIMENSIONLESS CONSTANT 
D PNDEC=(MTHS) PRIOR NOTICE FOR DECISION ON EXTENDING A B. F. 
* CAMPAIGN 
D PREVALCS=(T) PREVIOUS VALUE OF ALLOCATED STOCK 
D PREVSEMS-(T) PREVIOUS VALUE OF SEMI STOCK 
D PRTPER=(MTHS) PRINTING INTERVAL 
D R=(l/YRS) DISCOUNT FACTOR 
D REFElC=(l) REDUCED EFFICIENCY FACTOR AT END OF B. F. 19S CAMPAIGN 
D REFE2C=(l) REDUCED EFFICIENCY FACTOR AT END OF B. F. 29S CAMPAIGN 
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D REFE3C-(l) REDUCED EFFICIENCY FACTOR AT END OF B. F. 39S CAMPAIGN 
D REFECT-(l) REDUCED EFFICIENCY FACTOR AT END OF A B. F. CAMPAIGN 
* TABLE OF VALUES 
D REVR-(PS/MTHS) REVENUE RECEIVED 
D RPIT=(PS/T) REVENUE PER INGOT TONNE 
D RZCCHALCS-(PS/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE COST OF HOLDING ALLOCATED 
* STOCK 
D RZCCHSEMS-(PS/MTHS) RE-ZERO CU14ULATIVE COST OF HOLDING SEMI STOCK 
D RZCCOSTHE-(PS/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE COST AT THE HEAVY END 
D RZCCOSTFE=(PS/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE COST AT THE FINISHING END 
D RZCD-(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE DELIVERIES 
D RZCOL-(T) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE ORDERS LAUNCHED 
D RZCPF1-(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE 
* NO. 1 
D RZCPF2-(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE 
* NO. 2 
D RZCPF3=(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE PRODUCTION FOR BLAST FURNACE 
* NO. 3 
D RZCREV=(PS/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE REVENUE 
D RZCSEMP=(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE SEMI PRODUCTION 
D SDOPL=(T/MTHS) STANDARD DEVIATION OF ORDERS PLACED 
D SDPF1-(T/MTHS) STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRODUCTION FOR BLAST 
* FURNACE NO. I 
D SDPF2-(T/MTHS) STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRODUCTION FOR BLAST 
* FURNACE NO. 2 
D SDPF3=(T/MTHS) STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRODUCTION FOR BLAST 
* FURNACE NO. 3 
D SEMP-(T/MTHS) SEMI PRODUCTION 
D SEMS=(T) SEMI STOCKS 
D SEMSF=(l) SEMI STOCKS FACTOR 
D SEMSFT=(l) SEMI STOCKS FACTOR - TABLE OF VALUES 
D SEMSR-(I) SEMI STOCKS RATIO 
D SOLR=(T/MTHS) SMOOTHED ORDER LAUNCHING RATE 
D SUCALCS-(PS/T) STANDARD UNIT COST OF ALLOCATED STOCK 
D SUCSEMS=(PS/T) STANDARD UNIT COST OF SEMI STOCK 
D SWEXTF1=(I) SWITCH TO CONTROL EXTRA THROUGHPUT FOR B. F. 1 
D SWEXTF2-(l) SWITCH TO CONTROL EXTRA THROUGHPUT FOR B. F. 2 
D SWEXTF3=(l) SWITCH TO CONTROL EXTRA THROUGHPUT FOR B. F. 3 
D TFC=(PS) TOTAL FIXED COSTS 
D TFCPM=(PS/MTHS) TOTAL FIXED COSTS PER MONTH 
D TIME=(MTHS) SI14ULATED TIME 
D TPICF1=(T) TEST FACTOR FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF CAMPAIGN 
* IN B. F. I 
D TPICF2=(T) TEST FACTOR FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF CAMPAIGN 
* IN B. F. 2 
D TPICF3-(T) TEST FACTOR FOR PREMATURE INTERRUPTION OF CAMPAIGN 
* IN B. F. 3 
D TRCMOH=(MTHS) TIME TO RECOGNISE CHANGES IN MONTHS' OF ORDERS 
* ON HAND 
D TRLF=(MTHS) TIME TO RELINE A BLAST FURNACE 
D TSOL-(MTHS) TIME FOR SMOOTHING ORDERS LAUNCHED 
D UFE-(l) UTILISATION OF CAPACITY AT FINISHING END 
D UHE=(l) UTILISATION OF CAPACITY AT HEAVY END 
D UNALLO=(T) UNALLOCATED ORDERS 
D VCPTFE=(PS/T) VARIABLE COST PER TONNE AT THE FINISHING END 
D VCPTHE=(PS/T) VARIABLE COST PER TONNE AT THE HEAVY END 
RUN BASE RUN: NOISE + CYCLE (AMP- 48E3) +3 BLAST FURNACES 
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS FOR THE FIVE BLAST FURNACE MODEL 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE These statements must follow on from the three 
NOTE blast furnace model 
NOTE 
NOTE 
SEED 0.5 
C MNPFI=55E3 
C SDPFl-4472.14 
N CPFl-3.4E6 
C MNPF2-5OE3 
C SDPF2-4472.14 
N CPF2-4.6E6 
C MNPF3-5OE3 
C SDPF3-4472.14 
N CPF3=1.2E6 
A MFlF3. K=MAX(MFlF2. K, CPF3. K) 
A MFIF4. K-MAX(MFlF3. K, CPF4. K) 
A MALLF. K=MAX(MFlF4. K, CPF5. K) 
R SLP. KL=PFI. K+PF2. KtPF3. K+PF4. K+PF5. K 
S UHE. K-SMOOTH(SEMP. JK, TSSEMP)/((MNPF1+MNPF2+MNPF3+MNPF4+MNPF5) 
x *1.15)*100 
A NFB. K=SWITCH(FlOUT, FIIN, PFl. K)+SWITCH(F20UT, F2IN, PF2. K)+ 
X SWITCH(F30UT, F3IN, PF3. K)+SWITCH(F40UT, F4IN, PF4. K)+ 
X SWITCH(F50UT, F5IN, PF5. K) 
C F40UT=O 
C F41N=l 
C F50UT-0 
C F5IN=l 
C AMTPF=48E3 
NOTE 
NOTE COSTS & PROFIT 
NOTE 
C FCHE=165.88E6 
NOTE 
NOTE EQUATIONS FOR FURNACE 4 
NOTE 
A PF4. K=CLIP(PF4EC. K, PF4N. K, 6, (NTF-CPF4. K)/MNPF4) 
A PF4EC. K=SWITCH(MNPF4, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF4, SDPF4)*REFE4C. K, CPF4. K, 
X MXTF4. K), TIME. K) 
A REFE4C. K=TABHL(REFECT, (NTF-CPF4. K)/MNPF4,0,6,1) 
A PF4N. K-SWITCH(MNPF4, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF4, SDPF4)*PFF4. K*BEF. K, 
X CPF4. K, MXTF4. K), TIME. K) 
C MNPF4=4OE3 
C SDPF4-4472.14 
L CPF4. K-CPF4. J+DT*(PF4. J+ADDRPIC4. JK-RZCPF4. JK) 
N CPF4=2.8E6 
R ADDRPIC4. KL=NCLIP(lOE6/DT, O, TPICF4. K, O, MXTF4. K, CPF4. K) 
A TPICF4. K-CPF4. K-MALLF. K-FSCMC. K 
A HTMF4. K=SAMPLE(TIME. K, IVLF4. K, O) 
A IVLF4. K=CLIP(LENGTH, DT, CPF4. K, MXTF4. K) 
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R RZCPF4. KL-NCLIP(PULSE(CPF4. K/DT, TIME. K, DT), O, TIME. K, 
X (HTMF4. K+TRLF-DT), FSCMC. K, l) 
A MPF4. K-CPF4. K/MNPF4 
A PFF4. K-TABHL(PFFT, MPF4. K, 0,2,0.2) 
A MXTF4. K-NTF+EXTF4. K*SWEXTF4. K 
A EXTF4. K-CLIP(O, lE6, CPF4. K, NTF) 
A SWEXTF4. K-NCLIP(1,0, AVMOH. K, 4, CTDECF4. K, (NTF-CPF4. K)) 
A CTDECF4. K-(MNPF4+3*SDPF4)*PNDEC 
NOTE 
NOTE EQUATIONS FOR FURNACE 5 
NOTE 
A PF5. K-CLIP(PF5EC. K, PF5N. K, 6, (NTF-CPF5. K)/MNPF5) 
A PF5EC. K-SWITCH(MNPF5, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF5, SDPF5)*REFE5C. K, CPF5. K, 
X MXTF5. K), TIME. K) 
A REFE5C. K-TABHL(REFECT, (NTF-CPF5. K)/MNPF5,0,6,1) 
A PF5N. K-SWITCH(MNPF5, CLIP(O, NORMRN(MNPF5, SDPF5)*PFF5. K*BEF. K, 
X CPF5. K, MXTF5. K), TIME. K) 
C MNPF5-45E3 
C SDPF5=4472.14 
L CPF5. K=CPF5. J+DT*(PF5. J+ADDRPIC5. JK-RZCPF5. JK) 
N CPF5=0.5E6 
R ADDRPIC5. KL=NCLIP(IOE6/DT, O, TPICF5. K, O, MXTF5. K, CPF5. K) 
A TPICF5. K-CPF5. K-MALLF. K-FSCMC. K 
A HTMF5. K=SAMPLE(TIME. K, IVLF5. K, O) 
A IVLF5. K=CLIP(LENGTH, DT, CPF5. K, MXTF5. K) 
R RZCPF5. KL=*NCLIP(PULSE(CPF5. K/DT, TIME. K, DT), O, TIME. K, 
X (HTMF5. K+TRLF-DT), FSCMC. K, l) 
A MPF5. K=CPF5. K/MNPF5 
A PFF5. K=TABHL(PFFT, MPF5. K, 0,2,0.2) 
A MXTF5. K=NTF+EXTF5. K*SWEXTF5. K 
A EXTF5. K=CLIP(O, lE6, CPF5. K, NTF) 
A SWEXTF5. K=NCLIP(1,0, AVMOH. K, 4, CTDECF5. K, (NTF-CPF5. K)) 
A CTDECF5. K=(MNPF5+3*SDPF5)*PNDEC 
RUN ORDERS BOOKED - NOISE + CYCLE +5 BLAST FURNACES OPERATING 
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ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS FOR THE MIXED TECHNOLOGY MODEL 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE These statements must follow directly after the three 
NOTE blast furnace model 
NOTE 
NOTE 
SEED 0.5 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE PRODUCTION 
NOTE 
NOTE 
R SEMP. KL-SEMPBF. KL+SEMPEF. KL 
R SEMPBF. KL-PFl. K+PF3. K 
L CSEMPBF. K=CSEMPBF. J+DT*(SEMPBF. JK-RZCSEMPBF. JK) 
N CSEMPBF-O 
R RZCSEMPBF. KL=PULSE(CSEMPBF. K/DT, 12,12) 
A ANNTSEMPBF. K=SAMPLE(CSEMPBF. K, 12, O) 
S UHE. K=(ANNTSEMP. K/(((MNPF1+MNPF3)*12*1.15)+(NEFP*MPEF*12)))*100 
S UEF. K=(ANNTSEMPEF. K/((NEFP*MPEF)*12))*100 
S UBF. K=(ANNTSEMPBF. K/((MNPF1+MNPF2)*12*1.15))*100 
A MALLF. K-MAX(CPFl. K, CPF3. K) 
A NFB. K=SWITCH(FlOUT, FlIN, PFl. K)+SWITCH(F30UT, F3IN, PF3. K) 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE ELECTRIC FURNACES 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L CSEMPEF. K=CSEMPEF. J+DT*(SEMPEF. JK-RZCSEMPEF. JK) 
N CSEMPEF=O 
R RZCSEMPEF. KL-PULSE(CSEMPEF. K/DT, 12,12) 
A ANNTSEMPEF. K=SAMPLE(CSEMPEF. K, 12, O) 
A RSEMPEF. K=MAX((UNALLO. K-NOLR*MUNON)/DPEF-(PFl. K+PF3. K), O) 
C DPEF-1 
R SEMPEF. KL=SWITCH(O, NORMRN(MIN(RSEMPEF. K, NSEMPEF. K), SDPEF. K), 
X RSEMPEF. K) 
A NSEMPEF. K=CLIP(MPEF, NEFP*MPEF, MPEF, RSEMPEF. K) 
A NEFOP. K-SWITCH(O, CLIP(1, NEFP, MPEF, RSEMPEF. K), RSEMPEF. K) 
C NEFP=2 
C MPEF=40E3 
A SDPEF. K=CLIP(O, CLIP(5773.5,4082.5, MPEF, RSEMPEF. K), 18E3, RSEMPEF-K) 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE COSTS & PROFIT 
NOTE 
NOTE 
R COSTSEMP. KL=COSTSEMPHE. K+COSTSEMPEF. K 
A COSTSEMPHE. K=(PFI. K+PF3. K)*VCPTHE 
A COSTSEMPEF. K-SEMPEF. KL*VCPTEF 
C VCPTEF=62.02 
L CCOSTEF. K=CCOSTEF. J+DT*(COSTSEMPEF. J-RZCCOSTEF. JK) 
N CCOSTEF=FCEF 
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C FCEF-31.49E6 
R RZCCOSTEF. KL-PULSE((CCOSTEF. K-FCEF)/DT, 12,12) 
L CCOSTHE. K-CCOSTHE. J+DT*(COSTSEMPHE. J-RZCCOSTHE. JK) 
N CCOSTHE-FCHE 
C FCHE-123.14E6 
A CTCOST. K-CCOSTHE. K+CCOSTEF. K+CCOSTFE. K+CCHSEMS. K+CCHALCS. K 
A TFC. K-FCHE+FCEF+FCFE 
A TFCPM. K-(FCHE+FCEF+FCFE)/12 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE DEFINITION STATEMENTS 
NOTE 
NOTE EF- ELECTRIC FURNACES 
NOTE 
NOTE 
D ANNTSEMPBF-(T) ANNUAL TOTAL SEMI PRODUCTION FROM BLAST FURNACES 
D ANNTSEMPEF-(T) ANNUAL TOTAL SEMI PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D CCOSTEF=(PS) CUMULATIVE COST AT ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D CSEMPBF-(T) CUMULATIVE SEMI PRODUCTION FROM BLAST FURNACES 
D CSEMPEF-(T) CUMULATIVE SEMI PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D COSTSEMPEF-(PS/MTHS) COST OF SEMI PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC 
* FURNACES 
D COSTSEMPHE-(PS/MTHS) COST OF SEMI PRODUCTION AT THE HEAVY END 
D DPEF=(MTHS) DELAY IN PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D FCEF-(PS) FIXED COSTS AT ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D MPEF=(T/MTHS) MEAN PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D NEFOP=(EF) NUMBER OF ELECTRIC FURNACES OPERATING 
D NEFP-(EF) NUMBER OF ELECTRIC FURNACES AT THE PLANT 
D NSEMPEF=(T/(EF*MTHS)) NORMAL SEMI PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC 
* FURNACES 
D SDPEF=(T/MTHS) STANDARD DEVIATION OF PRODUCTION FROM AN 
* ELECTRIC FURNACE 
D SEMPEF=(T/MTHS) SEMI PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D RSEMPEF=(T/MTHS) REQUIRED SEMI PRODUCTION FROM ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D RZCCOSTEF-(PS/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE COST AT ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D RZCSEMPBF-(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE SEMI PRODUCTION FROM 
* BLAST FURNACES 
D RZCSEMPEF-(T/MTHS) RE-ZERO CUMULATIVE SEMI PRODUCTION FROM 
* ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D UBF=(I) UTILISATION OF CAPACITY: BLAST FURNACES 
D UEF=(l) UTILISATION OF CAPACITY: ELECTRIC FURNACES 
D VCPTEF=(PS/T) VARIABLE COST PER TON AT ELECTRIC FURNACES 
RUN TWO ELECTRIC FURNACES IN PLACE OF SECOND BLAST FURNACE 
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A MODEL-TO SUPPORT PUBLIC POLICY IN RESPECT OF THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 
4.1 Introduction 
The AIDS pandemic has been described as the greatest threat 
posed to world health in the twentieth century. Unknown prior 
to 1981, its spread since then has been relentless such that by 
1st December 1988 (World AIDS Day) 129,385 persons worldwide 
were reported to the World Health Organisation (WHO) as 
exhibiting symptoms of the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS). Of this total, in excess of 77,000 were attributed to 
the USA alone. WHO estimate that, because of under-reporting, 
the true figure for worldwide cases is likely to be between 
250,000 and 300,000. In the United Kingdom up to the end of 
1988 there were 1982 reported cases of whom 1059 had died. The 
onset of clinical AIDS leads ultimately to death: there is no 
known cure, nor is one likely to be found in the forseeable 
future. 
In the face of such startling and depressing statistics it is 
incumbent on the world's scientific community to respond in 
terms of enhancing understanding about the epidemiology of this 
new disease, projecting its spread and evaluating -alternative 
strategies for containing that spread. To a great extent this 
has happened. The author is aware of over twenty separate 
groups or individuals engaged worldwide in modelling the spread 
of AIDS and that of its aetiological agent, the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Symposia on AIDS modelling held 
in both Europe (Jager and Ruitenberg, 1988) and the United 
States (Institute of Medicine, 1988) have resulted in the 
publication either of summary reports of the overall 
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proceedings or all individually contributed papers. 
In the U. K. a number of studies have already been published. 
Within these, the work of a group of researchers at Imperial 
College is particularly prominent. Professor Roy Anderson and 
his colleagues have, between them, produced over a dozen 
articles devoted to various aspects of the transmission 
dynamics of HIV. Along with R. M. May of Princeton Univer- 
sity, Anderson has described the development of a deterministic 
mathematical model which underpins most of the group's work 
(Anderson, Medley, May and Johnson, 1986; May and Anderson, 
1987; May and Anderson, 1988). Latterly, detailed aspects of 
this model have been expounded by Blythe and Anderson (1988a; 
1988b) while Medley et al (1987; 1988a; 1988b) have 
concentrated attention on successive analyses of what data 
exists to enable the parameters of the distribution of the 
incubation period of AIDS to be determined. Professor Sir 
David Cox, who has contributed to the work on the incubation 
time distribution, was also the Chairman of a working party set 
up by the government in March 1988 and charged with the task of 
determining a best estimate of new cases of AIDS over the next 
five years. This group reported their conclusions in what has 
become known as the 'Cox Report' (Department of Health and the 
Welsh Office, 1988). Subsequently, the study was updated with 
the group re-convening under the chairmanship of Nicholas Day 
and their report, including amended, projections by risk group, 
was published earlier this year, becoming known as the 9Day 
Report' (Public Health Laboratory Service, 1990). 
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Other work in the U. K. includes a study by Knox (1986) report- 
ing the development of a steady-state analysis of the epidemic 
using a model categorised for specific risk groups adopting 
specific sexual practices, whilst Wilkie (1988) describes a 
model he has created for use as a planning tool by -the 
Institute ýof Actuaries on behalf of U. K. Life Offices. As 
would be expected the output from this model contains a lot of 
age-related detail. Griffiths et al (1990a; 1990b) have con- 
ducted AIDS research using a variety of techniques from 
statistical extrapolation to sophisticated mathematical and 
simulation modelling. Finally, purely data-driven studies have 
been carried out (McEvoy and Tillett, 1985; Healy and Tillett, 
1988). These involve fitting a curve to the existing data on 
new AIDS cases and extrapolating the fitted curve. Providing 
the projection is not done for more than a few years ahead, 
this kind of statistical analysis is perfectly acceptable. A 
critical overview of modelling work published by November 1987, 
primarily relating to the U. K. and Western Europe, is given by 
Isham (1988). In addition, a bibliograhy on AIDS modelling, 
incorporating an assessment of some of the entries, is now 
available (Withers, 1988). 
In the crescendo of scientific responses to this immense human 
problem the voice of the operational research community has not 
so f ar been heard. Yet with a rich tradition of success in 
improving organisational decision making it might be expected 
that O. R. would be well placed to contribute to the debate 
surrounding this vital issue of public policy. But here per- 
haps is the nub of the issue: the distinction between policy 
making and decision making, a distinction which was stressed in 
chapter 1. 
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Operational Research has not traditionally ventured far towards 
strategic issues in planning, preferring instead to concentrate 
on its strengths in dealing with operational and tactical mat- 
ters (Eilon, 1989). But it is policies, not decisions, which 
determine the success or failure of organisations, industries 
and governments. Poor strategic policy can never be overcome 
by enlightened tactical decisions no matter how sophisticated 
are the tools involved in the decision making process. If a 
trend is now evident that O. R. is moving away from an 
algorithmic approach and towards a systems approach then this 
should be nurtured and encouraged since the process of analys- 
ing strategic issues is furthered by adopting a systemic 
orientation. This chapter, describing a systems model of the 
processes underpinning the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS, should 
therefore be seen not only as a contribution to the inter- 
national debate on the AIDS pandemic but also as a statement of 
the ability of the O. R. community to orientate itself towards 
policy issues that lie in the glare of the public eye. 
Studies of the epidemiology of infectious diseases have not 
previously figured in the system dynamics literature save for 
some simple examples included in textbooks. Yet the 
epidemiology of any disease is an aggregated dynamic process of 
the sort which is well-suited to the system dynamics modelling 
approach. Moreover, the shift from running such models on 
mainframe computers to running them on personal computers, 
which has been a feature only of the last three or four years, 
has consolidated the advantages possessed by system dynamics 
for the creation-and presentation of models of disease spread. 
Such models are now capable of playing a vital public policy 
support role for national and regional health planners and 
I 
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administrators. 
Epidemiology concerns subject matter at the interface between 
medical science, biological science and statistics and 
epidemiological studies readily recognise the contribution made 
by mathematical modelling (Bailey, 1975). But this recognition 
does not yet appear to embrace computer simulation. Certainly 
the mathematical modellers often need to employ numerical 
methods to solve their complex non-linear differential 
equations but this is as near as they venture towards harnes- 
sing computer simulation in their work. It is argued below 
that this is not far enough. Adoption of what has been termed 
a "blue collar" approach (Clark, 1988) may lack the purity 
sought by some but it does offer a number of advantages which 
demystify the modelling process in the eyes of the client. 
This is a strength which deserves to be recognised. 
The system dynamics software adopted for this study, DYSMAP2 
(Dangerfield and Vapenikova, 1987), incorporates an interactive 
Command Processor environment which goes some way towards 
providing the mode of user interface which possesses the 
greatest hope of harnessing client interest and involvement. 
From this environment it is possible, using simple commands, to 
form and display different types of plot (with or without user 
defined scales); to change existing model equations or add new 
ones as a prelude to a further simulation run; and be reminded 
of the list of runs so far carried out as well as the original 
equations in the model. 
The software produces high resolution colour graph plots on 
screen as a major component of model output. In this way it 
exhibits a high degree of portability whilst allowing the ease 
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of output assimilation which a graph plot provides. In 
particular, the ability to plot a graph for one variable along- 
side the same variable from another simulation run (comparison 
plots or co-plots as they are called) ensures that those 
interested in the model9s output can rapidly digest the effects 
of either policy or parameter changes. In the case of the lat- 
ter this is of special importance, for it is an accepted facet 
of AIDS epidemiology that few of the crucial parameters relat- 
ing to its transmission are known with certainty. A review of 
this aspect is provided by Anderson and May (1988). 
Additionally, the provision of scatter plots is useful in that 
they allow the plot of one variable against any other in the 
model. Thus it is possible to assess the growth of HIV 
prevalence against numbers of cumulative clinical cases of 
AIDS, for instance. Examples of graph plots from various model 
simulations are included in the sections on results given 
below. 
Over the last three years or so, significant new knowledge has 
been uncovered about the processes which determine the spread 
of HIV. This knowledge has been gleaned from empirical studies 
in epidemiology, virology and sociology. The model described 
in this chapter (Dangerfield and Roberts, 1989; Roberts and 
Dangerfield, 1989; Roberts and Dangerfield, 1990a; Roberts and 
Dangerfield, 1990b) has the purpose of offering a means of 
understanding the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in the UK homosexual 
community initially, and is designed for the role of providing 
a policy support tool in that it can be seen as stimulating 
debate on the strategic response to this extremely serious 
problem of public health. The model incorporates this new 
knowledge via the following features, all relevant to the 
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course of the AIDS epidemic -- heterogeneity in sexual 
activity, a variable infectivity profile over the long incuba- 
tion period of the virus and a change in sexual behaviour. 
Heterogeneity refers to the phenomenon whereby a subset of the 
susceptible population are seen to be more intensively engaged 
in high risk behaviours than are other susceptible persons in 
the same risk group. The variable infectivity profile derives 
from a number of studies pointing towards the possibility that 
there is a burst of infectivity shortly after initial infection 
with HIV, followed by a long period of virtually zero infec- 
tivity before this starts to climb again in a third phase as 
the symptoms of clinical AIDS appear. Finally, signif icant 
reductions in the number of different sexual partners taken by 
male homosexuals -- currently the group accounting for the lar- 
gest number of AIDS cases in the UK -- have been reported from 
more than one empirical investigation. 
4.2 Purpose, Structure and Parameters of the model 
The purpose of the model is to provide a policy support tool 
which can be used as a component in the debate concerning the 
management of the epidemic; as a means of obtaining increased 
understanding of HIV transmission dynamics; and as a way of 
judging the efficacy of various intervention strategies. 
Whilst many of the published mathematical models of AIDS 
epidemiology are technically impressive, they have been put 
together in a vacuum insofar as they attempt to relate to 
potential clients. This is where the system dynamics method 
should exhibit its strengths, since it is essential that the 
model's interface with those who are engaged in national and 
I 
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regional planning for the management of the epidemic is such 
that it facilitates debate, ultimately sustaining the model in 
its role as a policy support tool. The interface should be a 
feature of the overall modelling effort, not merely an 
afterthought or something which has been totally ignored. 
Although projections are possible, the model is not primarily 
intended to possess a forecasting role. Rather it examines the 
progress of the epidemic in an at-risk cohort of one million 
male homosexuals, allowing the investigator to easily compare 
the relative epidemiological consequences of crucial 
virological and behavioural aspects of the infection. One mil- 
lion males is equivalent to 6.8% of the sexually active male 
population between the ages of 16 and 56 years. Little has 
been reported about attempts to assess the extent of male 
homosexuality in the U. K. In 1978 Belsey and Adler described a 
large study of genito-urinary clinic attendees (Belsey and 
Adler, . 1978). They found that 9% of male patients were 
homosexual. Because other studies have established that 
homosexuals change their partners far more frequently than 
heterosexuals (see below), it may be expected that homosexuals 
would be disproportionately represented in surveys of clinic 
attendees. Hence 9% must be regarded as an upper limit for the 
proportion in the population as a whole, but what figure below 
9% is appropriate for the true proportion of homosexuals in the 
population must at present remain a matter of conjecture. 
Male homosexuals accounted for some 84% of all U. K. cases 
reported to the Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre (CDSC) 
by the end of 1987. They also make up the major risk group in 
both the United States and Europe as a whole, although the 
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proportions -there lie between 60% and 70% of reported cases 
because of the relative size of the risk group arising from 
intravenous drug abuse (between 20% and 25% in the U. S. A. and 
Europe as a whole, but only 7% of cases in the U. K. up to the 
end of 1987). 
4.2.1 Influence and Flow Diagrams 
The influence diagram shown in figure 4.1 depicts the four main 
feedback loops to be found in the model. With the exception of 
the replacement of "deaths" by "immunity" in loop 4. or the 
addition of an adjacent fifth loop to allow for either deaths 
or immunity, the epidemiology of most diseases is characterised 
by the loops shown in figure 4.1 (with appropriate time 
constants). The possibility of transfer to an immune state 
unfortunately just does not exist with AIDS. There have been 
no reports of anyone making a full and complete recovery after 
having been diagnosed as presenting with symptoms of clinical 
AIDS. 
Susceptible 2 HIV*. --. 
ýl ýH+Iv 
-Ieo'3 AIDS-----4AIDS 
ý4- -", 4D* ýea 
tha 
Population incidence prevalence incidence prevalence 
++ 
D 
Figure 4.1 Influence diagram for the model 
Loop 1 is dominant initially. This merely shows a positive 
loop in which -newly-infected persons pass on the infection by 
adding to the HIV population, or HIV prevalence to use the 
correct epidemiological term. Loop 2 reflects the way in which 
the declining pool of susceptibles implies a saturation effect 
in the progress of the disease. Finally, loop 3 demonstrates 
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how the emergence of numbers of people with clinical AIDS is 
also constraining the system9s ability to spread HIV, although 
the link between HIV prevalence and AIDS incidence masks the 
lengthy incubation period of the virus (signified by the 9D1 on 
the arrow) and the extent to which people infected with HIV 
ultimately convert to clinical AIDS. Whereas a mere two years 
ago the proportion of HIV-infecteds who progressed to clinical 
AIDS was estimated to be as low as 0.3 it is now believed to be 
nearer 0.9. with many experts resigned to accepting that it 
will ultimately prove to be 1.0 . 
Loop 1 reflects what epidemiologists call the 'basic reproduc- 
tive rate of infection9. This is quantifiable and equivalent 
to the loop gain. If the gain around this loop is > 1.0 then 
an epidemic is inevitable. Reducing the gain to -K 1.0 
is 
indicative of the concomitant parameter changes which 
clinicians and health educationists would have to see in order 
to bring the epidemic under control. 
Of the four gain elements in this loop (which have to be mul- 
tiplied together in order to calculate the open loop gain), 
three are to be found in the equation for the infection rate of 
HIV. They are the Mean Number of Different sexual Partners 
(MNDP) taken by each infected individual, the Probability of 
Infection Per Partner (PIPP) and the Susceptible Population 
Ratio (SPR) which is the proportion of the at-risk population 
still uninfected. The fourth gain element is simultaneously a 
delay constant; the average length of time that individuals 
remain infectious. This is synonymous with the length of time 
an individual is incubating the virus (save for a short latency 
period immediately following initial invasion of the virus) for 
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which current estimates suggest 8 years (Medley, Anderson, Cox 
& Billard, 1988a). 
In the early stages of infection the operation of loop 1 
continues unchecked with initial open loop gain values probably 
in excess of 7.0 (in this model it is 8.4). Ultimately, 
however, the declining pool of susceptible individuals reduces 
SPR sufficiently below 1.0 to cause the intensity of the 
epidemic to abate. HIV incidence peaks and then declines as a 
consequence. Yet the task facing health educationists in the 
initial stage of the spread of the disease is starkly clear. 
If the incubation period of the virus is indeed 8 years, the 
values of MNDP and PIPP have, between them, to be reduced by a 
factor in excess of eight in order to bring the epidemic under 
control. 
The flow diagram at figure 4.2 shows the various states or com- 
partments which characterise the stages of the clinical evolu- 
tion of the syndrome, leading ultimately to death once the 
invasion of the body's immune system by HIV is sufficient to 
compromise it to such an extent that the patient develops an 
opportunistic infection which proves to be incurable. Although 
flows such as recruits to the susceptible class and deaths from 
other causes (background mortality) could be explicitly 
included in the model, their absence derives from the 
difficulty of their specification. Published models which 
incorporate these flows have so far merely assigned them 
arbitrarily constant rates. Their inclusion is implicit of 
such models adopting a quasi-forecasting role which is not the 
intention here. Exploratory runs with recruitment and back- 
ground mortality have demonstrated that the results obtained 
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from the analyses reported below are not materially affected by 
the incorporation of such additional features. 
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Figure 4.2 Flow diagram of the model 
4.2.2 Varying parameter values 
The split in the f lows emerging from the HIV population in 
figure 4.2 is indicative of the possibility that not all people 
who become infected with the virus will ultimately exhibit sym- 
ptoms conforming to the clinical definition of AIDS. - The model 
incorporates a value of 0.7 for the parameter, named the Symp- 
toms Emergence Ratio (SER), which handles this feature. This 
choice of value may well prove to be rather an underestimate, 
although variations in this parameter (as with any other) are 
easily handled and the resultant effects on the shape of the 
epidemic displayed. 
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The ability to examine easily the effects on the epidemic of 
changes in key parameter values is clearly critical since so 
much uncertainty presently surrounds their magnitudes (Anderson 
and May, 1988). Below is illustrated the effect on the 
clinical AIDS population of increasing the proportion of the 
HIV-infecteds contracting AIDS, beyond the value of 0.7 assumed 
in the base model. Later, in section 4.2.4, the effect of 
increasing the average survival time beyond one year is shown. 
The proportion of the HIV-infecteds contracting AIDS is model- 
led by the Symptoms Emergence Ratio and figure 4.3 shows the 
effect on the clinical AIDS population of increasing SER from 
0.7 to 1.0 in steps of 0.1 . The changes do not affect the 
timing of the peak of the epidemic but of course affect its 
relative size. 
SENSITIVITY OF SYMPTOMS EMERGENCE RATIO 
Prevalence of Clinical AIDS 
10000 
80001 
60000 
% 
40000 
20000 
------ .............. 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Year 
Symptoms Emergence Ratio -I 
Symptoms Emergence Ratio - 0.9 
Symptoms Emergence Ratio - 0.8 
Symptoms Emergence Ratio - 0.7 
Figure 4.3 Effect of variations in the Symptoms Emergence Ratio 
on the prevalence of Clinical AIDS (Base model) 
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4.2.3 Infection Rate equation 
The equation describing the rate of infection with HIV per unit 
time (IRHIV) "drives" the model and is set out below. New 
infections are assumed to be proportional to the number of HIV- 
infecteds, their average number of different sexual partners 
per year, the average probability of infection per sexual part- 
ner and the proportion of susceptible people in the at-risk 
population. The equation gives the total amount of suscep- 
tibles who become infected each simulated time step (1/16 th of 
a year), having regard to both the chances of them not being 
already infected and of the host actually passing the infection 
on. The absence of the variable describing those with clinical 
AIDS, the Clinical Aids Population (CAP), in the infection rate 
equation arises from the assumption made, in common with most 
other authors, that those with clinical symptoms of AIDS do not 
contribute to further infection. 
IRHIV-HIVPOP*MNDP*SPR*iIPP 
where 
IRHIV - Infection Rate of HIV (persons per year) - 
HIVPOP= HIV POPulation (persons) 
MNDP = Mean Number of Different Partners per year (persons per year 
per person) 
SPR = Susceptible Population Ratio (dimensionless) 
PIPP - Probability of Infection Per Partner (dimensionless) 
The equation for SPR, the Susceptible Population Ratio, is 
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SPR-Sý/(ETPAR-CCC) 
where 
SP - Susceptible Population (persons) 
ETPAR - Estimated Total Population At Risk (persons) 
CCC - Cumulative Clinical Cases (persons) 
All model equations are required to balance dimensionally and 
this is automatically checked by the software employed. 
Some models of AIDS epidemiology (Hyman and Stanley, 1988) 
incorporate not an average Probability of Infection Per Partner 
(PIPP) but instead employ a probability of infection per 
contact (sexual act). A consequence of this is that the 
estimated number of sexual acts per partner has also to be 
incorporated as a parameter. Our preference for the average 
probability of infection per partner derives from data analysed 
by Peterman et al (1988) which shows that there is very little 
correlation between the transmission of HIV to spouses of per- 
sons infected via blood transfusion and their frequency of 
sexual intercourse. 
In order to determine reasonable values for MNDP, PIPP and the 
other important parameter, the Mean 'Incubation Period of the 
Virus (MIPV), it is necessary to utilise the results of both 
clinical and social survey data in addition to the time series 
data of reported cases of AIDS in the United Kingdom. None of 
these parameters have been measured with a high degree of con- 
fidence and the value of PIPP is the most uncertain. A formula 
for the doubling time (in years) of the spread of infection is 
derived by Anderson et al (1986). Using the notation adopted 
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above: 
td - (ln 2)*MIPV/(PIPP*MNDP*MIPV-1) 
Given that the doubling time in the data on cumulative cases 
has been (until quite recently) of the order of 9 months and 
the average incubation time for HIV is thought to be 8 years 
(Medley et al, 1988), this must mean that the product of PIPP 
and MNDP is Just above 1.0 .A value for MNDP of 10.5 is 
incorporated following a major social survey conducted by the 
British Market-Research Bureau (BMRB, 1987) on behalf of the 
government, with the purpose of evaluating the public education 
campaign on AIDS. In turn, this must mean that the average 
probability of infection 0- 0.1, a figure within the range for 
this probability calculated by Grant et al (1987) using direct 
methods. Consequently 0.1 is the value employed in the 
homogeneous sexual mixing model, the results from which are 
described below. 
It is interesting to note that the recently reported near 
doubling of the numbers of heterosexual cases of AIDS must, if 
the above formula is used, mean that the product of MNDP and 
PIPP is 0.8. There are those who consider that the value for 
PIPP for susceptibles engaging in heterosexual sexual practices 
with an infected partner is likely to be lower than for those 
engaging in homosexual practices and, if this assumption is 
correct, it must mean that there is a reasonable degree of 
heterogeneity in the number of sexual partners per unit time in 
the heterosexual population. A large scale survey of sexual 
behaviour in the UK, currently in the field, will hopefully 
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shed some light on the extent of this heterogeneity. As an 
epidemiological concept, heterogeneity is discussed in'section 
4.3 below. 
4.2.4 incubation and Survival Distributions 
The two probability distributions included in the model are now 
considered. Firstly, the incubation time distribution is 
examined. Subsequently, consideration is given to that for the 
survival time of a patient consequent on a diagnosis of 
clinical AIDS. The incubation time is defined as the time 
period from initial invasion of HIV until symptoms of an 
opportunistic infection, which allows a diagnosis of AIDS, are 
manifested. However, within this extremely long period of time 
there is a short latency period. Following a primary infection 
there is a period of some six weeks, on average, before an 
individual produces antibodies to HIV which can be detected by 
one of the standard tests now employed. The latency period 
prior to the point of seroconversion, as it is known, is not 
thought important enough to warrant specific inclusion in a 
model which simulates the progress of the epidemic over forty 
years. The model assumes, therefore, that infected people are 
capable of infecting others immediately, once they themselves 
have been exposed to HIV. 
The incubation period - and in particular the mean incubation 
time - has a crucial effect on the course of the epidemic. It 
is, therefore, not surprising that considerable attention has 
been focussed on an appropriate probability distribution. The 
Centres for Disease Control in the U. S. A. have provided one of 
the most widely analysed data sets, specifically on 
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trans f us iop-as sociated cases, which by the end of the first 
quarter of 1989 numbered some 1469 usable adult cases. The use 
of data on transfusion cases to fit an incubation distribution 
is not without its problems. There will always be a reasbn for 
giving someone a blood transfusion and it may well be that the 
underlying health of transfusion recipients is, on average, not 
as strong as that of a member of any of the major risk groups 
who are exposed to an inoculum of HIV. Further, and this 
applies to any data purporting to pinpoint the (historical) 
date of infection in an individual, it is not possible to 
retain 100% of the data sample because some transfusion infec- 
ted people will die from other (unrelated) causes before they 
manifest symptoms of clinical AIDS. 
The most intractable difficulty in dealing with the transfusion 
dataset is inescapable: the data are truncated. Observations 
from the right hand tail of the distribution are 
disproportionately low at present and it will be many years 
before enough data has been amassed to be absolutely sure of 
the values of the parameters and the appropriate probability 
distribution. Additional distortions to the data stem from the 
fact that in the U. S. A. blood used for tranfusion was 
routinely screened for traces of HIV as from March 1985 and, in 
the two years prior to that, donors had been withholding their 
normal offerings because of increasing knowledge about the 
threat of AIDS and its principal modes of transmission. 
Consequently, a much lower incidence of infective transfusions 
can be expected from persons with transfusion dates beyond the 
first quarter of 1985 and a declining incidence in the two 
years prior to that. 
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Statistical analyses have been conducted on the transfusion 
data by Medley et al (1987; 1988a; 1988b) and these have been 
parametric in character. They have explored both an 
exponential and a linear increase in the incidence of infective 
transfusions and used the resultant values, along with a 
postulated probability distribution, to calculate the expected 
numbers of AIDS diagnoses arising at various time points j 
which have emanated from initial infection at given base dates 
i, such that i: ýJ. They take point (1,1) as January 1978 and 
produce a triangular matrix of observed and expected monthly 
values of AIDS incidence. The calculations derive from a log- 
likelihood model which is maximised so as to simultaneously 
determine the parameters of the equation for incidence of 
infective transfusions as well as the expected numbers of 
diagnoses. 
Two probability distributions were evaluated: Weibull and 
Gamma. The former produced a mean value of 8.23 years in keep- 
ing with other estimates. The mean for the Gamma distribution 
was found to be very high at 27.2 years although a subsequent 
analysis by Anderson and Medley (1988) produced means of 7.66 
years (Weibull) and 14.33 (Gamma). Because the Gamma distribu- 
tion has a longer right-hand tail it should be expected, in 
cases where the data are right censored, to produce a higher 
mean than does the Weibull. 
A graphical comparison between the three cumulative distribu- 
tion functions, parameterised according to the results given by 
Medley et al, is shown at figure 4.4 along with the Erlang 
type 3 distribution (A- 8 yr) which is the one employed in the 
model. The Erlang is a Gamma distribution with the value of 
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the shape parameter an integer number greater than zero. Two 
of the plots are from the initial (1987) analysis Weibull 
and Gamma and one is from the Anderson and Medley (1988) 
analysis Gamma -- on the assumption that only the 'scale 
parameter has changed since the initial analysis. (The f ull 
details of the revised fitted distribution have not yet been 
published; only the latest figure for the mean has been 
revealed. ) From the comparison it is clear that there is a 
reasonably close approximation between the cumulative distribu- 
tion function for the Erlang type 3 and the Weibull posited by 
Medley et al. 
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Top line at 5: Erlang type 3 distribution MEAN- 8 
Second line at 5: WsIbUll distribution (1987 analysis) MEAN- 8.2 
Third line: Gamma distribution (1988 analysis) MEAN- 14.3 
Bottom line: Gamma distribution (1987 analysis) MEAN- 27.2 
Figure 4.4 Comparison of the c. d. f's from analysis of the 
transfusion dataset by Medley et al with the Erlang used 
in the model 
It would be extremely unwise, given the data presently 
available, to claim that either the Weibull or the Gamma 
(Erlang) distribution is appropriate to the exclusion of the 
other. Indeed, further investigation using the Lognormal or 
COMPARISON OF ERLANG DISTRIBUTION WITH THOSE POSITED BY MEDLEY ET AL. 
Cumulative Distribution Functions for Incubation Time 
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Gompertz d. istributions may well prove to show an adequate fit 
to the available data. 
Consideration of the type of distribution to employ is often 
related to its hazard function. This is formally defined as 
h(x) - f(x)/(l-F(x)) (for F(x) < 1) 
where f(x) and F(x) are, respectively, the p. d. f. and c. d. f. of X 
and it is commonly used in survival analysis. In the present 
context it describes the fractional instantaneous rate of con- 
version to clinical AIDS for the remainder of a cohort who have 
been incubating HIV since a known common point in the past. 
One attraction of the Weibull distribution to the 
epidemiologists is that its hazard function is of a fairly sim- 
ple mathematical form; it increases as some power of time. 
This, it is argued, is in line with the biological phenomenon 
of continuous and progressive compromise of the immune system 
characteristic of the development of AIDS. 
The hazard function of the Erlang is mathematically more com- 
plicated than that of the Weibull which militates against its 
use in analytical studies. Nevertheless, for order 2 or above, 
it increases at a decreasing rate and so is not inappropriate 
for modelling progressive compromise of the immune system. 
Indeed, two authors who evaluated the effects on the epidemic 
of various candidates for the probability distribution of the 
incubation time conclude: "A low order Erlang distribution 
seems most likely to give a reasonably accurate approximation" 
(Blythe and Anderson, 1988a). 
page 265 
Figure 4.5 shows the Erlang type 3 distribution used in the 
model, together with its hazard function. The mean was set at 
8 years in line with the findings referred to above. It is 
portrayed in a way which should aid understanding. It shows 
the rate of conversion to clinical AIDS of 100 individuals 
exposed to HIV infection at time t-0. 
MODELLING THE INCUBATION PERIOD OF THE AIDS VIRUS 
Progress to clinical AIDS of 100 people exposed to HIV infection at time t-O 
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Figure 4.5 Incubation time of HIV for 100 people based on an 
Erlang type 3 distribution (g-8 yr), together with its 
associated hazard function 
The Erlang type 3 distribution, equivalent to a third order 
delay (DELAY3) in system dynamics models, should be familiar to 
operational researchers as it is commonly employed in queueing 
models to represent n-stage service processes where the time 
for each stage is taken to be a negative exponential 
distribution. In fact, an Erlang type 1 distribution is a 
negative exponential, so a third-order Erlang is merely the 
distribution achieved by cascading together three negative 
exponential distributions. There is intrinsic merit in employ- 
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ing the Erlang, arising from recent evidence (Pedersen et al, 
1987; Burger et al, 1986) that the progression from initial HIV 
infection to clinical AIDS can be viewed as comprising three 
separate stages. Not one of the other distributions under 
consideration has the property that it can be disaggregated in 
this way. 
Following on from the incubation distribution it is appropriate 
to consider the probability distribution of survival time. 
Studies in the U. K. of the survival time of patients after 
diagnosis of clinical AIDS have been carried out by Reeves and 
Overton (1988) and Reeves (1988). A two parameter exponential 
is proposed on the basis of analysis of the latest data 
SM = 0.9198 exp(-0.0669t) 
where S(t) is the probability of surviving >t months. 
This function reflects a positive probability of instantaneous 
deaths (zero survival time) for which p-0.0802 Hence there 
is both a mean and a conditional mean survival time. The lat- 
ter is 14.9 months; the overall mean is (1-0.0802)/0.0669 
13.7 months. In figure 4.6 is employed a negative exponential 
distribution of survival time (equivalent to a first order 
delay, DELAY1, in system dynamics) with a mean of 12 months 
which accords with the results from Reeves (1988) especially 
since some of the cases used in her analysis were administered 
zidovudine which can be expected to improve average survival 
time (Reeves, 1989). Under an assumption of a one year mean 
survival time, 35.6% survive for over 1 year, 12.7% survive 
over 2 years and 4.5% over 3 years. 
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Figure 4.6 Assumed distribution of survival time: mean -1 yr. 
The consequence of administering drugs like zidovudine is to 
increase the average survival time and the simulated outcome, 
using the base model, for the Clinical Aids Population (CAP) is 
shown in figure 4.7 for various hypothetical increases in this 
average beyond the value of one year. Clearly the widespread 
administration of drugs like zidovudine in anti-viral therapy 
has potentially important implications for bed occupancy and 
hospital/community care resources for AIDS patients generally. 
Those responsible for making these resources available would be 
ill-advised to ignore such implications. 
MODELLING SURVIVAL TIME AFTER CLINICAL AIDS IS DIAGNOSED 
Survivors from 100 people all disonosed with clinical AIDS at time t-O 
.0234 
YEARS 
Percentage Survival Rate (mean Survival Time -I yr. ) 
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SENSITIVITY OF MEAN SURVIVAL TIME (FOLLOWING A DIAGNOSIS OF CLINICAL AIDS) 
Prevalence of Clinical AIDS 
I 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 
Year 
Mean Survival Time -2 years. Number of casea*10'5 
Mean Survival Time - 1.5 years. Number Of C8889*10*5 
Mean Survival Time - 1.25 years. Number Of C8303*10*5 
Mean Survival Time -I years. Number of cases*10^5 
Figure 4.7 Effect of increasing survival time on the 
-Clinical AIDS Population (Base model) 
4.3 Base model scenarios concerning anti-viral therapy 
The effects of two possible interventions based on anti-viral 
therapy are now explored: a vaccine for seronegative members 
of the at-risk population; and a drug to reduce infectivity for 
seropositive members of the at-risk population. It would seem 
possible that a drug to reduce infectivity may be produced ear- 
lier than a vaccine (Hall, 1987). 
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of one realisation of these two 
possible interventions -a vaccine introduced in 1992, pos- 
sibly an optimistic eventuality, and a drug to reduce infec- 
tivity by 50% introduced in 1990. There are obvious difficul- 
ties - both practical and ethical - in identifying the 
I 
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qualifying recipients of either a vaccine or a drug to reduce 
infectivity. Hence this simulation, which assumes all qualify- 
ing members are identified, produces an optimistic scenario of 
the impact of either intervention. Further explorations with 
the vaccine option have shown that there will come a point in 
time when a vaccine will be too late to affect the size of the 
epidemic in the homosexual population. 
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Figure 4.8 Scenarios showing the effect of two possible 
anti-viral therapies (Base model) 
4.4 Heterogeneity in Sexual Mixing 
Published data on the frequency distribution of claimed partner 
change rates by male homosexuals are consistent in reporting a 
large variance usually very much larger than the mean. This is 
the case with data from both sides of the Atlantic. It is 
clear that this risk group has a much higher frequency of part- 
AM 
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ner change than does the young sexually active heterosexual 
risk group. Taken together with the adoption of very high risk 
sexual practices (such as unprotected anal intercourse) which 
increase the probability of viral transmission, this explains 
the initial preponderance of AIDS cases in the male homosexual 
risk group. 
Winkelstein et al (1987) reported an average of 10.8 partners 
per year in 1984 from his study of homosexual/bisexual men in 
San Francisco. However, 27% claimed to have had more than 10 
partners per year. This non-uniformity of partner change is 
further supported by evidence from the survey undertaken by the 
British Market Research Bureau for the government (BMRB, 1987). 
This survey revealed from the results at the first wave of 
interviews (February 1986) that, while a total of 27% of the 
sample claimed 0,1 or 2 different sexual partners in the past 
year, 15% claimed in excess of 11 (including 6 respondents in 
the 41-50 category and 2 in the 51-75 category). 
It is clear, therefore, that any credible model of the spread 
of AIDS within the U. K. homosexual population should 
incorporate this heterogeneity in sexual mixing. In such 
models one factor influencing the force of the infection is 
what is termed the 'effective' mean number of contacts. This 
is defined as the mean + (variance/mean) and it is necessary in 
order to properly account for the right-hand tail of the 
overall sexual activity distribution (May and Anderson, 1987). 
In the'homogeneous mixing model the variance is zero and'h-ence 
the effective mean is simply the mean itself. 
'499 
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Heterogeneity is incorporated into the model by disaggregating 
the susceptible population into separate strata each with their 
own mean number of different partners. This has been done to, 
as far as possible, mirror the variance in the data reported by 
BMRB which cannot, of itself, be calculated because of the way 
the data is presented. This separation is such that interac- 
tion between members of the different strata can take place. 
Mixing is programmed to happen in proportion to the product of 
the size of the group and its number of potential sexual part- 
ners per year (proportionate mixing). 
The crude disaggregation of the at risk cohort of one million 
homosexual males was done such that 30% had 1 partner yr-1,50% 
6 different partners yr-I and 20% 36 different partners yr-1. 
The overall mean was 10.5 partners yr-1, in accordance with the 
overall sample average (at wave 1 of four 9waves9 of inter- 
views) reported in the BMRB survey, and the variance was 167.25 
giving a variance to mean ratio of 15.9 . For epidemiological 
purposes, this split gives an effective mean of 26.4 . 
In this enhanced model in order to properly contain the product 
of the Mean Number of Different Partners (MNDP) and the 
Probability of Infection Per Partner (PIPP) (multiplied 
together in the infection rate equation) to a value of 1.0, a 
revised value of 0.04 was substituted for PIPP. Retaining PIPP 
at 0.1 causes a very rapid take off of the epidemic, totally 
inconsistent with the currently available time series data. In 
this way the model has reinforced the view that the maximum 
value of the product of the effective MNDP and PIPP cannot be 
much above 1.0 . 
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4.5 Sensitivity tests on the incubation time distribution 
Having introduced the concept of heterogeneity it is worth 
returning to the incubation time distribution. As already 
noted, this is an important component of any model of AIDS 
epidemiology. Results of sensitivity tests performed on the 
incubation time distribution are reported, restricting 
consideration to the more complex heterogeneous mixing model 
only. A change in the particular distribution employed is 
considered and, in addition, the effects of variations in its 
first two moments are assessed. 
Figure 4.9 below shows a comparison of the Clinical AIDS 
Manifestation Rate (incidence of AIDS) resulting from a 
negative exponential distribution of incubation time (DELAY1) 
and an Erlang type 3 distribution (DELAY3). The two density 
functions involved are shown in figure 4.10 and are quite dis- 
similar, as are the respective hazard functions (not shown). 
With the negative exponential the hazard function is constant 
and for the Erlang type 3 it is increasing at a decreasing 
rate. 
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Figure 4.10 Incidence of new AIDS cases arising from tne two 
chosen distributions 
HETEROGENEOUS SEXUAL MIXING MODEL 
Sensitivity to type of probability distribution employed 
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What is clear from the -output graph is that the Erlang 
distribution produces an epidemic which is more clustered 
around the period of peak incidence in 1998. With the negative 
exponential distribution used for the incubation time the 
epidemic takes off more quickly but after reaching a peak its 
decline is noticeably slower than with the Erlang. 
Although an Erlang type 3 distribution with a mean of 8 years 
has been employed in the model, it may well turn out that the 
mean incubation time is significantly different from this 
figure. Already a study using estimated seroconversion data 
from homosexuals in San Francisco has reported a mean nearer 
11 years (Bacchetti and Moss, 1989). Since the DYSMAP2 
software '(Dangerfield and Vapenikova, 1987) easily allows 
changes in the mean incubation time, it is possible to readily 
see the effects of such a change on the course of the epidemic. 
Figure 4.11 depicts the results from variations in the mean 
value for the incubation time. The incidence of new AIDS cases 
is plotted for four different mean incubation times. As can 
readily be seen, the smaller is the mean the more severe but 
less prolonged is the epidemic. This is because those infected 
are progressing to AIDS more quickly. They are therefore 
around for a shorter period and hence are infecting fewer 
susceptibles. 
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Figure 4.11 Sensitivity of incidence of new AIDS cases to 
variations in the mean incubation time 
(Erlang type 3 distribution) 
As a further addition to the sensitivity testing, Table 4.1 
indicates specific cumulative percentages for conversion to 
clinical AIDS for incubation times of 8,9 and 11 years when 
using an Erlang type 3 distribution. (The percentages are of 
the proportion of infecteds who eventually progress to clinical 
AIDS. ) On the basis of current evidence it would seem more 
likely that the mean incubation time might turn out to be 
greater than 8 years rather than less. 
HETEROGENEOUS SEXUAL MIXING MODEL 
Sensitivity to the mean (mu) Incubation time for HIV 
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4 
Mean 
incu- 
bation 
period 
(Years) 
8 
9 
11 
Cumulative Percentage converting to clinical AIDS after 
(Years) 
1 2 4 6 7 8 9 10 12 15 
0.6 4.0 19.0 38.9 48.6 57.6 65.4 72.2 82.6 91.9 
0.5 3.0 14.9 32.2 41.1 49.7 57.6 64.6 76.1 87.5 
0.3 1.8 9.7 22.5 29.8 37.1 44.3 51.2 63.4 77.4 
Table 4.1 Cumulative percentage converting to clinical AIDS for 
three different mean incubation periods (Erlang type 3 distribution) 
Finally, whilst discussing the ease with which sensitivity 
tests on the mean can be accomplished, it is also the case that 
experiments can be carried out which explore alterations in the 
variance. The variance of an Erlang distribution is related to 
its mean by , 
C2 . 11 2/C 
where u- the overall mean 
and c= the order of the distribution (shape parameter) 
Hence changes in the variance-for a fixed mean can be obtained 
by changing c. ' Thus with a mean of 8 years by rerunning the 
model using 3rd, 6th and 9th order delays (equivalent to Erlang 
type 3,6 and 9 distributions respectively) it is possible to 
alter the variance from 21.3 to 10.67 to 7.1 - Figure 4.12 
shows the effects of these changes in the variance. 
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Figure 4.12 Sensitivity of incidence of new AIDS cases to changes 
in the variance of the incubation time distribution (Erlang) 
It can be seen that the smaller is the variance the higher and 
later is the peak of the epidemic. Also shown on the graph is 
the result of an infinite order delay (pipeline delay). This 
produces a variance of zero and so merely shifts the HIV 
incidence curve (not shown) 8 years to the right. At least one 
early model of AIDS spread incorporated a fixed incubation time 
for all infecteds (Pickering et al, 1986). 
4.6 Structural results from the models 
Some important structural results from the models are now 
examined, beginning with the effects of heterogeneity in sexual 
mixing on the course of the epidemic. Figure 4.13 shows a com- 
parison plot (co-plot) where the graphs on the plot, reading 
from the top, show the prevalence of clinical AIDS for, repec- 
HETEROGENEOUS SEXUAL MIXING MODEL 
Sensitivity to the variance of the Incubation time distribution 
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tively, the homogeneous and heterogeneous profiles of the 
sexually active population. 
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Figure 4.13 AIDS prevalence arising from the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous sexual mixing models 
The effect of heterogeneity in the number of sexual partners is 
clearly encouraging for those who have to tackle the 
consequences of this epidemic. Peak prevalence of the disease 
is delayed by some three years and the overall intensity of the 
epidemic is lessened. Although not shown, the proportion 
ultimately infected falls from 100% down to 76%. As noted 
elsewhere (May and Anderson, 1987) these results are the 
consequence of the more sexually active individuals being 
removed from the system relatively quickly and thereby not 
contributing to the spread of the disease. The greater the 
degree of heterogeneity in the susceptible population the less 
severe is the overall epidemic. 
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Figure 4.14 below gives an insight into the effects of 
heterogeneity by showing-the spread of the infection across all 
three sexual strata. The epidemic is initiated half way 
through 1976 (which gives a good fit to known AIDS cases up to 
end-1988) by introducing one infected individual into the most 
active sexual class (stratum 3). Because of the mixing between 
classes the infection is eventually spread across all the 
sexual activity groups, although the least sexually active 
group takes seven years longer than the most active group to 
reach peak incidence of AIDS. Also, the highly active group 
are responsible for the greatest incidence of AIDS cases only 
up until 1994 after which point the moderately active group 
take over and then remain the largest contributor for the rest 
of the simulation. 
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Figure 4.14 AIDS incidence in the three sexual strata of the 
heterogeneous mixing model 
It is clear from the BMRB survey and other subsequent studies 
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(Evans et al, 1989; van Griensven, 1989) that the male 
homosexual population has undergone a significant change in 
sexual behaviour, clearly in response to the effects of the 
epidemic. For instance, the BMRB survey disclosed that, over 
the period February 1986 to February 1987, the average number 
of sexual partners per year taken by a sample of male 
homosexuals had fallen, over the four 'waves' of interviews, as 
follows: 10.49,8.7,7.1 and 4.8 . 
Assuming this trend reflects changes in the whole of the male 
homosexual population, this data was incorporated by allowing 
the Mean Number of Different Partners (MNDP) to vary, tracking 
as closely as possible the reported trend from February 1986 
and then remaining at 4.8 new partners annually from early in 
1987. (There may, of course, be further reductions after this 
point. ) The variance of the data consequently diminished over 
the period involved with the variance to mean ratio f alling 
from 15.9 at wave 1 to 6.5 at wave 4. Figure 4.15 shows a co- 
plot from a run which superimposes this changing behaviour onto 
the heterogeneous sexual mixing model. 
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Figure 4.15 Projection of the effects of changing sexual behaviour 
reported in the government sponsored BMRB survey 
The incorporation of changing behaviour has startling effects. 
The peak prevalence of the disease is pushed towards the middle 
of the first decade after the millenium and the proportion 
ultimately infected falls to 57%. Such a result confirms the 
sense of the message conveyed by many authorities about the 
need for at-risk individuals to voluntarily control the type 
and frequency of those sexual practices which clearly 
contribute towards the spread of HIV infection. 
The data on changing behaviour were obtained from four waves of 
interviews in gay bars and incorporated sample sizes the lowest 
and highest of which were 156 (at wave 1) and 298 (at wave 2), 
respectively. Coxon (1986) questions the reliability of attem- 
pting to elicit from male homosexuals their number of different 
partners, citing, from his own studies, discrepancies between 
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estimates given by respondents and sexual diaries which fhey 
were required to submit at periodic intervals. He is 
particularly sceptical of data obtained from attendees at 
clinics who have been presented with pre-supplied intervals for 
the estimated number of partners. Whether the data from the 
government sponsored survey are reliable- remains to be seen, 
but at the present time they are the most comprehensive 
available and the inquiry does possess the merit that respon- 
dents were questioned at their normal social haunts and not in 
a clinical situation. 
One interesting factor which might confound the observed 
changed behaviour by male homosexuals is that, in a system of 
heterogeneous mixing, the overall mean number of different 
partners will, over time, fall anyway. This arises from the 
fact that the stratum with the most rapid frequency of partner 
change is lost from the system most quickly, leaving the 
remainder who will have a lower overall mean number of 
different partners. In the model the equations below capture 
this particular situation. 
OMNDP - TSHIVA/X(ETPARj-CCCj) 
TSHIVA = I(ETPARi-CCCi)*MNDPi 
where 
OMNDP = Overall Mean Number of Different Partners 
TSHIVA = Total Susceptible and HIV Activity 
ETPAR = Estimated Total Population At Risk 
CCC = Cumulative Clinical Cases 
MNDP = Mean Number of Different Partners 
However, f igure 4.16 clearly shows that there is no danger of 
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0 
this phenomenon confounding the results from the BMRB survey 
because the changing behaviour occurs well in adv; nce of 
9natural9 changes happening in the system. In figure 4.16 the 
plot from the homogeneous mixing model is also shown for com- 
parison. Obviously with homogeneous mixing the effective mean 
number of different partners remains a constant. 
I 
1 
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Year 
Homogeneous mixing 
Heterogeneous mixing 
Heterogeneous mixing and changing behaviour 
Figure 4.16 Plot of Overall Mean Number of Different Partners for 
(i) homogeneous (ii) heterogeneous and (iii) heterogeneous + changing 
behaviour models 
4.6.1 Results from incorporating variable infectivity 
In the base model it was assumed that the infectious period was 
equal to the incubation period and, moreover, that the 
probability of infection was constant throughout. However, it 
now seems that a constant infectivity profile is unlikely. 
Infectivity may be related to the amount of antigenaemia (free 
virus) in the circulatory system of an infected individual. 
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That is, the greater the antigenaemia the more infectious the 
individual. 
Studies indicate that the level of antigenaemia goes up in the 
first few weeks after infection and then goes down as antibody 
response occurs, remaining at very low levels for years (Peder- 
sen, Nielsen, Vestergaard et al, 1987; Burger et al, 1986). As 
the immune system collapses in the year or so before AIDS 
develops, antigenaemia counts return to high levels. 
Figure 4.17 illustrates the possible antigenaemia levels -- and 
hence the infectivity profile -- during an assumed eight year 
incubation period. This variable infectivity profile is model- 
led using three cascaded first order delays with mean delay 
times of 1,6 and 1 years respectively. 
T 
E 
4D 
10 
. 21 c m 
> 
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8 years 
(average) 
II 
ARC AIDS 
STAGE 1 STAGE2 STAGE3 
Figure 4.17 Assumed infectivity profile over the incubation period 
During the first year the Probability of Infection Per Partner 
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(PIPP1) was set at 0.06, during the middle six years (PIPP2) at 
zero and during the 'last year (PIPP3) at 0.12 Figure 4.18 
1 shows the effect on the prevalence of AIDS of incorporating 
this variable profile into the heterogeneous sexual activity 
model. Its effect once again is to lessen the size of the 
epidemic. 
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Figure 4.18 Comparison between the effects of (i) heterogeneity and 
(ii) heterogeneity and variable infectivity on the prevalence of 
clinical AIDS 
Since the probabilities of infection at the beginning and at 
the end of the incubation period are highly uncertain, 
sensitivity tests have been performed. Figures 4.19 and 4.20 
illustrate the effect of changes in these two parameters, PIPP1 
and PIPP3. It can be seen that variations in PIPP1 have a much 
greater impact on the course of the epidemic than do changes of 
twice the amount made to PIPP3. On both graphs the f lat 
prof ile of inf ectivity plot is . 
included f or comparison 
purposes. 
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Figure 4.19 Effect of variations in the first stage of 
infectiousness on the prevalence of clinical AIDS 
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Year, 
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U-shaped profile of Infectivity: third stage PIPP - 0.12 
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Flat profile of Infectivity with stages 1. S. and I years 
Figure 4.20 Effect of variations in the second stage of 
infectiousness on the prevalence of clinical AIDS 
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The implications of this result are twofold; for the 
virologists it is necessary to concentrate on assessing infec- 
tivity during this first stage of infectiousness shortly after 
initial invasion of the virus; and for the health educationists 
it is imperative that they succeed in their desire to persuade 
those people, whose behaviour puts them at risk of infection, 
to adopt safe sexual practices. The earlier in the course of 
the epidemic that this message is heeded, the greater is the 
benefit. 
This result could also provide an input into the debate 
surrounding a recent policy announcement that, in addition to 
patients with clinical AIDS, HIV-infecteds would also be 
treated with the drug zidovudine (AZT). There may be those who 
think that the a. dministration of zidovudine to this new group 
of patients will have epidemiological as well as prophylactic 
benefits. But as the result indicates, a major determinant of 
the progress of the epidemic is risky behaviours in the early 
stages of infectivity. At that time a newly-infected person 
may experience nothing more than a short acute illness which 
goes unremarked. Therefore, even if zidovudine also reduces 
infectivity, early identification of those individuals to whom 
its administration would be of epidemiological benefit is going 
to prove extremely difficult. 
4.7 Results from an Optimisation experiment 
In this section a parameter optimisation experiment is conduc- 
ted in order to extract, from the quarterly time series data on 
cumulative reported cases of AIDS, as much as could be gained 
on behalf of a model incorporating heterogeneity in sexual 
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activity and variable infectivity over the distributed incuba- 
tion period. The concepts and tools of system dynamics 
optimisation have been developed for nearly a decade now by 
Keloharju (1976,1981). Latterly they have been expounded in 
papers by Coyle (1985), Keloharju and Wolstenholme (1988,1989) 
and Wolstenholme and Al-Alusi (1987). 
Up until now the data-driven (curve fitting) approach to model- 
ling the epidemic has existed in isolation from the transmis- 
sion modelling approach. The latter reflects the actual 
processes going on but takes notice of externally generated 
data only insofar as parameter values are supported by 
empirical surveys and/or clinical case reports. However, by 
using the optimisation software it is possible to harness the 
information obtainable from time series data on the epidemic 
with the construction of a causal model. 
The software tool associated with the use of system dynamics 
optimisation is an enhanced version of the mainframe DYSMAP 
package and is called DYSMOD (Dynamic Systems Modeller 
Optimiser and Developer), (Luostarinen, 1982). Up until 1990 
this software was available only on Hewlett Packard minicom- 
puters but it has recently been ported to an 80386-based PC 
environment (DYSMOD/386). DYSMOD includes a heuristic search 
routine devised by Buffa and Taubert (1972) which explores the 
multi-dimensional response surface created, through the range 
of variability of those parameters in the model not held fixed, 
with respect to an objective function. This function is either 
maximised or minimised. 
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DYSMOD is an implementation of a range of powerful system 
dynamics optimisation'facilities. Of these, only the simplest, 
namelyýstraightforward estimation of (constant) parameters, has 
been utilised in the experiment reported. For any 
optimisation, the user must formulate, using the DYSMAP 
language syntax, the necessary objective function to be 
included in the model along with all the other equations. An 
objective function was formulated which represented the sum of 
squared deviations of the simulated from the actual quarterly 
time series values for cumulative clinical cases of AIDS, from 
1982 up to the end of the second quarter of 1988. A range for 
each of the six parameters chosen for optimisation was also 
specified, these being the Mean Number of Different Partners in 
each of three sexual activity groups, the Symptoms Emergence 
Ratio and the Probability of Infection Per Partner for each of 
stages 1 and 3 in the three-stage variable infectivity profile. 
All other parameters were held fixed. 
The results showed the best fit Mean Number of Different Part- 
ners in each group to be 0.72,4.66 and 27.90 compared with the 
values previously used (estimated from data provided from'the 
government sponsored survey) of 1,6 and 36. The Symptoms 
Emergence Ratio came out at 1.0, confirming the most pes- 
simistic of all opinions on this feature and the Probability of 
Infection Per Partner in stages 1 and 3 as 0.071 and 0.149 
respectively. Although the 'third stage infectivity is 
estimated at over twice that of the first stage, 'itS influence 
on the magnitude of the overall epidemic is slight as compared 
with that of the first stage PIPP. (This feature has already 
been commented upon in the previous section. ) A plot of the 
actual and simulated series, arising from running the model 
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's 
with the optimised parameter values to the end of 1988 Q2, is 
shown in figure 4.21 . 
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Figure 4.21 Comparison of actual and simulated cumulative cases 
of AIDS following the optimisation experiment 
with such a good fit to the actual data it is worthwhile 
examining the figures produced for HIV prevalence at, say, end- 
1987. This is the 9base of the iceberg' phenomenon; the number 
of people HIV-infected but who have not yet shown symptoms of 
clinical AIDS. Reading the value, firstly, directly from the 
model variable for HIV prevalence and, secondly, using a mul- 
tiplication factor which adjusts for whether the simulated 
cumulative clinical cases of AIDS are above or below the 
actual, gives a range between 18,800 and 19,100 rounded to the 
nearest hundred. The government appointed committee of 
experts, chaired by Professor Sir David Cox, has investigated 
ways of attempting a five year prediction for new AIDS cases 
(to assist in health care planning). Their report (Department 
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of Health and the Welsh Office, 1988) puts a figure for HIV 
prevalence in homosexuals at end-ý1987 in the range 1ý, 000 to 
30,000. 
4.8 The Relationship between HIV prevalence and reported cases 
of AIDS 
Finding the relationship between the prevalence of the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and observed cases with clinical 
symptoms of the acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) was 
the main preoccupation of contributors to the Cox Report. A 
recent American article by. Salzberg and Dolins (1989) has 
claimed that the relationship is constant. This is something 
of an oversimplification. 
With the model described above, it is trivial, to compute the 
ratio of HIV prevalence to cases of AIDS over the course of the 
epidemic. In , figure 4.22 below a plot of this ratio is 
presented and it can be seen that the relationship is forward 
falling with just a short period when the ratio remains fairly 
constant. The changes in the rate of-fall of the curve reflect 
the changing nature of the relationship between the respective 
proportionate rates of growth of HIV infectives and AIDS cases. 
After the period when both proportionate growth rates are 
almost the same, the number of new cases of AIDS starts to 
increase quite substantially, the proportionate growth rate of 
cumulative AIDS cases is much higher than that for HIV 
prevalence and thus the ratio declines. 
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Figure 4.22 Plot of the ratio of HIV prevalence to cumulative 
clinical cases of AIDS 
Although the precise values on the vertical axis in figure 4.22 
are determined by the values of parameters and the assumptions 
in the model (and the ratio is not plotted prior to 1980 
because not one AIDS case is generated before that date), the 
form of the curve -is universal and will be an artefact of the 
AIDS epidemic in all countries which report one. Moreover, its 
overall shape is the same whether you take the ratio of HIV 
prevalence to AIDS incidence; to AIDS prevalence; to cumulative 
cases of AIDS (as illustrated above); or to AIDS incidence in 
the year following (as with Salzberg and Dolins). 
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4.9 Model Validation 
With the approach adopted there is normally a much sharper 
external focus on model validation than is the case with other 
modelling methods. Why this should be so is not readily 
apparent, but nonetheless various validation tests have been 
performed on the model. 
The scientific method espoused by Popper (1959) provides a bac- 
keloth to the entire range of tests capable of being applied: 
the model should not be 'obviously wrong2. The tests conducted 
covered the following: 
(a) A mathematical check that the model neither gained or 
lost people during the execution of the simulation. 
(b) A run of the heterogeneous model with all three strata 
having the same mean of 10.5 partners yr-1. This produced an 
exact trace of the homogeneous model behaviour. 
(c) A detailed assessment of all the numerical values 
chosen for the parameters. 
(d) A comparison of the simulated output with the 
corresponding reported data up to the present time. 
(e) An inspection of the maximum and minimum values of all 
the model variables. This is to check that the model, while 
perhaps generating reasonable values for the important output 
variables, is not being sustained by totally implausible values 
for the supporting variables. This check revealed that all 
variables' values were satisfactory. 
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Of the above, points (a) and (c) warrant further explanation. 
A checksum equation was f6rmulated in order to satisfy test (a) 
above. This took the following formt 
CHECK-ETPAR-(SP+HIVPOP+CTNIS+CAP+CD) 
where 
ETPAR - Estimated Total Population At-Risk 
SP - Susceptible Population 
HIVPOP - HIV infected POPulation 
CTNIS - Cumulative Transferrals to Non-Infectious State 
CAP = Clinical Aids Population 
CD ,- Cumulative Deaths 
Clearly its value should be zero at all times and indeed the 
numerical results for this variable showed that it was zero or 
(at most) approximately equal to 11.2X10-101. The sof tware 
employed operates in double precision arithmetic throughout and 
so the calculated values for the CHECK variable are highly com- 
putationally accurate despite the fact that a differencing 
operation between some reasonably large numbers is being 
carried out. 
In respect of (c) it can be stated categorically that the 
estimates of parameter values used in the model were drawn from 
the published literature. In the section above all the sources 
have been identified. Because the model is not characterised 
by a level of detail which goes down to the separation of 
individual risk groups and type of sexual activity, the extent 
of the necessity for parameter values is constrained. , Models 
which incorporate great detail compound the difficulty involved 
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in obtaining reliable parameter estimates and in any case 
detailed models are not necessarily justified in the light of 
the needs of those people who are planning for the epidemic. 
4.10 Conclusion 
If the foregoing has demonstrated that system dynamics has a 
role to play in epidemiological modelling then it will have 
served its purpose. It is not the quarter which 
epidemiologists might have previously turned to in seeking 
help, but developments in the power of personal computers and 
in system dynamics simulation software have combined to ensure 
that the management scientist has a capability which should 
prove attractive to clinicians, epidemiologists and others who 
are in the front line for developing policies to cope with this 
major problem of public health. Written description of the 
models fails to convey the impact of this policy support tool 
in use. Runs take a matter of minutes on a PC/AT and, if one 
of the latest 32-bit personal computers is deployed, the 
9run and plot' time is measured in seconds. For instance, 
using a 386-SX machine equipped with a maths co-processor, the 
most complex model, incorporating heterogeneity in sexual mix- 
ing and a variable infectivity profile, runs in 33 seconds. 
The impact which the AIDS pandemic is having on the output of 
epidemiological models worldwide has much in common with the 
genesis of O. R. in wartime. The world is f aced with an 
incipient problem of potentially horrendous proportions. It 
follows from this that there is insufficient time to be drawn 
into lengthy consideration of how comprehensive one model is 
compared to another or of the relative merits of analytical as 
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opposed to simulation models; each approach has a contribution 
to make. The offering above stems from the view that 
analytical models may be mathematically exact but incur over- 
heads in formulation time and, more so, in the time needed for 
their solution. They also impose a barrier to understanding 
for the clients, when what is needed is a means of endorsing a 
common vocabulary. 
The heterogeneous sexual mixing model is complex without being 
detailed. Nevertheless, there are some who have attempted to 
incorporate into their models a degree of detail on sexual risk 
groups and practices which cannot be' other than overambitious 
given current knowledge concerning the measurement of vital 
parameters. Attempts to construct very detailed models of HIV 
transmission inevitably ýput up the cost (and time) of the 
research as well as placing an unnecessarily heavy stress on 
model validation. The objective in devising this model was to 
create something which was: capable of handling the 
significant features of the HIV/AIDS epidemics which have been 
highlighted in the medical and scientific literature; ideal for 
rapid recomputation and illustration of the effects of 
parameter changes and, most of all, was reasonably transparent 
to non-modelling professionals. It is to be hoped that some 
movement towards achieving that goal has been accomplished. 
The use of stochastic models of AIDS spread has its adherents. 
The approach adopted here does not, in fact, prohibit such 
explorations. DYSMAP2 has both normal and uniformly 
distributed random number functions, so it would be a simple 
task to impose stochasticity on the model and re-run it many 
times, producing the results in the form of frequency 
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distributions as has been done by Bailey and Estreicher (1988). 
However, it is worth reiterating the main conclusion of Tan and 
Hsu (1989) from their experiments with some stochastic models. 
They found that, providing the numbers at risk are large 
enough, stochastic models merely produce an approximation to 
the underlying deterministic model. 
Modelling the epidemic in the homosexual risk group is a neces- 
sary first step for the UK and many other countries where this 
group accounts for a significant proportion of total AIDS 
cases. However, it should be expected that such a model would 
eventually be -augmented by further sectors incorporating drug 
users and non-monogamous sexually active heterosexuals, with 
linkages across all three groups. To attempt to achieve such a 
goal using mathematical modelling is daunting, because of the 
greater degree of interaction between the risk groups involved 
and the need to model the sexes separately. But by employing a 
system dynamics simulation approach there is a realistic hope 
of producing such an enhanced model. This could then, with 
appropriate parameter changes, be applied to the AIDS epidemic 
in any country of the world: it would be a generic model. 
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the model described 
above is regarded as a first step, albeit an important one, in 
supporting public policy on HIV and AIDS. It is intended sub- 
sequently to enlarge the model of spread in the homosexual 
population along the lines indicated in the previous paragraph. 
As a consequence of the research to date, together with any 
further enhancements, it is to be hoped that medical profes- 
sionals and health planning staff will become convinced that 
system dynamics models are a helpful support tool for capturing 
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those insights which will contribute cogently to debates on 
AIDS policy. 
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LISTING OF THE VARIABLE INFECTIVITY MODEL 
* EPIDEMIOLOGY DYNAMICS: THE SPREAD OF AIDS IN THE U. K. 
N TIME=STIME 
C STIME=1976.5 
C ETPAR=1E6 
L SPl. K=SPl. J+DT*(-EIRHIV1. JK) 
N SP1=ETP1AR-HIVPOP1IN 
C ETP1AR-300E3 
L SP2. K=SP2. J+DT*(-EIRHIV2. JK) 
N SP2=ETP2AR-HIVPOP2IN 
C ETP2AR=5OOE3 
L SP3. K=SP3. J+DT*(-EIRHIV3. JK) 
N SP3=ETP3AR-HIVPOP3IN 
C ETP3AR-20OE3 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE Three stages of infectivity for sexual activity group 1 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L HIVPOPlSl. K=HIVPOPlSl. J+DT*(EIRHIV1. JK-HIVS2MR1. JK-ETRNIS1. JK) 
N HIVPOPlSI=HIVPOPlIN/3 
C HIVPOP1IN=O 
R HIVS2MR1. KL=DELAY1(EIRHIV1. JK, SlIT. K) 
L HIVPOPlS2. K=HIVPOPlS2. J+DT*(HIVS2MR1. JK-HIVS3MR1. JK) 
N HIVPOPlS2=HIVPOPlIN/3 
R HIVS3MR1. KL-DELAY1(HIVS2MR1. JK, S2IT. K) 
N HIVS2MR1=0 
L HIVPOPlS3. K=HIVPOPlS3. J+DT*(HIVS3MR1. JK-ECAMR1. JK) 
N HIVPOPlS3-HIVPOPlIN/3 
A HIVPOP1. K=HIVPOPlSl. K+HIVPOPlS2. K+HIVPOPlS3. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE Three stages of infectivity for sexual activity group 2 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L HIVPOP2Sl. K=HIVPOP2Sl. J+DT*(EIRHIV2. JK-HIVS2MR2. JK-ETRNIS2. JK) 
N HIVPOP2Sl=HIVPOP2IN/3 
C HIVPOP2IN=O 
R HIVS2MR2. KL=DELAY1(EIRHIV2. JK, SlIT. K) 
L HIVPOP2S2. K=HIVPOP2S2. J+DT*(HIVS2MR2. JK-HIVS3MR2. JK) 
N HIVPOP2S2=HIVPOP2IN/3 
R HIVS3MR2. KL=DELAY1(HIVS2MR2. JK, S2IT. K) 
N HIVS2MR2=0 
L HIVPOP2S3. K=HIVPOP2S3. J+DT*(HIVS3MR2. JK-ECAMR2. JK) 
N HIVPOP2S3=HIVPOP2IN/3 
A HIVPOP2. K=HIVPOP2Sl. K+HIVPOP2S2. K+HIVPOP2S3. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE Three stages of infectivity for sexual activity group 3 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L HIVPOP3Sl. K=HIVPOP3SI. J+DT*(EIRHIV3. JK-HIVS2MR3. JK-ETRNIS3. JK) 
N HIVPOP3Sl=HIVPOP3IN 
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C HIVPOP3IN-1 
R HIVS2MR3. KL-DELAY1(EIRHIV3. JK, SlIT. K) 
L HIVPOP3S2. K=HIVPOP3S2. J+DT*(HIVS2MR3. JK-HIVS3MR3. JK) 
N HIVPOP3S2-O 
R HIVS3MR3. KL-DELAY1(HIVS2MR3. JK, S2IT. K) 
N HIVS2MR3-O 
L HIVPOP3S3. K=HIVPOP3S3. J+DT*(HIVS3MR3. JK-ECAMR3. JK) 
N HIVPOP3S3-O 
A HIVPOP3. K-HIVPOP3Sl. K+HIVPOP3S2. K+HIVPOP3S3. K 
NOTE 
NOTE Below, the Sexual Activity Ratio is used to parcel out 
NOTE the AGGregate Infection Rate of HIV amongst the three 
NOTE strata. This produces an Effective Infection Rate of 
NOTE HIV for each of the strata. 
NOTE 
R EIRHIV1. KL-AGGIRHIV. KL*SARl. K 
R EIRHIV2. KL-AGGIRHIV. KL*SAR2. K 
R EIRHIV3. KL=AGGIRHIV. KL*SAR3. K 
A TSA. K=SPl. K*MNDPI. K+SP2. K*MNDP2. K+SP3. K*MNDP3. K 
A SARI. K=SPl. K*MNDPl. K/TSA. K 
A SAR2. K=SP2. K*MNDP2. K/TSA. K 
A SAR3. K=SP3. K*MNDP3. K/TSA. K 
R AGGIRHIV. KL=IRHIV1. K+IRHIV2. K+IRHIV3. K 
A IRHIV1. K=(HIVPOPISI. K*PIPPSI+HIVPOPlS2. K*PIPPS2+HIVPOPlS3. K 
X *PIPPS3)*MNDPl. K*SPR. K 
A IRHIV2. K-(HIVPOP2Sl. K*PIPPS1+HIVPOP2S2. K*PIPPS2+HIVPOP2S3. K 
X *PIPPS3)*MNDP2. K*SPR. K 
A IRHIV3. K=(HIVPDP3Sl. K*PIPPS1+HIVPOP3S2. K*PIPPS2+HIVPOP3S3. K 
X *PIPPS3)*MNDP3. K*SPR. K 
A SPR. K=TSA. K/((ETPlAR-CCCl. K)*MNDPl. K+ 
X (ETP2AR-CCC2. K)*MNDP2. K+(ETP3AR-CCC3. K)*MNDP3. K) 
L HIVPOP. K=HIVPOP. J+DT*(AGGIRHIV. JK-CAMR. JK-TRNIS. JK) 
N HIVPOP=HIVPOPlIN+HIVPOP2IN+HIVPOP3IN 
A MNDPI. K=l 
A MNDP2. K=6 
A MNDP3. K=36 
C PIPPSI=0.0378 
C PIPPS2=0.0378 
C PIPPS3=0.0378 
A SIIT. K=MIPV/3 
A S21T. K=MIPV/3 
A S31T. K=MIPV/3 
L CCCI. K=CCCI. J+DT*ECAMR1. JK 
N CCC1=0 
L CCC2. K=CCC2. J+DT*ECAMR2. JK 
N CCC2=0 
L CCC3. K=CCC3. J+DT*ECAMR3. JK 
N CCC3=0 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE 
, 
The third & final stage of infectivity: the transmission 
NOTE to clinical AIDS for each of sexual activity groups 1,2 
NOTE and 3. 
NOTE Also, the transfer to a non-infectious state for each of 
NOTE the 3 groups. 
NOTE 
NOTE 
R ECAMR1. KL=DELAY1(HIVS3MRI. JK, S3IT. K)*SER 
N HIVS3MR1=0 
R ETRNISI. KL=DELAY3(EIRHIV1. JK, MTNIS)*(l-SER) 
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N EIRHIV1-0 
R ECAMR2. KL-DELAY1(HIVS3MR2. JK, S3IT. K)*SER 
N HIVS3MR2-0 
R ETRNIS2. KL-DELAY3(EIRHIV2. JK, MTNIS)*(l-SER) 
N EIRHIV2-0 
R ECAMR3. KL-DELAY1(HIVS3MR3. JK, S3IT. K)*SER 
N HIVS3MR3-0 
R ETRNIS3. KL-DELAY3(EIRHIV3. JK, MTNIS)*(l-SER) 
N EIRHIV3=0 
C MIPV-8 
C MTNIS-8 
C SER-0.7 
R CAMR. KL-ECAMR1. KL+ECAMR2. KL+ECAMR3. KL 
R TRNIS. KL-ETRNIS1. KL+ETRNIS2. KL+ETRNIS3. KL 
S PCINF. K-(ETPAR-SP. K)/ETPAR*100 
A SP. K-SPl. K+SP2. K+SP3. K 
N CAMR-0 
R DR. KL=DELAY1(CAMR. JK, MST) 
C MST=l 
L CAP. K=CAP. J+DT*(CAMR. JK-DR. JK) 
N CAP-0 
L CD. K-CD. J+DT*DR. JK 
N CD=O 
L CCC. K=CCC. J+DT*CAMR. JK 
N CCC=O 
L CTNIS. K=CTNIS. J+DT*TRNIS. JK 
N CTNIS=O 
S RHIVCAP. K=RATIO(HIVPOP. K, CAP. K) 
S RHIVCCC. K=RATIO(HIVPOP. K, CCC. K) 
NOTE 
NOTE ACTUAL REPORTED STATISTICS 
NOTE 
S RCUMC. K=TABHL(RCUMCT, TIME. K, 1982,1989,0.25) 
T RCUMCT-ICUMC. ACTI External file 
S RCUMD. K=TABHL(RCUMDT, TIME. K, 1982,1989,0.25) 
T RCUMDT=9CUMD. ACT1 External file 
NOTE 
NOTE CHECKSUM EQUATIONS 
NOTE 
A CHECK1. K-ETPAR-(SP. K+HIVPOP. K+CTNIS. K+CAP. K+CD. K) 
A CHECK2. K=HIVPOP. K-(HIVPOP1. K+HIVPOP2. K+HIVPOP3. K) 
NOTE 
NOTE DEFINITION STATEMENTS 
NOTE 
D AGGIRHIV=(P/YRS) AGGregate Infection Rate with HIV 
D CAMR=(P/YRS) Clinical Aids Manifestation Rate 
D CAP-(P) Clinical Aids Population 
D CCC=(P) Cumulative Clinical Cases 
D CCC1=(P) Cumulative Clinical Cases stratum 1 
D CCC2=(P) Cumulative Clinical Cases stratum 2 
D CCC3=(P) Cumulative Clinical Cases stratum 3 
D CD=(P) Cumulative Deaths 
D CHECK1=(P) CHECKsum equation no. 1 should be zero 
D CHECK2-(P) CHECKsum equation no. 2 should be zero 
D CTNIS=(P) Cumulative Transferrals to a Non-Infectious State 
D DR=(P/YRS) Death Rate 
D DT=(YRS) simulation time step 
D ECAMRI=(P/YRS) Effective Clinical Aids Manifestation Rate 
* stratum 1 
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D ECAMR2-(P/YRS) Effective Clinical Aids Manifestation Rate 
* stratum 2 
D ECAMR3-(P/YRS) Effective Clinical Aids Manifestation Rate 
* stratum 3 
D EIRHIV1-(P/YRS) Effective Infection Rate of HIV in stratum 1 
D EIRHIV2-(P/YRS) Effective Infection Rate of HIV in stratum 2 
D EIRHIV3-(P/YRS) Effective Infection Rate of HIV in stratum 3 
D ETPAR-(P) Estimated Total Population At Risk 
D ETP1AR-(P) Estimated Total Population of stratum 1 At Risk 
D ETP2AR-(P) Estimated Total Population of stratum 2 At Risk 
D ETP3AR-(P) Estimated Total Population of stratum 3 At Risk 
D ETRNIS1-(P/YRS) Effective Transfer Rate to Non-InfectiouS State 
* stratum 1 
D ETRNIS2-(P/YRS) Effective Transfer Rate to Non-Infectious State 
* stratum 2 
D ETRNIS3-(P/YRS) Effective Transfer Rate to Non-Infectious State 
* stratum 3 
D HIVPOP-(P) HIV-infected POPulation 
D HIVPOP1-(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 1 
D HIVPOP2-(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 2 
D HIVPOP3=(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 3 
D HIVPOPlIN=(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 1 INitially 
D HIVPOPlSl-(P) HIV-infected PoPulation of stratum 1 at 
* Stage 1 infectivity 
D HIVPOPlS2-(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 1 at 
* Stage 2 infectivity 
D HIVPOPlS3-(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 1 at 
* Stage 3 infecti. vity 
D HIVPOP2IN=(P) HIV-infected PoPulation of stratum 2 INitially 
D HIVPOP2Sl=(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 2 at 
* Stage 1 infectivity 
D HIVPOP2S2=(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 2 at 
* Stage 2 infectivity 
D HIVPOP2S3=(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 2 at 
* Stage 3 infectivity 
D HIVPOP3IN=(P) HIV-infected PoPulation of stratum 3 INitially 
D HIVPOP3SI=(P) HIV-infected PoPulation of stratum 3 at 
* Stage 1 infectivity 
D HIVPOP3S2-(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 3 at 
* Stage 2 infectivity 
D HIVPOP3S3-(P) HIV-infected POPulation of stratum 3 at 
* Stage 3 infectivity 
D HIVS2MR1=(P/YRS) HIV Stage 2 Manifestation Rate for stratum 1 
D HIVS2MR2-(P/YRS) HIV Stage 2 Manifestation Rate for stratum 2 
D HIVS2MR3-(P/YRS) HIV Stage 2 Manifestation Rate for stratum 3 
D HIVS3MR1=(P/YRS) HIV Stage 3 Manifestation Rate for stratum 1 
D HIVS3MR2=(P/YRS) HIV Stage 3 Manifestation Rate for stratum 2 
D HIVS3MR3=(P/YRS) HIV Stage 3 Manifestation Rate for stratum 3 
D IRHIV1-(P/YRS) Infection Rate of HIV in stratum 1 
D IRHIV2=(P/YRS) Infection Rate of HIV in stratum 2 
D IRHIV3=(P/YRS) Infection Rate of HIV in stratum 3 
D LENGTH=(YRS) LENGTH (duration) of the simulation 
D MIPV=(YRS) Mean Incubation Period of the Virus 
D MNDP1=(P/(P*YRS)) Mean Number of Different Partners for 
* stratum 1 members 
D MNDP2=(P/(P*YRS)) Mean Number of Different Partners for 
* stratum 2 members 
D MNDP3=(P/(P*YRS)) Mean Number of Different Partners for 
* stratum 3 members 
D MST=(YRS) Mean Survival Time (after a diagnosis of clinical aids) 
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D MTNIS-(YRS) Mean Time for transfer to Non-InfectioUS State 
D PCINF-(1) PerCentage of the total population INFected 
D PIPPS1-(1) Probability of Infection Per Partner at 
* Stage 1 infectivity 
D PIPPS2-(I) Probability of Infection Per Partner at 
* Stage 2 infectivity 
D PIPPS3-(1) Probability of Infection Per Partner at 
* Stage 3 infectivity 
D PRTPER-(YRS) PRinTing PERiod (interval) 
D RCUMC-(P) Reported CUMulative Cases 
D RCUMCT-(P) Reported CUMulative Cases Table of values 
D RCUMD-(P) Reported CUMulative Deaths 
D RCUMDT-(P) Reported CUMulative Deaths Table of values 
D RHIVCAP-(l) Ratio of HIV population to Clinical Aids Population 
D RHIVCCC-(I) Ratio of HIV population to Cumulative Clinical Cases 
D S1IT-(YRS) Stage 1 Infectiousness Time 
D S21T=(YRS) Stage 2 Infectiousness Time 
D S31T-(YRS) Stage 3 Infectiousness Time 
D SAR1-(1) Sexual Activity Ratio stratum 1 
D SAR2-(I) Sexual Activity Ratio stratum 2 
D SAR3-(1) Sexual Activity Ratio stratum 3 
D SER-(1) Symptoms Emergence Ratio 
D SP=(P) Susceptible Population (in total) 
D SP1-(P) Susceptible Population stratum 1 
D SP2=(P) Susceptible Population stratum 2 
D SP3-(P) Susceptible Population stratum 3 
D SPR=(I) Susceptible Population Ratio 
D STIME=(YRS) Start TIME for the simulation 
D TIME=(YRS) simulated TIME ------- > 
D TRNIS-(P/YRS) Transfer Rate (total) to Non-Infectious State 
D TSA=(P/YRS) Total Susceptible Activity 
NOTE 
NOTE OUTPUT CONTROL 
NOTE 
NOTE A PRTPER. K=1-STEP(O. 75,1986)+STEP(O. 75,1989) 
C PRTPER-1 
C DT=0.0625 
C LENGTH=40 
PRINT SP, HIVPOP, CAMR, CAP, DR, CD, AGGIRHIV 
PRINT 2)CHECK1, CHECK2/7)CCC, PCINF 
RUN HETEROGENEITY + FLAT PROFILE OF INFECTIVITY WITH EQUAL STAGES 
A S1IT. K-1 
A S21T. K=6 
A S31T. K=1 
RUN HETEROGENEITY+FLAT PROFILE OF INFECTIVITY WITH STAGES 1: 6: 1 YRS 
C PIPPS1=0.06 
C PIPPS2=0 
C PIPPS3=0.12 
RUN U-SHAPED PROFILE OF INFECTIVITY 
A MNDPI. K=TABHL(MNDPT1, TIME. K, 1986,1987.25,0.25) 
T MNDPT1=1/0.9/0.8/0.7/0.6/0.5 
A MNDP2. K=TABHL(MNDPT2, TIME. K, 1986,1987.25,0.25) 
T MNDPT2=6/5.4/4.8/4.2/3.6/3 
A MNDP3. K=TABHL(MNDPT3, TIME. K, 1986,1987.25,0.25) 
T MNDPT3=36/32.6/29.25/25.8/22.5/15.75 
D MNDPT1=(P/(P*YRS)) Mean Number of Different Partners: 
* Table of values for stratum 1 
D MNDPT2=(P/(P*YRS)) Mean Number of Different Partners: 
* Table of values for stratum 2 
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D MNDPT3-(P/(P*YRS)) Mean Number of Different Partnerst 
* Table of values for stratum 3 
RUN U-SHAPED PROFILE OF INFECTIVITY & CHANGING BEHAVIOUR 
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5 MODELLING A CORPORATE COLLAPSE: THE CASE OF LAKER AIRWAYS 
5.1 Introduction 
On 5 February 1982 there occurred in the United Kingdom a com- 
pany collapse which was of major economic significance in the 
aviation industry and which came accompanied by a certain 
amount of human suffering. On that day, Laker Airways crashed 
with, it is said, debts in excess of E200m. As a firm selling 
direct to the public, hardly anyone in the U. K. had not heard 
of Laker Airways which, despite considerable pressure from the 
rival national carriers and even obstructionist policies by 
governments, had grown to such an extent that it offered 
serious competition to the other larger airlines on the 
normally prosperous N. Atlantic route. 
But its collapse hit many of the people who were benefitting 
from Laker's idea of making it possible to fly to popular 
destinations at extremely low prices. Besides those holding 
Skytrain (the name Laker gave to the operation) tickets which 
instantly become worthless, others suffered the disappointment 
of having their outbound flight cut short; a DC-10 routing up 
over Scotland before turning to head over the Atlantic was cal- 
led back to Gatwick airport as was an Airbus full of 
holidaymakers half way to Tenerife. 
For those interested in the design of business PolicYq 
particularly financial policy, this corporate failure is an 
admirable case study which exhibits important features. The 
purpose of the model described below is to extract some of 
these features by explaining what happened and why it happened. 
Laker need not have failed; there is no doubting that. Some 
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causal effects on Laker's financial position were exogenous, 
being associated with the economic environment. Yet these 
influences could possibly have been accommodated had they not 
compounded the difficulties ensuing from his other policies, 
particularly the speed of growth of the firm. 
The model below describes the essential features of what hap- 
pened. It is not based on material gleaned from academic jour- 
nals but rather from quality newspapers (Economist, 1982a-c; 
Guardian, 1982a-c; Observer, 1982), Extel Unquoted Companies 
Services (1982) and a book written in popular style by two 
journalists (Eglin and Ritchie, 1982). The need to resort to 
these sources was unavoidable; they were the only sources 
available which contained any detail on the reasons for the 
collapse. However, it is often the case that material 
contained in quality newspapers and business magazines embodies 
essential information which enables the analyst to put together 
a useful dynamic model. 
After discussion of the model, comment is made on the utility 
of system dynamics for illustration of a real life case study 
on policy design and consideration is given to what Laker might 
have done to improve his position. 
5.2 The Model 
The purpose of the model does not extend to reproducing the 
published accounts and balance sheets with a high degree of 
accuracy, although relevant variables from the company reports 
are included. It is felt that in the working model such 
variables exhibit values not totally out of line with the 
accounts. In any case, the official accounts for the final two 
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critical years of operations are not available. The firm 
crashed almost two months away from its 1981-82 year end and at 
that time the return for the 1980-81 financial year still had 
not been made. The last published return (for 1979-80) was 
made on 21 January 1981. 
Figure 5.1 shows the influence diagram for the overall system 
of interest. 
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Figure 5.1 Influence diagram for the model 
Capacity expansion drives the model. Laker expanded markedly 
over the years 1977-81 to become the fifth largest carrier on 
the transatlantic route. He did not exhibit a cautionary 
approach: with the low fares being charged he could fill his 
planes easily, especially during the peak Summer travel season. 
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He started with three wide-bodied DC-109s in 1977 and finished 
up owning around fifteen such jets including three Eýropean 
airbuses. 
All of the new aircraft were financed by long term borrowing 
using the planes themselves as collateral. In the expansionary 
market at the time (and with the need to maintain the order 
books of national aircraft manufacturers) Laker found little 
trouble in persuading banks in America and Europe to lend him 
the money. However, these loans had to be repaid over ten 
years and during such a long period of time it is normal for an 
economic system to exhibit at least one, more probably two, 
cycles of activity (Lunt, 1975; Shearer, 1984). Laker did not 
survive the first downturn. 
The diagram reflects the importance of the exchange rate to 
Laker. All his long term borrowing was denominated in dollars 
as were his fuel contracts. Thus the firm became progressively 
more exposed as the pound: dollar exchange rate fell steeply 
during 1981. This affected both repayments and interest on 
long term loans. 
Loop 1 depicts how short term borrowing helped when cash became 
scarce, mainly during the final years of Laker's operations. 
But any form of borrowing involves repayments (loop 2) and 
interest (loop 3) and so is not something that can be thought 
of as the basis for a sound financial policy. 
Loop 4 is a manifestation of a problem which any firm 
experiencing financial difficulties must dread, especially one 
like Laker which was providing a service to the public at 
large. It is the effect of rumour. In Laker's case, travel 
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agents gradually became aware that they were dealing with an 
airline in a precarious position. Naturally, to protect their 
own and their client's interests they withheld revenue due to 
Laker until the very last minute. For Laker this extended 
delay in receiving revenue merely amplified his already weak 
financial position. 
Travel agents had a role to play in the other feedback loop 
(loop 5) which was to have a major impact on Laker's ability to 
keep going; they could advise clients not to travel with Laker 
Airways. Not unnaturally, because of his spectacular growth 
(something like 50% per annum over four years), Laker came in 
for stiff competition from much larger carriers who were able 
to withstand offering cut price fares. Generally during 1981 
the market for overseas travel was softening with increasing 
unemployment in the UK and a depreciating currency. The result 
was, for the first time Laker was operational on the UK - USA 
route, all the airlines were fighting over a diminishing 
market. The larger carriers started offering- fares that 
matched or even undercut what Laker was charging. (Whether 
they did so in order to drive Laker out of business or in the 
spirit of free competition was the subject of a subsequent 
legal action by Laker. ) His firm could not withstand this fac- 
tor allied to the normal seasonal downturn and a Receiver was 
called in on 5 February 1982. 
5.3 Results from the Hodel 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the likely passenger demand experienced 
by Laker. Particularly during the Summer months it was up to 
available capacity. The fall off in demand in 1981-82 reflects 
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the direcý actions of competitors coupled with the more 
insidious effects of the fall in the pound against the dollar. 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1952 
year 
Passenger Demand (annual rate)*10*6 
Rate of Change of Average Passenger Demand*10*6 
Passenger capacity (seats)*10*6 
1983 
Figure 5.2 Passenger demand and capacity expansion 
The effects of the slowdown in demand were obvious. Figure 
5.3, depicting income and overall expenditure, shows a classic 
"twin squeeze" on company cash flow. As income was falling off 
(for the reasons outlined above and because travel agents were 
withholding payments due to Laker) expenditure was rising. 
MODEL OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
BASE MOD13. - WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 
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MODEL OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
BASE MODEL -- WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
year% 
II 
Income (1/yr) *10'8 
Overall ExPenditUre (L/yr)*10'8 
Figure 5.3 Laker's increasing expenditure simultaneous with 
decreasing income 
Borrowing was being undertaken, in part, to sustain repayment 
of earlier debt. The rapid depreciation of sterling was push- 
ing up both debt repayments and fuel costs denominated in dol- 
lars and a rise in bank Base Rate in late 1981 compounded the 
problems surrounding short term debt. The convolution of these 
two effects on the cash position of Laker Airways was alarming 
(figure 5.4). 
An interesting topical analogy is with the (now frequent) 
drought situations in this country. The reason f or the com- 
plete elimination of an inflow of water into the nation"s 
reservoirs (cloudless skies) is of itself the reason why the 
outflow steps up. People take more frequent showers and desire 
to water their wilting garden lawns and flowers. In these cir- 
cumstances, the intervening level variable (here literally the 
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reservoir water level) can fall extremely rapidly. Hence the 
introduction of bans on the use of hosepipes. 
The only difference between the situation Laker found itself in 
and the occurrence of a drought is that in the Laker case the 
causes of the increasing expenditure (cash outflow) were 
virtually simultaneously effecting a fall-off in revenue (cash 
inflow). In the drought situation the linkage is reversed; the 
falling inflow is simultaneously causing the rising outflow. 
However, the dramatic effect on the intervening level variable 
is the same. 
MODEL OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
BASE MODEL -- WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 
0. 
ýz 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Year 
Cash Balances (&)*10'7 
Figure 5.4 Laker2s cash-balances 
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5.4 The Model as a Teaching Tool 
The case study is a popular tool for the teaching of business 
management. Pioneered at Harvard in the 1960's its use has 
spread worldwide. In the United Kingdom the Case Clearing 
House at Cranfield Institute of Technology holds many hundreds 
of cases which individual institutions can subscribe for. Few 
business schools eschew the use of case studies in courses on 
Corporate Strategy or Business Policy. A popular text 
associated with such courses is that by Christensen, Andrews 
and Bower (1987) now in its sixth edition. It was published 
originally in 1965. 
Student groups typically spend several days studying the case 
material and then make a formal presentation to their tutor as 
to how they have analysed the 'scenario' they have been con- 
fronted with and, more pertinently, what they would have done 
in the same situation. It is at this point that the traditional 
case study approach loses its impact. There are no means of 
introducing a dynamic into the situation. Arguments about the 
effectiveness of the students9 chosen course of action are hol- 
low unless there is some way of putting hypotheses to the test. 
With a computer simulation model those students are now at 
liberty to directly test out their chosen policies. This may 
transfer argument onto the adequacy of the model as a 
representation of the real life system. Nonetheless it is 
argued that this process, of itselfo will improve their under- 
standing of the complexities of business policy design far more 
potently than will a group discussion. Cognitive improvements 
in skills are of more substantial long term benefit. 
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It will also make the learning process more exciting. Apart 
from the vivid impact of the graphical results, a teaching tool 
is available which can be used to arbitrate on the various 
(possibly conflicting) policies coming out of the 
deliberations. There is now a better way of extracting 
relevant conclusions for policy design. The whole exercise is 
more fulfilling; more of a meaningful experience and less of an 
academic debate about what might have been. 
This is not the first time that a system dynamics model has 
been formulated for the purpose of charting and evaluating a 
case study of a real-life organisation. Coincidentally, this 
earlier work also involved the rise and fall of a private 
corporation. In the 1970's Hall (1976) developed a system 
dynamics model reflecting a 20-year history of the old Saturday 
Evening Post, at one time one of the most profitable weekly 
magazines in the United States. After almost a decade of dwin- 
dling fortunes, it ceased publication in January 1969. 
The Laker Airways case is obviously one which, primarily, has a 
strong financial undercurrent and it could be most profitably 
employed in the teaching of corporate financial policymaking. 
Laker induced his company into a financial condition 
sustainable only in a growing market. His chosen policy of 
rapid expansion based largely on borrowed money hemmed him in. 
It is perhaps a neat example of the concept of lorganisational 
origamis posited by Hall (1984). Laker's financial straight- 
jacket might be included in a discussion of gearing ratios 
prefaced by consideration of material in Wright's book (1980) 
on financial management from which the following quote is 
extracted (p. 156). 
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11 ...... Overborrowing ...... is not untypical of 
the business which is started on a shoestring by 
one or two individuals with no capital and partly 
explains their high failure rate. The years until 
profit retentions have considerably broadened their 
equity base are critical. " 
Borrowing per se is not a poor policy. But continuous borrow- 
ing without consideration of possible vulnerability in a 
cyclical downturn is. Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the effect of a 
policy of slower growth. In fact, this merely eliminates the 
spurts in Laker9s borrowing which occurred in 1980 and 1981 
when he purchased over ten new jets. The results suggest a 
containable situation and one that was likely to see the firm 
through the subsequent downturn. 
MODEL OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
Comparison of Cash Balances 
I 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Year 
BASE MODEL - WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (J)*10'7 
STEADY GROWTH IN SIZE OF THE BUSINESS (20% P. B. ) W *10'7 
Figure 5.5 Comparison of cash balances under two rates of growth 
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1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Year 
BASE MODEL - WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (1)*10'8 
STEADY GROWTH IN SIZE OF THE BUSINESS (20% P. B. ) (, t)*10^8 
Figure 5.6 Comparison of long term debt under two rates of growth 
In this context it is worth recording a recent comment by 
Richard Branson founder of Virgin Atlantic, another example of 
a small airline offering competitively priced tickets to 
popular destinations and which has emerged since Laker9s 
demise. He stated: 
"Airlines should be kept small and personal. We 
want no more than 10 major routes and a dozen 747 
planes. If ever I get bigger, hold my head under 
cold water. I hope I have learnt from Laker's 
mistakes. " 
Whether he has learnt from all of Laker9s mistakes remains to 
be seen. Virgin Atlantic also has a significant amount of debt 
at the present time, just when the economic cycle is taking a 
turn for the worse. 
MODEL-OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
Comparison of Long Term Debt 
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An exogenous factor which was important for Laker's financial 
policy was the rate of exchange of the dollar to the pound. 
While this was high, Laker enjoyed the benefits of lower long 
term debt repayments and fuel costs. Figure 5.7 illustrates a 
situation that could never have happened. Here is shown the' 
consequences for long term debt repayment of a constant rate of 
exchange of 2.2 dollars to the pound. For the student of 
financial policy though it offers a desirable method of projec- 
ting the comparative effect of anticipating using an average 
(as financial managers are apt to do) and anticipating by 
allowing for some dynamics around that average. 
MODEL OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
Effect on Long Term Debt Repayments of no fluctuations In the exchange rate 
1.4- 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Year 
BASE MODEL - WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (1/yr)*10'7 
EXCHANGE RATE HELD AT A CONSTANT 2.2 $ TO THE I U/yr)*10'7 
Figure 5.7 Long Term Debt Repayment under (i) actual and 
(ii) constant rates of exchange 
Of course back in 1977 the Laker management would not have 
known the actual figures (plotted as a comparator in figure 
5.7) but a number of plausible cycles around the assumed 
average could have been evaluated easily using the model and in 
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this way a prudent value to specify for currency fluctuation 
reserves would have been available. Recognition of the timing 
of the previous exchange rate downturn (1976) might have 
indicated the need for substantial currency fluctuation reser- 
ves in the early 1980's. This possibility, of itself, ought to 
have cautioned the firm against an exposed debt structure 
around that time. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The foregoing has demonstrated the need to enhance the teaching 
of business policy by recourse to a model of a real life case 
study. While the traditional (reasoned discussion) case study 
approach has some merit, it does tend to perpetuate the 
distinctly non-quantitative approach to policy design which is 
quite widespread. Perhaps more models of this nature will help 
persuade those responsible for strategic policy that the com- 
puter really can help them animate their thinking. 
page 323 
REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 5 
CR CHRISTENSEN, KR ANDREWS and JL BOWER (1987) "Business Policy: 
Text and Cases", 4th Edn., RD Irwin, Illinois. 
ECONOMIST (1982a) "The Laker Legacy", 13 February. 
ECONOMIST (1982b) "Sir Freddie's creditors join the used aircraft 
business", 13 February. 
ECONOMIST (1982c) "Little man's big debts", 13 February. 
R EGLIN and B RITCHIE (1982) "Fly Me I'm Freddiel".. 
Futura Macdonald & Co., London. 
EXTEL UNQUOTED COMPANIES SERVICE (1982) Laker Airways 
(International) Ltd; LAA-Q 51, updated to 10 February. 
GUARDIAN (1982a) 116,000 stranded as Laker crashes owing E210mll, 
6 February. 
GUARDIAN (1982b) "Banks and airlines fear IdominoP effect from 
Laker Airways crath", 6 February. 
GUARDIAN (1982c) "The Laker legend - and legacy", 6 February. 
RI HALL (1976) "A System Pathology of an Organisation: the Rise 
and Fall of the old Saturday Evening Post", Administrative science 
Quarterly, 21,185-211. 
RI HALL (1984) "The Natural Logic of Management Policy Making: 
its implications for the Survival of an Organisation". 
Management Science, 30,905-927. 
ST LUNT (1975) "Trade cycling in U. K. industry", 
Measurement and Control, 8,152-156. 
OBSERVER 
- 
(1982) "Laker's last standby", 7 February. 
PR SHEARER (1984) "Cycles in business planning", Transactions 
of the institute of Measurement and Control, 6,27-32. 
MG WRIGHT (1980) "Financial Management", 2nd Edn., McGraw Hill, 
London. 
page 324 
LISTING OF THE MODEL 
* MODEL OF THE COLLAPSE OF LAKER AIRWAYS ON 5 FEBRUARY 1982 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE PASSENGER DEMAND 
NOTE 
NOTE 
AP- DEM. K=(AVP-DEM. K+AMPSD. K*SIN(2*PI*(TIME. K-(STIME+PSLS))/SF))* 
X MCOMP. K 
C PI=3.141592654 
C SF-1 
C PSLS=0.125 
A AMPSD. K-(PCAP. K-AVP-DEM. K) 
L AVP_DEM. K=AVP_DEM. J+DT*RCAVP_DEM. JK 
N AVP_DEM=30OE3 
R RCAVP-DEM. KL=AVP-DEM. K*PCAPGR. K*MEXCH. K 
A MEXCH. K=TABLE(MEXCHT, PREXCH. K, 1.5,2.5,0.125) 
T MEXCHT=0.2/0.28/0.36/0.47/0.6/0.8/1.08/1.44/2 
A PREXCH. K=SMOOTH(REXCH. K, TPCEXCH) 
C TPCEXCH=0.25 
A MCOMP. K=TABHL(MCOMPT, SPCAP. K, 0.5E6,1.2E6, O. lE6) 
T MCOMPT=1/1/0.93/0.78/0.51/0.29/0.15/0.13 
A SPCAP. K=SMOOTH(PCAP. K, TCRI, G) 
C TCRLG=0.5 
A REXCH. K=TABLE(REXCHT, TIME. K, 1977.25,1982.25,1/12) 
T REXCHT=9EXCH. DAT9 External file 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE PASSENGER CAPACITY 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L PCAP. K=PCAP. J+DT*CAPEXP. JK 
N PCAP-CAP INIT 
C CAP INIT;; 3OOE3 
R CAPEXP. KL=PCAP. K*PCAPGR. K 
A PCAPGR. K-PCAPGR_INIT+STEP(ACAPGR19TACAPGR1)+STEP(ACAPGR2, TACAPGRZ) 
C PCAPGR INIT-0.2 
CP ACAPGR1-0.15 
C TACAPGR1=1980.25 
CP ACAPGR2-0.1 
C TACAPGR2=1981 
S LF. K=P-DEM. K/PCAP. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE CASH FLOWS & CASH BALANCES 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L CB. K=CB. J+DT*(P_REV-RL. JK+STL. JK-INT_PAY. JK-LTDR_PND. JK-STDR. JK 
X -OPEXP. JK) 
N CB=7E6 
S NCF. K=P 
- 
REV 
- 
RL. KL+STL. KL-INT_PAY. KL-LTDR_PND. KL-STDR. KL-OPEXP. KL 
AP REV. K=P DEM. K*AVFARE 
C AVFARE=100 
page 325 
RP- REV 
- 
RL. KL-DELAY3(P-REV. JK, PAY-DEL. K) 
A PAY_DEL. K=TABXT(PAY_DELT, SCB. K, -3E6, lE6, lE6) 
T PAY 
- 
DELT=1/0.46/0.3/0.25/0.25 
A SCB. K-SMOOTH(CB. K, DRTLF) 
C DRTLF=0.25 
R OPEXP. KL=PCAP. K*OCPS. K 
A OCPS. K=FCPS/REXCH. K+NFCPS 
C FCPS=90 
C NFCPS=25 
S INCOME. K=P REV RL. KL 
S EXPEND. K=INT_PAY. KL+LTDR_PND. KL+STDR. KL+OPEXP. KL 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE LOANS & DEBT (LONG TERM AND SHORT TERM) 
NOTE 
NOTE 
L LTDEBT. K=LTDEBT. J+DT*(LTL. JK-LTDR. JK) 
N LTDEBT=20E6 
R LTL. KL=CAPEXP. KL*CCWBA/AACWBA 
A CCWBA. K=CCD 
C CCD=45E6 
C AACWBA=172500 
R LTDR. KL=LTDEBT. K/RTLTDEBT 
C RTLTDEBT-10 
R LTDR 
- 
PND. KL-LTDEBT. K*(l/REXCH. K)/RTLTDEBT 
R INT 
- 
PAY. KL=LTDEBT. K*IRLTDEBT/(100*REXCH. K)+STDEBT. K*IRSTDEBT. K/100 
C IRLTDEBT=10.2 
S GEAR_R. K-TOTDEBT. K/(EQUITY+RESERVES) 
C EQUITY-5E6 
C RESERVES=20E6 
A IRSTDEBT. K=TABLE(IRSTDEBTT, TIME. K, 1977.25,1982.25,1/12) 
T IRSTDEBTT=9INT. DATI External file 
L STDEBT. K-STDEBT. J+DT*(STL. JK-STDR. JK) 
N STDEBT=50OE3 
R STDR. KL=STDEBT. K/RTSTDEBT 
C RTSTDEBT=2 
R STL. KL=ABS(MIN(CB. K/TECD, ZEROSTL)) 
C TECD=1 
C ZEROSTL-O 
A TOTDEBT. K=LTDEBT. K/REXCH. K+STDEBT. K 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE DEFINITION STATEMENTS 
NOTE 
NOTE P= Passengers (seats in the context of capacity) 
NOTE 
NOTE PS - Pounds(E) Sterling 
NOTE 
NOTE A- Aircraft 
NOTE 
D AACWBA=(p/(YR*A)) Average Annual Capacity of a Wide 
* Bodied Aircraft 
D ACAPGR1=(l/YR) Additional CAPacity Growth Rate phase 1 
D ACAPGR2=(l/YR) Additional CAPacity Growth Rate phase 2 
D AMPSD=(P/YR) AMPlitude of Seasonality in Demand 
D AVFARE=(PS/P) AVerage FARE paid by passengers 
D AVP 
- 
DEM-(P/YR) AVerage Passenger DEMand 
D CAPEXP=(P/(YR*YR)) CAPacity Mansion 
D CAP_INIT=(P/YR) CAPacity INITially 
D CB=(PS) Cash Balances 
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D CCD=($/A) Capital Cost in Dollars 
D CCWBA-($/A) Capital Cost of a Wide Bodied Aircraft 
D DRTLF=(YR) Delay in Response by Travel trade to Laker's 
* Financial position 
D DT=(YR) simulation time step 
D EQUITY=(PS) EQUITY held by the company 
D EXPEND=(PS/YR) overall EXPENDiture 
D FCPS=($/P) Fuel Cost Per Seat (passenger) 
D GEAR_R-(l) GEARing Ratio 
D INCOME=(PS/YR) overall INCOME 
D INT_PAY=(PS/YR) INTerest PAYments 
D IRLTDEBT=(l/YR) Interest Rate on Long Term DEBT 
D IRSTDEBT=(l/YR) Interest Rate on Short Term DEBT 
D IRSTDEBTT=(l/YR) Interest Rate on Short Term DEBT: 
* Table of values 
D LENGTH=(YR) duration of the simulation 
D LF=(I) Load Factor 
D LTDEBT=($) Long Term DEBT 
D LTDR=($/YR) Long Term Debt Repayment 
D LTDR_PND=(PS/YR) Long Term Debt Repayment in PouNDs 
D LTL=($/YR) Long Term Lending 
D MCOMP=(I) Multiplier from effect of actions of COMPetitors 
D MCOMPT-(1) Multiplier from effect of actions of COMPetitors: 
* Table of values 
D MEXCH=(1) Multiplier from effect of EXCHange rate 
D MEXCHT-(I) Multiplier from effect of EXCHange rate: 
* Table of values 
D NCF=(PS/YR) Net Cash Flow 
D NFCPS=(PS/P) Non-Fuel Costs Per Seat (passenger) 
D OCPS-(PS/P) Operating Cost Per Seat 
D OPEXP=(PS/YR) OPerating EXPenditure 
D PAY_DEL=(YR) PAYments DELay by travel trade 
D PAY 
- 
DELT=(YR) PAYments DELay by travel trade: Table of values 
D PCAP=(P/YR) Passenger CAPacity 
D PCAPGR-(l/YR) Passenger CAPacity Growth Rate 
D PCAPGR_INIT=(I/YR) Passenger CAPacity Growth Rate INITially 
DP- DEM=(P/YR) Passenger DEMand 
D Pi-(1) dimensionless constant 
D PREXCH-($/PS) Perceived Rate of EXCHange by travel customers 
DP REV=(PS/YR) Passenger REVenue 
DP REV 
- 
RL=(PS/YR) Passenger REVenue Received by Laker's bank 
D PRTPER-(YR) PRinTing PERiod 
D PSLS-(YR) Phase Shift for Laker's Seasonality 
D RCAVP_DEM=(P/(YR*YR)) Rate of Change of AVerage Passenger DEMand 
D RESERVES-(PS) RESERVES accumulated from previous profits 
J) Rate of EXCHange -$ to E 
D REXCHT-($/PS) Rate of EXCHange: Table of 
D RTLTDEBT-(YR) Repayment Term on Long Term 
D RTSTDEBT-(YR) Repayment Term on Short Ter 
D SCB=(PS) Smoothed Cash Balances 
D SF=(YR) Seasonality Factor 
D SPCAP=(P/YR) Smoothed Passenger CAPacity 
D STDEBT=(PS) Short Term DEBT 
D STDR=(PS/YR) Short Term Debt Repayments 
D STIME=(YR) Start TIME for the simulation 
D STL=(PS/YR) Short Term Lending 
values 
DEBT 
m DEBT 
Growth Rate phase 1 
Growth Rate phase 2 
to Laker9s Growth 
D TACAPGR1-(YR) Time of Additional CAPacity 
D TACAPGR2=(YR) Time of Additional CAPacity 
D TCRLG-(YR) Time for Competitors to Respond 
D TECD-(YR) Time to Eliminate Cash Deficit 
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D TIME-(YR) years -----> 
D TOTDEBT-(PS) TOTal DEBT 
D TPCEXCH-(YR) Time to Perceive Changes in the EXCHange rate 
D ZEROSTL=(PS/YR) ZERO Short Term Lending 
NOTE 
NOTE 
NOTE OUTPUT CONTROL STATEMENTS 
NOTE 
NOTE 
N TIME=STIME 
C STIME=1977.25 
C DT=0.0625 
C LENGTH=5 
C PRTPER=0.5 
PRINT 1)P_DEM, AVP_DEM, RCAVP_DEM, AMPSD, LF 
PRINT 2)MEXCH, MCOMP, REXCH, PREXCH, INCOME, EXPEND 
PRINT 3)PCAP, SPCAP, CAPEXT, PCAPGR 
PRINT 4)NCF, P_REV, STL, INT_PAY, LTDR_PND, OPEXP, STDR 
PRINT 5)P_REV 
- 
RL, PAY 
- 
DEL, OPEXP, OCPS, CB, SCB 
PRINT 6)LTDEBT, LTL, LTDR, LTDR_PND, GEAR 
-R PRINT 7)IRSTDEBT, STDEBT, STL, TOTDEBT 
RUN BASE MODEL -- WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 
C ACAPGR1-0 
C ACAPGR2=0 
RUN STEADY GROWTH AT 20% PER ANNUM 
T REXCHT=61*2.2 
RUN EXCHANGE RATE AT 2.2 DOLLARS TO THE POUND 
